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Glossary of Russian terms and Abbreviations
Aktiv-Communist Party activists 
CC (TsK)-Central Committee; Tsentral’nyi komitet
CPSU (KPSS)-Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Kommunisticheskaya partiya sovetskogo 
soyuza
Edinonachalie-single officer command
Gorkom-Communist Party City Committee
GRU-Army intelligence services; Glavnoe razvedyvatel’noe upravlenie general’nogo shtaba
GPU-Main Political Administration; Glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie
ICBM-Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRBM-Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
KGB-Committee on State Security; Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti 
MRBM-Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MVD-Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCMD-North Caucasian Military District
NEVZ-Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Works
NKVD-People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs; Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del
Oblast’-province
SAC-Strategic Air Command (USA)
SAM-Surface-to-air Missile
SLBM-Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
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SRF (RVSN)-Strategic Rocket Forces; Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznecheniya
USSR-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Soyuz sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik
WTO-Warsaw Treaty Organisation; Warsaw Pact
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Introduction
 Structure, organisation, an idea of esprit de corps, and hierarchy characterised the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).  Throughout the history of the Soviet Union only 
the Soviet Armed Forces had the potential to rival the CPSU in those qualities and were able to 
be an organised locus for potential opposition.  A sense of professionalism was instilled in the 
Soviet Armed Forces, not only from those ‘Red Commanders’ of the Revolution and Civil War, 
but also from those junior, noncommissioned officers who were holdovers from the tsarist 
regime.  The primary focus of this study is on the immediate post-Stalinist era while Nikita 
Khrushchev was First Secretary of the CPSU.  Bridled by Stalin’s hold over strategic and armed 
forces policy, after his death, the Soviet Armed Forces became an institution that illustrated a 
strong sense of military professionalism, while at the same time serving the Soviet regime.  
 With a focus on five case studies that occurred during the Khrushchev era 1953-1964, 
this thesis argues that the military attempted to remain apolitical throughout the 1950s and 
1960s.  Previous studies of Soviet civil-military relations have focused on the levels of 
cooperation or competition between the CPSU and the Soviet armed forces.  This study argues 
however, that the ebb and flow of that relationship can be explained by the selection of 
personalities, or agents, by Khrushchev to posts of military command.  Officers were promoted 
based on several factors.  However, Khrushchev increasingly promoted officers to positions of 
command who he deemed were more personally loyal to him and were willing to put that loyalty 
above their duty to the Soviet armed forces.  Khrushchev chose personal loyalty over an officer’s 
military professionalism and expertise when appointing them to posts at the Ministry of Defence, 
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the Soviet General Staff, and to the command posts in the branches of the Soviet military and 
key military districts around the Soviet Union.
Historical Background, 1917-1941
 The Bolshevik Party strove to create a military distinct from the Russian Imperial army, 
moreover distinct from the Western traditional model.  In 1917, the Bolshevik Party supported 
the demobilisation of a traditional, standing army; they favoured the reliance for defence on the 
idea of a popular militia force along territorial lines.  Driven by ideology, the decision to forego a 
standing army was quickly scrapped out of realist necessity.  Still embroiled in war against the 
Germans, until the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, Bolshevik Russia 
needed a standing army capable of defending the nation.  While fighting against the German 
army, Bolshevik forces had simultaneously to fight against other foreign interventionists and a 
civil war. Necessity trumped ideological concerns for the Bolshevik elite, many of whom had not 
served in the military.  In March 1918, Lenin tasked Leon Trotsky with creating a professional 
military force to defend the young Soviet state.  Quickly forming an army along traditional lines, 
Trotsky's most controversial decision “was his reliance on former tsarist officers to train and 
even lead units of the Red Army.”1  Other Bolshevik leaders scorned the use of such class 
enemies.
 Georgii Zhukov served under Tsar Nicholas II in the capacity of a noncommissioned 
officer.  From the beginning of his service to the new Bolshevik government as a 
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1 Roger Reese, The Soviet Military Experience, A History of the Soviet Army, 1917-1991 (London: Routledge, 
2000), 3.
noncommissioned officer, Zhukov was not seen as suspicious as general officers; however, that 
stigma for some would follow throughout their careers.  Noncommissioned officers were 
perceived by the Bolsheviks as class allies whereas general officers from the former tsarist forces 
were tainted with a bourgeois background.  Bolshevik leaders believed those noncommissioned 
officers were better suited, from a standpoint of class, to serve in the new Bolshevik armed 
forces.  Despite the class differences, approximately 8,000 former tsarist officers ‘willingly put 
themselves at the disposal of the Soviet Republic out of feelings of patriotism - not support for 
the revolution.’2  Feelings of duty, patriotism, and military professionalism, many officers and 
noncommissioned officers from the tsarist military served the Soviet government.  Regardless of 
class background, officers served whatever authorities governed the newly formed Soviet state.  
Taking these ideas forward, we can see their implications during the Khrushchev era in Zhukov’s 
career, but also in some officers decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the debates over 
strategy, and during events at Novocherkassk.  
 Developments that changed the face of warfare and tactics had been difficult subjects to 
discuss in the Soviet Union.  Mikhail Tukhachevskii, one of the former tsarist officer who served 
the in the Red Army openly criticised other officers’ support of a defensive doctrine for the 
Soviet Union in the interwar period.  While other officers advocated a defensive posture for the 
Red Army, Tukhachevskii advised for an offensive strategy based on armoured infantry, 
maneuver, and encirclement.  It was not until the late 1920s that the Red Army sufficiently 
adopted modern warfare strategies and techniques.  Larger mechanised forces became a primary 
component of the Red Army.  Internal debates had been a factor within the Soviet armed forces 
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since its inception.  Should the Soviet Union develop a defensive or offensive military doctrine?  
What was the role of modern weapons, namely tanks, in warfare?  How was new technology to 
be integrated into the Soviet system?  These questions were asked and debated throughout the 
interwar period and were a driving debate throughout the Khrushchev era.  Although 
Tukhachevskii was liquidated in the purges of the military in 1937, his ideas were again pertinent 
when the military made changes to doctrine, strategy, and tactics through the Second World War.  
After World War II the debate shifted from the role of tanks in modern warfare to the role of 
nuclear weapons and their attendant delivery systems in modern warfare.
 Civil-military relations during the Khrushchev era, 1953-1964, were fluid, changing as 
the officers holding high military positions were appointed and replaced.  However, the military 
was never in direct opposition to the CPSU’s leadership of the Soviet Union.  As time 
progressed, the military became more professionally aware of their status in society but also 
fiercely protective of those areas believed to be within their sole purview.  Each side, the CPSU 
and the Soviet armed forces, believed that certain facets of their relationship to be the sole 
purview of their domain.  CPSU officials, namely Khrushchev, saw the Party to be the authority 
in regard to overall military doctrine and strategy.  Questions arising on what type, defensive or 
offensive, of force and conduct of war the Soviet Union would pursue were to be answered by 
the Party.  Those decisions were then to be implemented by the armed forces of the USSR.  The 
military’s role in foreign and domestic affairs were also to be dictated by the Party.  Conversely, 
the military, specifically the high command saw it as their duty to protect their soldiers.  When 
details of pay, pensions, housing, and tactics arose, they were to be seen as the authority, with the  
knowledge to correctly advise the CPSU on courses of action.  Each side saw their purviews as 
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important areas - certainly the military became an interest group when advocating for better 
treatment of retirees, and their role in civilian protests.  Skilling and Griffiths argue that interest 
group experts and specialists, as the military can been seen, had a greater voice in decision 
making in the 1950s and 1960s.3  As will be argued below, the military’s role as an interest group 
increased when Zhukov was named to the Presidium and his successors were increasingly asked 
for their counsel and expert opinions at meetings of the Party leadership.  When those domains 
were believed to be impinged on, the relationship between the parties became stressed.  That can 
be seen not only in the arguments over military doctrine and strategy but also during the events 
of the Novocherkassk uprising in June 1962.  Khrushchev tactic was to promote officers believed 
to be more inclined to his policies so that the line between the Party’s domain and military’s 
purview concerning armed forces policies might be blurred.  By 1962, Khrushchev’s tactic of 
blurring the military-Party distinction had failed; military officers, even below the General Staff 
and Ministry of Defence level were outwardly questioning policies pursued by the Khrushchev 
Presidium.
 Ever increasing throughout the Khrushchev era was a sense of military professionalism 
within the Soviet officer corps.  Samuel Huntington’s seminal work on civil-military relations, 
The Soldier and the State, defined military professionalism with three facets: expertise, 
responsibility, and corporateness.4  Huntington defined the military professional, specifically the 
officer corps, as holding those three characteristics.  His work is largely concerned with the 
experience of the US and other Western militaries and was not written with specific reference to 
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3 H. Gordon Skillings and Franklyn Griffiths, editors, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton; Princeton 
University Press, 1971), 10.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 8-10.
the Soviet Union.  Huntington’s terms are his own.  Nonetheless, his ideas and definition of 
military professionalism are used in this study.  Those three facets can be seen throughout the 
cases examined below.  Expertise was held by the officer corps.  A centralised repository of 
military knowledge, the equation of education plus experience, created an objective standard of 
military competence.5  Expertise also has an academic branch.  Officers conducted research, 
studied previous experiences, and through writings, disseminated their findings.  From their 
expertise, officers were able to plan, organise, and direct the armed forces.6
 Huntington’s second facet was responsibility.  With their knowledge and expertise, an 
officer corps had the responsibility to use that expertise to serve society.  Their responsibility was 
the protection of society from outside security threats.  According to Huntington, that facet also 
has a moral component.  Not only did officers and the military have a responsibility to protect 
society, they had to have a moral consciousness.  Professionalism was knowing when to correctly  
and morally use their expertise.  The officer corps has the responsibility to use their knowledge 
and expertise to protect society.  Morally, they cannot use that expertise against society.7
 The third and final facet of military professionalism in Huntington’s model was 
corporateness.  Corporateness within the military equates to a sense of unity and cohesiveness.  
Discipline is essential.  Corporateness is an important criterion for the military to be considered a 
profession with its own set of norms and values.8    Corporateness encompassed the first two 
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facets and enabled the officer corps and military to hold a cohesive set of values, thoughts, and 
goals.
 This study will use Huntington’s definition of military professionalism to illustrate the 
increasing sense of professionalism within the Soviet armed forces from 1953 to 1964.  For the 
core group of officers studied within gained their primary education of military knowledge in the 
prewar years under Stalin and gained their experiences during the trials and successes of the 
Second World War.  The use of that expertise and acquired knowledge was tested and questioned 
throughout the Khrushchev era.  Technology and weapons developed tested assumptions on the 
conduct of war.  War could not be fought on the same tactics and lessons learned from the last 
war.  The responsibility to protect the nation from nuclear war increased; however, their moral 
responsibility was tested both in the Novocherkassk uprising and the Cuban operation.
Historiographical Study
 
 The historiographical discussion about Soviet civil-military relations has been focused on 
various theories on the interaction between the CPSU and the Soviet military leadership at the 
level of the institutions - the Party and military structures.  Previous theorist have taken a 
structural approach to the study of Soviet civil-military relations by focusing in the institutions of 
the CPSU and Soviet armed forces.  There are several theorists who have written on Soviet civil-
military relations.  Each has focused their writing on a specific period, often the years 
immediately preceding the publishing of their major work.  The theories focused on the nature of 
the interaction between the CPSU and the Soviet military.  Was the relationship a zero sum game 
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as Roman Kolkowicz argued in 1967?  In 1998, William Odom, writing primarily on the 
Gorbachev era, saw the relationship as one of cooperation rather than a zero sum.  Timothy 
Colton (1979, 1990), while focused on the Brezhnev era, provided a synthesis of Kolkowicz and 
Odom’s ideas.  Colton viewed civil-military relations as a mix of cooperation and conflict.  
 More recently, Roger Reese has made the attempt “to humanise the discussion of an 
important Soviet institution.”  Reese strongly feels that the Soviet armed forces have been 
dishonoured by scholars as simply a “monolithic and faceless organisation.”9   Earlier theories 
have relied on a study at the macro level of interaction, between the institutions of the CPSU and 
the commanding bodies of the Soviet armed forces.  In 2005, Dale Herspring, while focused on 
the post-Soviet Russian state, saw civil-military relations as an example of divide and conquer.10  
Herspring viewed civil-military relations in the same light as Kolkowicz, as primarily a conflict 
driven relationship.  Herspring’s work chronicled the debate about civil-military relations along 
with his own conclusion on the nature of that relationship.  Reese’s publications have focused the 
rank and file of the Soviet armed forces and how civil-military relations affected those soldiers.
 According to Herspring and Kolkowicz, from the 1920s the military increasingly lost 
autonomy in conflict with its civilian authorities.  After World War II, the trend reversed itself 
until the 1960s and 1970s under Brezhnev when military autonomy reached an all-time high due 
to a more cooperative relationship.11  That reversal occurred during the Khrushchev era.  The 
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9 Roger Reese, Red Commanders, A Social History of the Soviet Army Officer Corps, 1918-1991 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2005), ix.
10 Dale Herspring, Russian Civil-Military Relations (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), x.  
Herspring focused his argument on the appointment of General A. Lebed as Russian National Security Advisor by 
President Boris Yeltsin.  Herspring argued Yeltsin played senior military officers off against one another throughout 
his tenure.
11 Herspring, xv.
important questions that arise from previous work on civil-military relations revolve around the 
nature of that relationship.  Was it as Herspring and Kolkowicz argued; or were they closer to 
that suggested by Odom and based on cooperation?  Can the relationship be better explained as 
the synthesis argued in the work of Timothy Colton?  
 Roman Kolkowicz’s book about  Soviet civil-military relations, published in the years 
immediately following Khrushchev’s ouster, is the first study, to draw conclusions based 
specifically on the Khrushchev era.  Cooperatively published by Princeton University Press and 
the RAND Corporation, Kolkowicz’s study is scholarly and offers a review of work published 
that might have policy implications for US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union.  Introducing 
his approach, Kolkowicz stated that his work is “a study of institutions in conflict.”12  Kolkowicz 
wrote that the ‘essential characteristics of authoritarian political systems are internal coercion 
and external militancy, and to achieve these postures the ruling elite must maintain powerful 
security organs and large military establishments.’13  While the internal security organs of the 
KGB and MVD were integrated into the structure of the CPSU and intensely loyal to the regime, 
the Soviet military, according to Kolkowicz would seek to dissociate itself from Party control.14  
While under the constraints of imposed Party controls, any perceived ideas or maneuvers on the 
part of the Soviet military gave the CPSU reason to question loyalty, thus causing the conflict-
driven relationship developed in Kolkowicz’s theory.  Kolkowicz argued that the Party would 
take any measures necessary to maintain control over the institution tasked with the defence of 
the Soviet state. 
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12 Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1967), vii.
13 Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, 8.
14 Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, 3.
 After a discussion of the historical background of the relationship between the CPSU and 
the Soviet armed forces, from the October Revolution until the death of Stalin, Kolkowicz 
demonstrated his theory of a conflict-driven relationship with a focus on the Khrushchev era.  
The case of Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union, was Kolkowicz’s 
primary example; however, the role of the GPU (Main Political Administration) permeated 
Kolkowicz’s work.  Tracking the political qualities and standards within the military was the 
primary task assigned to the GPU by the CPSU.  The GPU was to monitor as well as indoctrinate  
political ‘education’ in the Soviet armed forces.  It operated at all levels of organisation with the 
armed forces of the Soviet Union.  Kolkowicz argued that the role of the GPU in civil-military 
relations was a primary source of conflict.  While political control over the military was the 
primary concern of the GPU, it was not the primary source or the focus of civil-military 
relations.  Kolkowicz focused on Zhukov as a strong-willed military professional, which is a 
valid characterisation.  While that holds true in this study, Zhukov holds importance as the 
driving force of military professionalism.  Agreeing at times with Khrushchev, but fiercely 
arguing against him in others, above all Zhukov strove to protect the military’s areas of expertise 
in strategy, tactics, officer and rank and file housing, as well as training.  Those points are where 
this study disagrees with that of Kolkowicz.
 Odom concentrated his influential study on the Soviet armed forces as they collapsed side 
by side with the Soviet Union.  His work discussed the relationship between the army and the 
Party in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The construct of Odom’s study was 
focused on the bureaucratic nature of the Soviet armed forces, then continued to describe the 
military in the decade before its demise.  As Odom stated, “the Soviet Armed Forces went 
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complaining but passively into the dustbin of history, to use Trotsky's phrase.”15  Odom focused 
his study on the years of Gorbachev’s tenure at the helm of the Party.  He drew from historical 
examples from the Khrushchev era such as conventional force reduction to indicate change 
implemented during the Gorbachev regime.  From new government structures, military reforms, 
especially the economic reform, and arms reduction, Odom painted a picture of constant change, 
which led to flux within the military.  The primary impetus to oscillation within the echelons of 
military leadership was Gorbachev’s dogged pursuit of the linked goals of military doctrinal 
change and arms control.16  While the policy goals set forth by Gorbachev directly at the United 
Nations in December 1988 led to the resignation of the Chief of the General Staff, Odom’s thesis 
throughout the study is one of cooperation and a sense of unwillingness by the military to 
support the faltering Party after 1988.
  In a structure unparalleled in Western democracies, the Soviet military officers held 
positions as both Party members, and sometimes Party office holders, and as members of the 
state bureaucracy in the organisation of the Ministry of Defence.  Unlike Western democracies, 
the Soviet military decision making, or policy-making as Odom termed it, occurred behind the 
closed doors of the Politburo.  There were no open hearings in front of legislatures, no lengthy 
feasibility studies, only deliberations among close associates behind closed doors.
No Western political leader could bring a mere dozen of his close associates into a 
closed room, deliberate with them based only on materials prepared by the staff of 
his military department and reviewed only by his political staff, and then push 
through his preferred policy (occasionally over the objections of a disgruntled 
fellow official), a policy sometimes involving scores of billions of dollars, at a 
cost not even known by himself in terms of market value of the resources 
16
15 William Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1998), ix.
16 Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, 118.
involved.  Yet [that] is precisely how the general secretary of the party [sic] made 
military policy in the Politburo.17
Odom’s study did illustrate well the decision-making process when applied to the Khrushchev 
era.  The chapter on the Cuban Missile Crisis details such application of Odom’s theory. 
Nonetheless, Odom saw greater cooperation between the military and the Party than this body of 
work does.  While the decision-making process throughout the Khrushchev era paralleled that 
elucidated above, there was less cooperation.  Khrushchev was confronted with objections from 
both the military high command and within the highest echelons of Party.  Throughout, Odom 
draws the conclusion that the military served in an advisory capacity, which was accepted or 
disregarded at the whims of the Party leadership.  According to Odom’s theory, whether taken or 
not, the military’s recommendations were the limit of their decision-making powers.  The Party 
was the final arbiter of policy.  His conclusion is challenged below in the main case studies 
examined here but also specifically in the role of the military in the formulation of military 
strategy and doctrine.
 While Colton focused his thesis on the Brezhnev years, it is easily applicable to the 
Khrushchev era.  Colton’s work examined the years following Khrushchev’s removal from 
power until the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Colton’s study was primarily concerned with the 
GPU (glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie) and its role in Soviet civil-military relations.  Its role 
was the political education and indoctrination of the military rank and file, but also to maintain 
an ideological watch over military officers.  Colton saw the GPU as a ‘school of communism’ for 
the military.18  Nevertheless, through the 1950s and 1960s, junior political officers’ greatest 
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18 Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics 
(Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1979), 70.
sources of anxiety were not their commanders they were assigned to but their immediate 
superiors in the GPU.19  Colton saw party discipline and military discipline intrinsically linked.  
As the Party pursued policies that affected military discipline, especially the policies of criticism 
and self-criticism, the relationship between the CPSU and the military changed.  Military 
discipline was accepted and a necessity for Party discipline in the armed forces.20
 While Colton viewed civil-military relations as a mixed system, at times conflict-driven 
and at others driven by cooperation, he argued there were two key aspects that one should not 
overlook.  The relationship revolved around key issues of policy implementation, foreign policy, 
and primarily military issues [such as pay, housing, training, and discipline].  Core issues for the 
military were pay, discipline, promotions, and tactics.  Non-core issues were more aligned with 
issues of foreign policy.  Dale Herspring argues that under Khrushchev and Brezhnev the 
military’s control over core issues and values expanded, while under Stalin they were 
nonexistent.21  Doctrine and force structure, two none-core areas traditionally dominated by the 
Party, were increasingly controlled by the military during the Khrushchev era, and by the 1970s 
civilians were almost totally excluded from the decision-making process in those two areas.
 Colton’s view was that throughout the history of the Soviet Union, both civil and military 
authorities accepted the power of the CPSU.22  While that fact is not disputed by the research 
below, what was the driving force in civil-military relations?  Specifically, what factor allows us 
18
19 Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority..., 115.
20 Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority..., 119.
21 Herspring, xvii.
22 Timothy Colton, “Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union,” in Timothy Colton and Thane 
Gustafson, eds. Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton, NJ, 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 12.
to characterise civil-military relations as a conflict-driven or cooperation-driven relationship, or a 
relationship based on a synthesis of both?  What caused civil-military relations in the 
Khrushchev era to be a synthesis between Kolkowicz and Odom more similar to Colton?  No 
theorist has explained civil-military relations beyond the implications of total control of the state 
by the CPSU.  While disputing the purely political study and theorising of Kolkowicz, Colton, 
Odom, and Herspring, Reese focused solely on questions of the development of the concept of 
military professionalism in the Soviet military.  Reese attributes a lack of professionalism within 
the military to the founding tenets of the Soviet state.  By purposefully following a policy of 
avoiding the creation of a professional officer corps and caste, the founders of the Soviet state 
quashed the development of military professionalism in its infancy.23 Reese’s study has focused 
on the founding moments of the officer corps, its actions during the Great Terror, especially the 
purge of the military in 1938-1941, their service during the Second World War, during the 
conflict in Afghanistan, and the August 1991 putsch.  The primary focus of his work is on those 
case studies, while the Khrushchev years is seen as a transitory period from Stalin to Brezhnev 
during which the military and Khrushchev had an increasing contentious relationship.  
 During the twentieth century, military professionalism has been defined in purely 
Western, democratic terms, defined by theorists and scholars in Western countries.  Reese posits 
the question how one can use those definitions of professionalism in the Soviet sphere if by 
design, from the beginning of its existence, the Soviet military spurned Western military thought.  
He argues that military professionalism, whether applied to the Soviet Union or Western, 
democratic states, has a universal definition.  Reese concluded that the Soviet military 
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subordinated itself to its civilian masters in the CPSU.  “Despite policy disagreements,” the 
military accepted that subordination.24  However, military strategists, namely Tukhachevksii and 
Zhukov, both studied the military concepts and strategies being developed by their 
contemporaries in the West.  It was the Party, primarily under Stalin, who forced the military to 
dissociate with their Western counterparts.  Prior to the outbreak of WW II, Tukhachevskii and 
his closest adherents were proved correct as Zhukov commanded the enemy forces in war games 
severely defeating the ‘Soviet’ force using Western tactics that Tukhachevskii had been a staunch 
advocate of in the 1930s - namely the use of combined arms, mechanised and mobile infantry, 
and the use of deep pincer attacks and encirclement.  To the detriment of the Soviet Union, those 
tactics were not adopted nor heavily studied after the demise of Tukhachevskii, but they were 
successfully used by the German Wehrmacht against the Soviet Red Army throughout the first 
two years of the war on the Eastern Front.
   Throughout the Khrushchev era the relationship between the CPSU and the Soviet 
armed forces was dependent upon one factor, the personalities of those in power in both 
institutions.  It is the argument of this dissertation that it was the selection of personality, the 
selection of agency, by Khrushchev which determined the characterisation of that relationship.  
Khrushchev chose officers to lead the Soviet military apparatus that were deemed more pliable, 
and more willing to support his ideas for military reform and doctrine over officers who had 
proved they honored their military expertise and professionalism over becoming sycophantic 
‘yes-men’ to the CPSU leadership.  Increasingly, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Khrushchev 
knowingly chose mediocracy over meritocracy.  Khrushchev was willing to elevate mediocre 
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officers to positions of leadership in the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff, and key military 
districts in order to have a perceived cohesive military command that would support 
Khrushchev’s scheme for changes to the structure and doctrine of the Soviet military.
 The personality leading the CPSU was static; Khrushchev was in office from 1953 until 
1964.  Before Kennedy’s meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961, Charles Bohlen had a 
study of Khrushchev drafted.25  It is a character study of Khrushchev designed to provide 
background to Kennedy before that meeting, but it also shed light on the man who drove 
changing civil-military relations in the Soviet Union.  The report began: “By any standards, 
Khrushchev is an extraordinary person.  He is simultaneously a handshaking, backslapping, 
grass-roots politician who could draw a good vote in any democracy, and a shrewd and ruthless 
manipulator of power in the best totalitarian tradition.”26  Decisive yet indecisive, often over the 
same issue, Khrushchev was:
Capable of extraordinary frankness, and in his own eyes no doubt unusually 
honest, Khrushchev can also on occasion be a gambler and a dissembler expert in 
calculated bluffing.  It is often hard to distinguish when Khrushchev is in his own 
eyes voicing real conviction and when he is dissembling.  The boundary line 
between truth and stratagem, between the pursuance of real conviction and of 
tactical advantage, is in any event much less clear in the Russian communist mind 
than ours.27  
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Bohlen’s presidential briefing accurately reflected Khrushchev’s perceptions of domestic 
political machinations as well as a more global outlook for the Soviet Union.
 However, Khrushchev’s schemes and ideas made it difficult to manage working with him.  
The Soviet military was commanded by two very different professional officers while 
Khrushchev was in power.  Strong personalities permeated both the CPSU and Soviet Armed 
Forces.  Taubman’s work on Khrushchev strongly argues that Khrushchev’s personality had an 
impact on his policies.  Zhukov and Malinovskii, both just as strong, were varied personalities 
when leading the Ministry of Defence.  Throughout his career Zhukov was a strong, charismatic, 
and almost fierce disciplinarian.  During World War II, Zhukov was one of a few people who 
argued with Stalin on military matters. Marshal Malinovskii and Zhukov served at different 
levels of command during World War II.  Those different experiences followed them through the 
Khrushchev era.  Malinovskii served as a military commander in areas where Khrushchev was a 
political officer; thus there was a bond between them from their common military service.  Once 
Zhukov was replaced by Malinovskii as Minister of Defence, Khrushchev believed he had a 
more pliable and friendly officer at the head of the Soviet armed forces.  Whereas as Zhukov 
stood his ground on military matters, Khrushchev believed Malinovskii would support his ideas 
lock step.  It was exactly those varying personalities that determined civil-military relations 
during the Khrushchev era.  Rather than the confrontation or cooperation theories argued by 
Kolkowicz and Colton respectively, civil-military relations were fluid, depending on the 
circumstance, at times a strong sense of cooperation among the civil and military leaders, and at 
others fierce protectorates of their perceived spheres of influence.  Those interactions, however 
22
we characterise them, were vastly determined by the personages commanding the CPSU and the 
Soviet Armed Forces and their interactions during the four case studies examined in this thesis.
 Generally, the issue of personality can be correlated to the level that officer become 
politically ‘active.’   Officers that Khrushchev deemed more pliable, and more concerned with 
career advancement became more politically active.  Robert Conquest characterised officers in 
four classifications based on their military professionalism and political activism.28  Whereas 
officers such as Zhukov and his associates were attempting to increase professionalism and the 
power of the army, they were not engaged in Party machinations.  Other officers such as those 
from the ‘Stalingrad Group’ were given quick promotions out of political considerations and 
became “identified with political maneuvers almost to the exclusion of their military links.”29  
Zhukov was the anomaly.  Whereas Conquest concretely argued Zhukov’s apolitical attitude, as 
Minister of Defence, he was bought into the Presidium through co-option.  A few questions need 
to be answered.  Why did the leadership, especially Khrushchev, bring Zhukov into the 
Presidium knowing that he was a strong national hero in the eyes of the Soviet public?  Did 
Khrushchev consider Stalin’s distrust of Zhukov following the war?  Did Zhukov allow himself 
to be exploited by Khrushchev or did he genuinely feel recognized by Khrushchev as a military 
leader?  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Khrushchev sought out officers whom he deemed 
politically pliable, who put career ahead of military professionalism.
 The argument here that the selection of personality, or agents, to leadership posts within 
the Soviet armed forces, goes beyond a historical study and adds to the literature of structure 
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versus agency debates.  This dissertation defines structure as the institutions of the Soviet state: 
the CPSU, armed forces, governmental bureaucracy, and the security apparatus.  Agency or 
agents are defined as those individuals who are leading or members of the above institutions.  
The core argument throughout the dissertation is agents drive civil-military relations in the 
Soviet Union and Khrushchev attempted to manipulate that relationship by the selection of 
agents to command the Soviet armed forces.  Does the institutional structure inherent in the 
Soviet system explain the ebb and flow of civil-military relations?  Does the selection of agents, 
of those men chosen by Khrushchev to lead the armed forces apparatus, and their actions within 
those offices go further to explain the cooperation and conflict, the ebb and flow, of the 
relationship between the civilian authorities and the Soviet armed forces?  As Giddens wrote, 
‘actors’ knowledge of the practices in which they participate is already an element of those 
practices.’30  The selection of officers for higher military and government office along with the 
interactions in the communist system that they served together explain the civil-military relations 
of the Khrushchev era.  Giddens further stated that ‘structure is both the medium of generating 
interaction and at the same time the reproduced outcome of it.’31  Giddens’ theory of 
structuration, as opposed to the structural-functionalist model, goes far to explain this theory of 
the selection of personalities in Soviet civil military relations.  Both societal structures and 
societal agents are equal in Giddens’ structuration theory.  Giddens argued that orthodox 
functionalist theories do not adequately explain structures and reproductions.
 Giddens advocated that a duality of structure, an integral part of his theory, goes further 
to explain societal systems and interactions.  Structures are reproduced by agents over and over.  
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Structure, as defined by Giddens, is the ‘patterning’ of social relations.  More simply stated 
structure are the ‘rules’ of social interactions.32  Cerny’s definition of structure more fully 
develops the idea that structure both constrains and gives opportunity to agents for action and to 
make choices.  According to Cerny’s 1990 work structure gives agents the resources and rules on 
how to play the game - structure both limits and propels the actions of societal agents.33  
Certainly, military officers were constrained and given opportunity within the Soviet political 
system.  Officers had to outwardly conform to Soviet ideology to advance up the military ranks.  
However, while the system served as an opportunity, it also served as a restraint to action.  
Marshal M.V. Shaposhnikov’s actions at Novocherkassk in June 1962 questioned the ruling 
Party’s decisions, and put him on a collision course with authorities, which led to a shortened 
military career and criminal proceedings against him.
 Khrushchev and his officers were reproducing variants of civil-military relations that had 
been ongoing since the founding of the Soviet state.  Leaders had chosen officers to high 
positions that they personally knew, and in some cases elevated them on the basis of their loyalty 
at the expense of their military expertise.  Stalin elevated those he served with at the battle for 
Tsaritsyn during the Russian Civil War to command posts during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s - 
Marshals Voroshilov, Budenny, Timoshenko, and Tukhachevskii.  As Tukhachevskii illustrated a 
greater capacity for original thought and military prowess, he was increasingly in the crosshairs 
of Stalin.  Khrushchev reproduced this model by elevating officers from the Battle of Stalingrad 
to high commands within the Soviet armed forces.  Skilling and Griffiths go further and argue 
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that both Stalin and Khrushchev sought loyal officers to these posts but also officers that had not 
served in previous conflict or office in and around Moscow.34  Officers from the periphery were 
bought to the center by both Stalin and Khrushchev.
 Giddens quoted from Marx to further illustrate a basic component of his theory of 
structuration.  Marx wrote that, ‘men make history, but not in circumstances of their own 
choosing.’35  Giddens argued that structuration illustrated how structure has an impact on the 
actions of agents but how agents change those structures as well.  In his theory, Giddens stated 
that agents occupy multiple positions within societal relations that correspond to their specific 
social identities.36  Applying Giddens’ theory to Soviet civil-military relations can explain the 
relations between commanding officers and the higher echelons of the CPSU.  Marshal Zhukov 
became a complicated agent as he was bought back to the command structure of the Ministry of 
Defence in early 1950s and as he was elevated to leaderships positions in the CPSU.  Zhukov 
and Malinovskii served those roles differently as their personal friendship and histories with the 
Party leader were different.  Partly because Khrushchev believed Malinovskii to be a more 
pliable officer, more concerned with his career than the policies of the military, Khrushchev and 
Malinovskii had a much more cordial relationship than his predecessor.  Nonetheless, it was 
Zhukov who had to navigate, what Giddens called the modalities of co-presence, his position as 
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head of the armed forces and a member of the highest decision-making body of the CPSU.  
Malinovskii did not occupy the same specific social identities as Zhukov had.37
 Khrushchev’s selection of agents, of military officers to lead the Soviet armed forces 
placed those officers in positions to act - to base their actions on their acquired military 
knowledge and expertise in the defence of the Soviet Union as military professionals or to act in 
their own best interests of their careers by placating Khrushchev’s desires and goals for military 
policies.  Those agents have the ability to influence the structure of the system.38  Officers such 
as Zhukov and Malinovskii have the ability, and with their titles and offices, the power, to 
influence some control over military policies of the CPSU.  Inherent in that power is the 
understanding that wielding the power of their titles and offices may run them afoul of the 
CPSU.  Conflict and cooperation in the system is thus based on those perceived realms of control 
discussed above but also on the actions of those agents chosen by Khrushchev to command the 
armed forces of the Soviet Union.
Source Material
 In my source material, I have relied on personal accounts from key individuals such as 
Khrushchev and Zhukov and contemporary sources from Soviet newspapers and journals.  New 
interpretations of sources and former works on the subject of civil-military relations will be 
found in the overall study.  Debates on military policies and affairs during the Khrushchev era 
took place in the open, in the public press of the Soviet Union.  The press was used to wage a 
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war against Malenkov in 1954 and 1955, just as the military doctrinal reforms were widely 
discussed in the 1960s in various literary organs of the Party and military.  Therefore, to gauge 
opinions and viewpoints of numerous officers, it was important to look at coverage in Pravda, 
the Party newspaper, in Izvestiya, the government newspaper, and Krasnaya zvezda, the official 
organ of the Ministry of Defence.  Dissent against Khrushchev’s military policies was published 
in the pages of these publications by senior officers.  At other times, officers attacked one 
another as in the case of Zhukov ouster, which played out on the pages of Pravda.  Officers also 
published works, whether monographs or in professional journals.  Numerous articles published 
in the Ministry of Defence’s internal journal, Voennaya mysl’ (Military Thought), provide 
information about internal debates among high-ranking officers.
 Memoir and other primary literature sources must be used with a grain of salt; however, 
they are used in this study to give a sense of the inner thoughts of participants in various events.  
Given the research questions and the importance of agents, memoir literature have been 
appropriate sources, despite their distortions of history.  Memoirs were able to give a sense of a 
persons inner thoughts and importance those individuals gave to events.  Various editions of 
Khrushchev’s memoirs have been consulted, both in Russian and English.  Khrushchev was a 
strong-willed personality, which comes out in his memoirs.  He is not apologetic in his memoirs, 
but does staunchly defend his policy initiatives and ideas.  He strongly believed in his 
prerogatives where the defence and security of the Soviet Union was concerned.  Marshal 
Zhukov’s memoirs were consulted as well.  However, various editions were used due to that fact 
that censors heavily edited the earlier editions; a complete version of Zhukov’s memoirs was 
published after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Zhukov wrote his memoirs through to the end 
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of the Great Patriotic War; he did not include his time as Minister of Defence.  Memoir material 
are used to get a sense of the individuals own thoughts on topics; they must be used alongside 
other material to gauge factual accuracy.
   Archival sources from the General Department of the CPSU (from RGANI, but held on 
microfilm at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham) were 
used for information on Soviet forces stationed abroad, specifically for the Soviet Group of 
Forces Germany.  Documents pertaining to Soviet operations in Hungary, during the 
Novocherkassk uprising, and the Cuban Missile Crisis were found in the Hoover Institution’s 
collection.  Collections of published documents from the Soviet archives were used to 
supplement varied access to archives in Moscow.  The main collection of documents used in this 
study was Aleksandr Fursenko’s edited three-volume series on the Presidium in the Khrushchev 
era published by Rosspen, Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964.  The 2001 collection of documents 
on Marshal Zhukov, Georgii Zhukov: stenogramma oktyabrskogo (1957 g) plenuma TsK KPSS i 
drugie dokumenti, provided archival evidence of his advocation of policies, attendance at 
important Presidium meetings, and material concerned with his removal in 1957.
 The collections of documents and archives of Soviet sources both in the United Kingdom 
and the United States were integral to completing this study due to difficulties gaining access to 
archives in Moscow.  At the time of the research, Russian archives were not allowing access to 
postwar documentation concerning the Soviet military, specifically where nuclear programs were 
concerned.  Funding for research trips to Moscow limited the amount of time spent at RGANI 
and GARF.  Time in Moscow was used effectively, and access was gained to the Central Military 
Archives reading room.  However, no materials were forthcoming after access was gained.  
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Reliance on Russian archival material housed in the UK and US has limited my search; 
nonetheless, the study is supported by primary resources.
 Using available sources this study aims to re-conceptualise the debate on civil-military 
relations in the Soviet Union during Khrushchev’s tenure.  This study uses those available 
documents to illustrate through the case studies below how previous works and theories only 
answered questions on the subject to a point without delving into why.  Theories on civil-military 
relations, whether conflict-driven or cooperation-driven, only looked at the events causing that 
relationship.  Previous studies characterised civil-military relations without explaining why that 
relationship developed in such a way.  By reevaluating previous studies and using new sources, 
this study’s characterisation of civil-military relationship, to some extent agreeing with Timothy 
Colton, goes further to explain that the selection of personalities, or agents, by Khrushchev and a 
growing sense of professionalism were the driving force behind the relationship between 
Khrushchev, the CPSU, and the Soviet armed forces from 1953 to 1964.
Case Studies
 Upon Stalin’s death in 1953, an almost stranglehold grasp on military doctrine and 
thought was finally relaxed.  The first case study focuses on the debate that continued throughout 
the Khrushchev era over the role of military doctrine and thought on the strategy and tactics of 
the Soviet Armed Forces.  That debate included the role of advancing nuclear weapons 
technology and ballistic rocketry.  Questions were asked by both military professionals and Party  
apparatchiks on the impact of those technologies on troop levels, conventional armament 
30
production, and, moreover, on the political and ideological ramifications of those technologies.  
Was war with the West still inevitable?  Peaceful coexistence, as well as peaceful economic 
cooperation, was a policy now to be followed.  Should disarmament policies be pursued?  
Debates over those questions and more occurred among military officers themselves, academics, 
but also among the leaders of the CPSU.  More than once the leadership of the CPSU held 
differing views on doctrine and especially nuclear armaments from those of the military officers 
holding commanding posts within the General Staff and Ministry of Defence.  Military leaders 
debated the use of conventional weaponry and forces on a nuclear battlefield.  However, 
Khrushchev was adamant that nuclear weapons were to become the primary weapon and 
workhorse of the Soviet armed forces on future battlefields.  Battlefields, as military leaders had 
experienced in World War II, were to be a thing of history.  Now battles would take place 
hundreds, if not thousands, of miles apart on the territories of the enemies being targeted with 
ballistic missiles.  
 Zhukov’s role in civil-military relations is the focus of the second case study.  Marshal 
Georgii Zhukov, Minister of Defence from 1955 to October 1957, was protective of the role of 
the Soviet Armed Forces over their own ranks as opposed to the CPSU and the Main Political 
Administration (glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie, GPU); however, he was also strongly in favor 
of the role of military professionals in providing for the defence of the Soviet Union.  Zhukov’s 
commanding personality moved the Soviet military towards a greater sense of military 
professionalism, although, in the end, Zhukov’s insistence on autonomy from political and Party 
controls led to his dismissal from both the military and Party leadership.
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 Throughout his leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces, Zhukov was hampered by the rise 
of the so-called ‘Stalingrad Group’ of officers, both military and political, who had served 
alongside Khrushchev at Stalingrad and southern fronts as they fought westward towards 
Germany in World War II.  That group of officers owed their posts and promotions to 
Khrushchev’s patronage, and therefore, were more compliant in supporting Khrushchev’s views 
of the military and reform.  By the 1960s, despite that patronage, the ‘Stalingrad Group’s’ 
support was not always forthcoming for Khrushchev’s policies.  Fractures developed, and in 
some cases, officers chose to be military professionals rather than politically pliable. 
 While Khrushchev saw Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovskii as a more pliable 
Minister of Defence, Malinovskii proved to be well-qualified at supporting Khrushchev’s 
military policies while at the same time focusing on the concerns of the more conservative 
military commanders.  The role of Marshal Malinovskii is discussed in the third case study.  The 
choice of Malinovskii as the new Minister of Defence illustrated the choice by Khrushchev of 
mediocracy over merit.  It was known that Zhukov supported and even called for Marshal Ivan 
Konev to replace him as Minister of Defence.  Konev was passed over by Khrushchev believing 
that the officer was of the same ilk of Zhukov and to independently minded.  Malinovskii has 
been seen as more sycophantic like other members of the Stalingrad Group.  By looking at 
Malinovskii’s speeches in the 1960s, when the Stalingrad Group really began to fracture, one can 
argue that he was able to toe the line on military policies being espoused by Khrushchev and 
supporting the need to retain modern conventional forces in the Soviet Union’s arsenal.
 Those fractures within the Stalingrad group in 1960s became evident during the 1962 
events in Novocherkassk and the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The military’s role in suppressing the 
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June 1962 workers’ uprising in Novocherkassk is the focus of the four case study.  Historians and 
journalists, both Western and Russian, have discussed and argued about the role of Soviet 
military and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).  Whereas Baron argued that the 
Soviet military played an important, deadly role at Novocherkassk, contemporary sources, and 
KGB cases against military officers, who took part in the operation, show that the Soviet Armed 
Forces did not fire the deadly shots in June 1962.  Those shots instead came from divisions of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs.  Actions of specific officers during the Novocherkassk operation 
proved how far they had come along the road to military professionalism.  The Soviet Red Army 
viewed its role as to thwart a foreign enemy, not to ensure domestic order, which military leaders 
regarded as ‘policing.’
 Finally in the fifth case study, although the military leadership became complacent in 
supporting Khrushchev’s policies, the role of the Soviet High Command in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, from planning, to implementation, and reflection, was at times supportive and at other 
times outright against the Cuban gambit.  Officers, who did not support the operations, were 
relieved of their commands, and others supported harebrained schemes they personally knew 
were not plausible. While one of the greatest logistical feats of the Soviet military since World 
War II, the Cuban Missile Crisis failed to redress strategic parity with the United States as was 
Khrushchev’s goal.39
 The Soviet Armed Forces did not actively participate in the removal of Nikita 
Khrushchev, nor did they actively support Khrushchev’s positions.  After the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, military officers questioned the operation in the Caribbean.  From strategy, to further 
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reductions to conventional forces, Khrushchev was thwarted by military officers questioning his 
motives and goals as they pertained to military spheres.  Overall, Soviet officers confined 
themselves to the concerns of the military, and they did not stray into area of political and Party 
purviews.  
 While, I challenge Kolkowicz’s assertions on the antagonistic relationship between the 
CPSU and the Soviet military, theories put forward by Colton and Reese are questioned as well.  
Although Colton and Reese have shown the relationship between the CPSU and the military to 
be primarily driven by cooperation, I intend to add to that argument below.  Personality is of 
utmost importance; individuals are key to understanding that relationship.  Whereas Reese 
focuses on the social aspects affecting the Soviet armed forces, I argue against his viewpoint that 
the military always accepted their subordination to the CPSU.  Never did the military become 
outwardly anti-Party during the Khrushchev era, but the officer corps did voice strong opinions 
both for and against policy decisions made by their political leaders.  I believe that the military 
did make conscious decisions to oppose Khrushchev on military policies and reforms out of an 
aware sense of military professionalism, which stemmed from a perceived incursion into the 
military’s scope of interest within the three areas enumerated by Huntington: responsibility, 
military expertise, and corporateness.
 It was these areas, which caused the relationship between Khrushchev and the 
commanding officers of the Soviet armed forces to move fluidly between conflict and 
cooperation.  Officers who put professional values above Party or political considerations were 
removed from decision-making posts within the hierarchy of the Ministry of Defence and 
General Staff.  As his tenure progressed, Khrushchev looked to gain support for his policies in 
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more pliable military officers who were more concerned with their careers to the detriment of 
military values.  Khrushchev chose officers for leadership posts by selecting those who were 
more concerned with their own advancement.  Khrushchev did not elevate officers first based on 
their military prowess but on suspected personal loyalty.  It was a system of mediocracy, not one 
of meritocracy.
35
Chapter 1: Evolution of Soviet Strategic Thought and 
Military Doctrine
 Writing a year after Khrushchev’s removal, Robert Conquest stated: “Apart from the 
Party itself, the Soviet Army [was] the one organised body in Russia with its own esprit de corps, 
professionalism, and political ability to carry out moves to place its nominees in power.”1  
Conquest aptly described why the Party was so concerned with the control of the Soviet Armed 
Forces, specifically the Soviet high command (the Soviet General Staff and Ministry of 
Defence).  Within that framework played out the roles of such men as Khrushchev and Georgii 
Malenkov, and the military personnel such as Marshals Zhukov and Malinovskii.  A compliant 
military was in the best interests of the CPSU; the paths taken to achieve that goal were at the 
core of Soviet civil-military relations.  Khrushchev’s selection of agents, of those officers to lead 
the Soviet armed forces faced important tests throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  What were 
perceived as sycophantic personalities became more nuanced in their outward support for 
Khrushchev’s reforms for the military.  Perceived to be pliant to Khrushchev’s wishes, officers 
increasing voiced nuanced opinions.  The role of agents in the decision-making process where 
military doctrine was concerned became increasingly important after the removal of Zhukov.  
The duality faced by the Party for control and the necessity for the defence of the Soviet Union 
created a maligned dichotomy in which reliance on the military for defence allowed military 
commanders to wrest some control from the Party.
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 Although discussed in the introduction, a brief historiographical outline is necessary as it 
relates to the development of Soviet strategic thought.  Political scientists and Sovietologists 
have examined and written on civil-military relations in the former Soviet Union and the Russian 
Federation.  Those theories concerned themselves with characterizing civil-military relations into 
two divergent paths.  Whether civil-military relations are driven by cooperation or conflict has 
been the primary thesis of prior research.  Led by the necessity to explain the interactions of 
institutions within the Soviet Union, prior studies have lacked a focus on personality, especially 
the individuals at the highest echelons of leadership within Soviet institutions.  This chapter 
argues that as the agents promoted to command positions in the Soviet military changed from the 
late 1950s to the 1960s, Khrushchev believed that he was surrounding himself with a more 
compliant officer corps; however, this group became divided over the best use of their 
knowledge, expertise, and military professionalism.  In the confines of this study, the focus is on 
those individuals at the top of the leadership pyramids within the CPSU and the Soviet armed 
forces.  How did those individuals interact when formulating defense policies of the Soviet 
Union?  To answer that question, this chapter presents a case study of decision-making on 
policies and doctrines arising from the development of nuclear weapons, their attendant delivery 
systems, and other rapidly advancing military technologies of the early Cold War.
 The chapter begins with a discussion of civil-military relations theories advanced since 
the 1950s, and suggests that they do not go far enough in explaining the relationship between the 
CPSU and the Soviet Armed Forces during the 1950s and 1960s.  Further, it is intended to show 
that by examining the relationships and interactions amongst he leaders of the CPSU and the 
military leadership in the 1950s and 1960s, we can hypothesize that the selection of agents, or 
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personalities, to higher office within the armed forces chain of command by Khrushchev goes 
further to explain the span of civil-military relations from the founding of the Soviet state.
 Following the death of Stalin, military offices were faced with a new structural paradigm 
which allowed them to have greater insight into the discussion and decision-making on military 
doctrine and strategy.  Previous attempts by military professionals to participate in military and 
strategic thought had been stymied by Stalin, who acted as the supreme arbiter of doctrine and 
strategy for most of his rule.
 After the discussion of current theories, this chapter examines the pre-WWII writings on 
military doctrine.  During the late 1920s and early 1930s there was an open dialogue, although 
heavily monitored, on contemporary military doctrine and military thought.  Socialist and 
Western thought was extensively studied.  Leading those discussions were two bright military 
minds: Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskii and Aleksandr Svechin.  Both were the leading military 
strategists of their era.  According to Andrei Kokoshin, 
Svechin’s Strategiya is a major work which incorporates the best of military 
thought from Russia, the young Soviet power, Germany, France, and other foreign 
countries.  This work was the result of Svechin’s two years (1923-1924) of 
teaching a strategy course at the Military Academy of the [Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Red Army].  No other works on this theme were published in the USSR 
until 1962, when Voennaya Strategiya [Military Strategy] was published under the 
editorship of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskii.2 
Tukhachevskii was ahead of his time, as compared to his Soviet and European contemporaries, 
when it came to planning new modes of combat and the integration of forces.  Mobile infantry 
and mechanization were two ideas championed by Tukhachevskii.  Both Svechin and 
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Tukhachevskii were the bright military minds of their era; both were dismissed by Stalin as 
imperialist stooges.  Their ideas and their lives were lost in Stalin’s purge of the military.  
 It was only with the relative openness of the 1950s and 1960s that both officers and their 
ideas were rehabilitated.  Studied again, the officers’ ideas were expanded on. Again in the 1950s 
and 1960s, military thinking and strategic thought were no longer taboos nor only the sole 
purview of Stalin.  As happened in the early interwar period, the military more openly discussed 
and studied doctrine, strategy, and tactics.
 Delving into the case study of the policies and decisions on military doctrine, we can 
discover how Khrushchev used those policies to give him an additional edge over others, such as 
Malenkov, in the leadership struggle immediately following the death of Stalin.  He then 
attempted to use these policies to initiate changes in foreign policy directed toward the United 
States and its allies in an era of detente and peaceful coexistence.  At the same time, Khrushchev 
tried to decrease military expenditure, as technological knowledge increased, thereby enabling 
him to increase the output of consumer goods and a higher standard of living to the Soviet 
citizenry.
Literature Study: Civil-Military Relations Theories
 Numerous scholars have studied civil-military relations in the Soviet Union.  However, a 
majority of the studies concentrated on the periods after Khrushchev was ousted from power.  
Timothy Colton’s seminal study was published in the late Brezhnev era, while William Odom 
studied the collapsing Soviet military system and the respective civil-military questions raised at 
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this turning point in history.  Concurrent with Odom’s work, Condoleeza Rice used a historical 
model to explain the implications of Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies on civil-military relations.  
Only Roman Kolkowicz’s work has focused on the earlier Cold War period of Khrushchev’s 
Soviet Union.  Dated though it is, Kolkowicz’s work has set the framework in which one can 
study the Khrushchev era and civil-military relations and military and defense policies.  
 Dale Herspring incorporates a historical study of the Khrushchev era into his 1996 work 
on post-1991 Russian civil-military relations.  Lacking a semblance of autonomy from the 1920s 
onward, the military was freed from its ideological shackles upon Stalin’s death in March 1953.  
The military was given a greater voice in Party discussions where military policy was concerned.  
Whether that was a seat on the Presidium for Zhukov, or having military officers attend 
Presidium meetings after 1957, the CPSU understood that they needed to better utilize the 
expertise and educational experiences of military officers.  Increasing throughout the 
Khrushchev era, the foundation was set in the 1950s and 1960s that rocketed military autonomy 
to an all-time high in the 1960s and 1970s, which manifested itself in cooperation in civil-
military relations in the Brezhnev era.3  While discussing civil-military relations studies by 
Western scholars, Herspring argues contemporary theories have been oversimplified.  Whereas 
some theories argue that civil-military relations in the former Soviet Union were centered on a 
conflict-cooperation rationale, Herspring’s argued that throughout the history of the Soviet state, 
the relationship between these two integral institutions cannot be boiled down to conflict or 
cooperation.  Only a combination of those two factors adequately explains civil-military relations 
in the context of the CPSU and the Soviet high command.  As military officers became more 
40
3 Dale Herspring, Russian Civil-Military Relations (Bloomington; Indiana University Press, 1996), xv.
‘vocal’ in support of or against CPSU policies, conflict and cooperation ebbed and flowed.  As 
the military agents in the Soviet societal structure became more professional, the rules of society 
were tested and sometimes changed.
 For Kolkowicz, civil-military relations in the Soviet Union was a zero-sum game.  
Kolkowicz’s seminal study was published three years after the ouster of Khrushchev.  His 
primary task was to focus on answering two questions: where do interests coincide, and where do 
those interests create conflict?  The high command of the Soviet Armed Forces and the 
leadership of the CPSU were the two protagonists in this struggle for influence and status.  This 
relationship was conflict driven; it was unstable in the eyes of Kolkowicz.4  Although the 
emphasis of Kolkowicz’s study was the Khrushchev era, the study was published without the 
opportunity to look back on the 1950s and 1960s with hindsight, within the context of the history 
of events to come.  Archives were not available for study and dissection.  Although access to the 
archives is greater than when Kolkowicz’s work was published, military sources are rare.  One 
must read between the lines of other archival sources from CPSU material as well as the military 
press.  Perhaps Kolkowicz’s lasting contribution to the study of civil-military relations in the 
Khrushchev era is his thorough literature search of the Soviet press, both governmental and 
military.  
 Integral to Kolkowicz’s thesis is that in communist regimes the military attempts to 
distance itself from the Party apparatus.  Their goal was not to be disloyal to the state or Party, 
but they must gain some semblance of military professionalism; they must remain untainted from 
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the aura of politics.5  Therein is the root cause of the conflict within civil-military relations.  
What the military perceives as its stride for military professionalism, the CPSU regarded as a 
push to be anti-Party.  
   William Odom, retired Leutientant-General, US Army and former Director of the 
National Security Agency, found fault with the zero-sum outlook towards Soviet civil-military 
relations.  There was an interchangeable system where allegiance to the Marxist-Leninist 
ideology reigned.6  In his view, Odom saw it the duty of officers to carry out policy, which was 
set by the government and CPSU.  Officers were not to shape policy.  By contrast Kolkowicz 
argued that conflict directly arose when officers attempted to delve into the realm of policy 
creation, Odom argued that was at its core unprofessional, thus could not create conflict. Simply, 
officers did not view politics as their realm and stayed above the fray. 
 While those studies are still relevant, Western historiography on civil-military relations in 
the Soviet Union, what is more important concerning the 1950s and 1960s, have not been 
covered extensively since Herspring’s 1996 study.  Brian Taylor published a history of civil-
military relations in 2003, but his discussions of the 1950s and 1960s relied heavily on 
contemporary studies and focused on key events such as the removal of Zhukov.  Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Western historiography has yet to cover this key era in detail.  
None of the studies have focused on the actions of agents within the Soviet structure.  Those 
studies have not focused on the interactions of agents in the dynamically changing structure of 
civil-military relations after the death of Stalin.
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Khrushchev’s Leadership Tactics
 Nikita Khrushchev used the tactic of divide and conquer in his attempt to thwart military 
opposition to his policies.  Soviet leaders historically used this tactic to control the military 
leadership and to garner support for specific policy initiatives.   After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, similar tactics were used by Boris Yeltsin.7  We can divide the Khrushchev era into two 
distinct eras.  One can divide the years Khrushchev was in power into a time when Zhukov’s 
influence was on the rise through his time as Minister of Defense, from January 1955 to October 
1957.  During that first period, Khrushchev allied himself with the Stalingrad group of younger 
officers.  Thus, a conflict emerged between younger officers versus Zhukov and those who 
served at his level during the Great Patriotic War, was created.  Not only was a service chasm 
created but also developed was a generational difference as Khrushchev looked to a younger 
generation of officers for support of his military policies.  Khrushchev was able to manage those 
two groups against each other to develop policies.  Zhukov’s downfall in 1957 initiated the 
second phase of civil-military relations within the Soviet Union.  His influence was a key to that 
relationship despite Khrushchev’s wishful thinking; however, the removal of Zhukov had little 
effect in making the Soviet military into a more pliable tool to support the CPSU’s policy 
initiatives.  In that second period, the Stalingrad Group fractured as Khrushchev implemented 
policies officers saw directed at their areas of sole purview such as tactics, maneuvers, and 
housing.  In each period, Khrushchev assisted that group that actively supported policies being 
espoused by him.
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 Khrushchev attempted to divide and conquer the leadership of the Soviet military.  While 
Zhukov was Minister of Defense there was focused around him a group of officers, generally 
older, higher-ranking, officers from the Great Patriotic War, who had served in the central 
command headquarters, or Stavka.  Younger officers, who served on Front or Army commands, 
were generally opposed to the influence of Zhukov and increasingly supported Khrushchev in his 
push to modernize and fund the military.  Those younger officers rose to prominence under 
Khrushchev, and many owed there status and positions to the First Secretary.  That group of 
officers, for the most part, had served as officers at the Battle of Stalingrad, and the movement 
from Stalingrad through Ukraine, Belorussia, and Poland into Germany.  Those officers served 
where Khrushchev had been posted as a political officer.  He knew these men and their 
capabilities.  Military competency was not a deciding factor in Khrushchev’s appointments; 
nonetheless, previous meritorious service had propelled those officers to where they were in the 
early 1950s.   Furthermore, offering promotion Khrushchev garnered obedience.  He promoted 
them to high rank and brought them into senior positions in the Party and the military leadership 
as his power grew within the leadership of the CPSU.  It was hoped the favors would be 
returned.  Khrushchev was promoting mediocracy over meritocracy.  He was consciously 
choosing officers perceived to be more favorably disposed to his own thoughts on the military 
despite those officers shortcomings in military expertise.
 However, as time showed, even a pliable corps focused around the Stalingrad Group was 
no guarantee that the military would lend support to defense and military policies conceived by 
Khrushchev.  As we shall see, the officer corps that worked in concert with Khrushchev’s 
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thinking in the 1950s became divided themselves in their support for Khrushchev in the 1960s, 
especially after the debacle of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
 Khrushchev stressed the importance of an original, Leninist ideology in Party work but 
also within the development of both foreign policy and military decisions.  Writing almost ten 
years after Khrushchev’s ouster, N.A. Lomov (General Staff) incorporated the numerous 
advances to military science and technology that came about in the preceding decades.  Lomov is 
an important primary source giving insight into the thought and decision-making process during 
the early Cold War.  In his text, Lomov described as the development of Soviet military theory 
and doctrine in relationship to scientific-technical developments.  Lomov served as general 
editor of the volume, but it was compiled by a group of officers and generals who also served as 
students and faculty members in the military academies.  The book analyzes the qualitative 
changes in weapons and technical outfitting of the Soviet army.  As part of what can be seen as 
an internal study of the development in Soviet doctrine and strategic thought, Scientific-
Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs is an important source on civil-military 
relations and the debate on doctrine in the Khrushchev era.  Prevalent throughout Lomov’s work 
is the impact of ideology on the Soviet military and civil-military relations in the Soviet Union.  
Discussing what Khrushchev called a revolution in military affairs, caused by the incorporation 
of nuclear weapons and their attendant delivery systems into the arsenal of the Soviet Union, 
Lomov places ideology at the foundations of all decisions.  Lomov wrote: “For the Soviet Union 
as well as for the other nations of the socialist community, the decisive significance of policy in 
45
implementing the tasks of the revolutionary transformation of military affairs has been 
determined by the necessity of the military defense of socialism against imperial aggression.”8  
 While Lomov acted as overall editor of the volume, leading military scholars of his day 
contributed greatly to the final publication.  Major General V.V. Voznenko, candidate of military 
science (at time of original publication), commented on the means of waging war and methods of 
military operations in an era of rapidly changing military technology.  Voznenko wrote, “all 
aspects of social life and all social phenomena ultimately depend upon the development level of 
the productive forces and production relationships, that is, upon economic conditions.”  He 
argued that economic conditions, which also embrace technological innovation, are the primary 
locomotive of military might and scientific progress.  He quoted F. Engels, who said that 
“nothing so depends upon the economic conditions as the army and the navy.  Weapons, the 
composition, the organisation, tactics and strategy depend primarily upon the level of production 
achieved at the given moment and upon the means of communication.”9
 Voznenko goes further when discussing the impact of ideology on Soviet military 
strategy.  Voznenko stated: 
Soviet military strategy proceeds from the great and noble goals of our state 
expressed in building a communist society and the necessity of the armed defense 
of the nation against aggression.  This strategy serves the interests of the Soviet 
people and its efforts are focused on elaborating the main questions of raising 
military might and the defense capability of the socialist motherland, as well as 
the fraternal community of socialist nations.10
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All decisions concerning the defense of the Soviet motherland had to follow from the founding 
tenets of the Soviet state.  Contemporary military and defense policies were built upon the 
leading ideology of the CPSU.  Despite the detente pursued by Khrushchev, ideology was still 
wary of capitalism and perceived imperialist states.  Voznenko continued his discussion of the 
impact of ideology on the military policies of the Soviet Union.  Suspicion remained concerning 
the intentions of the West.  The guarantee of peace was a fundamental interest of the Soviet 
people; however, “as long as capitalism exits, the threat of war from the imperialist aggressors 
remain[ed].”11
 Khrushchev strongly believed that ideology was the driving force of the Soviet Union, 
especially a more pure Leninist version of communist ideology.  Khrushchev intended to refocus 
his perceived ideological pillars of the Soviet state when concerned with reform of the Soviet 
armed forces.  Lenin, on military affairs, did not dismiss Western thought, particular that of Carl 
von Clausewitz.  Lenin, and military officers from 1917 onward, were able to show that 
Clausewitz’s theories were able to be integrated into Marxist-Leninist ideology.  Former 
commander of the General Staff Academy, Colonel-General I. A. Shavrov, wrote on Clausewitz:
He, in reality, for the first time in military theory, denied the ‘eternal’ and 
‘unchanging’ in military art, strove to examine the phenomenon of war in its 
interdependence and inter-conditionality, in its movement and development in 
order to postulate their laws and principles.12
Even as other Western theorists and specialist in academic, economic, and philosophical fields, 
and their writings, were taboo in the Soviet Union, Clausewitz’s ideas were studied.  Lenin’s first 
citation of Clausewitz came in June 1915, in a work on the collapse of the Second 
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International.13  Whereas Marx and Engels used citations of Clausewitz to explain wars of 
aggression between capitalist, imperialist states, Lenin’s synthesis of Clausewitz was integral to 
the Bolshevik ideology of class struggle and revolution through violent means by a dedicated, 
professional body.  For Lenin, Clausewitz provided the framework in which wars among 
bourgeois states were to be transformed in national, civil wars to overthrow capitalist powers.  
War, as a continuation of politics by other means, was able to be applied by Lenin to class 
struggle as well as to external threats once the Soviet Union was established.
 It was out of necessity, not ideological concerns, that the Red Army of Worker’s and 
Peasants was created in 1918.  Civil war and foreign intervention required a strong, centralized 
force, built around the Red Guards, to defend from external and, at that time, internal threat.  
Lenin identified the Red Army as a new type of military force in keeping with the 
state formation which the of the Soviet Republic represented.  The Red Army in 
many ways negated the imperial military tradition, but it also negated much of the 
prewar socialist ideas about a citizens army, which would dispense with the 
services of a professional officer corps.14
While the debate over a socialist-style, territorial-based militia army did not end in 1918, nor 
after the Civil War, it was firmly finished by the 1950s.  Khrushchev inherited strong, centralised 
armed forces, which were commanded by an increasingly professional corps of well-educated 
officers.
 Lenin and Clausewitz’s thoughts on war can be applied to the Khrushchev era.  Whether 
cognizant of his own thoughts or not, how Khrushchev’s use military force, and the threat of 
military force, to influence both domestic politics and international relations can be seen as a 
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Clausewitzian approach.  Whether when it was answering a questions posed over dinner by 
Anthony Eden’s wife during a state visit to the United Kingdom (1956), or through nuclear bluff 
during the Suez crisis (1956), Khrushchev attempted to influence foreign policy and international 
disputes with the mere mention of the Soviet Union’s technical achievements and military 
might.15  In Khrushchev’s thinking, nuclear brinksmanship was a continuation of his policies, 
both foreign and domestic, by other means.
 Military officers viewed the debate in a different prism.  Officers argued the military 
might of a country created conditions where politics and diplomacy were able to function, 
without the necessity to resort to military power.  The military was tasked with creating those 
conditions in “which politics was in a position to achieve the aims set for itself.”16  In a reverse 
way, the Clausewitzian dictum was advocated to allow politics to work, without resorting to 
military means.  The mere existence of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, not their actual 
use, was their importance.  More on the differences between Khrushchev and military officers 
will be discussed later in this chapter.
A Comparison of Khrushchev’s USSR and Eisenhower’s USA
 Ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union were central to 
the evolution and developments which spurred on the Cold War.  Ideological percepts spilled 
over into the area of military doctrines in both states.  The role of the Soviet military was to 
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defend the USSR against external aggressors, which had been admirably accomplished in the 
fight for its very survival during the Great Patriotic War.  The Marxist-Leninist revolution was 
advanced by the political officers of the Red Army.  
 It was in the context of maintaining a territorial defence, while launching at Marxist-
Leninist revolutionary offensive, that the Soviet Union acquired its atomic bomb in 1949.  Soon 
after Stalin claimed that not only was nuclear war foreseeable, but it was feasible to win such a 
conflict.  With greater technological advancements the probability of winning a nuclear exchange 
only increased.  Officially, plenipotentiaries from both countries argued that their rival 
socioeconomic systems, as they competed, would only surpass one another in technological 
advancements.  Thus, the guiding rails of the arms race were laid.  Competition in armaments, in 
economic indicators, and culture spanned the next 45 years.  
 Stalin’s dictum that nuclear war was winnable died with him on 5 March 1953.  Under 
the collective leadership that emerged, nuclear war was not imminently foreseeable.  
Nonetheless, military officials, both in the US and USSR had to plan for nuclear eventualities. 
Foreshadowing Khrushchev’s own position on nuclear war, the collective leadership focused on 
the humanistic factors of nuclear war.  Khrushchev and the collective leadership strongly stated 
that nuclear war was not only unforeseeable in the future, but also there was no way a nuclear 
exchange was winnable.  A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers would consume the 
world; it would engulf the entire globe in conflict and fallout.  Across the Atlantic, Khrushchev’s 
American counterpart, Dwight D. Eisenhower, echoed those sentiments.  Eisenhower and 
Khrushchev owed the world restraint.  The fate of the world, Communist and Western, rested in 
the hands of the leaders of the world’s superpowers.
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 Parallel developments in armaments and doctrine occurred under the leaderships of 
Khrushchev and Eisenhower in their respective countries.  Both men were intrigued and 
appreciated the powers of ballistic rocketry and nuclear weaponry.  Rockets and missiles 
elevated the arms race in the ideological struggle to overcome the other state.  Another factor 
attracting those two men to new technologies was the ability to shift focus to these new 
technological advancements in weaponry from more conventional forces, thereby reducing 
military expenditures and defence budgets.  Khrushchev presumed that reductions to 
conventional forces would reduce expenditures on the military; however, with increased research 
and development costs, as well as the long development period of technologically superior 
missiles, costs tended to increase over the long run.  Reductions to conventional armed forces 
were a prime concern for both Khrushchev and Eisenhower. Both men had visionary programs to 
raise consumer goods production and the standards of living in their respective states.  With 
those thoughts came reductions in conventional arms, an increased reliance on strategic forces, 
and a visionary program to develop nuclear submarines capable of firing ballistic missiles.  
Khrushchev’s new strategic thinking began with focusing the leadership debate within the 
Presidium on “where limited resources [should] be invested.”17  Furthermore, what specific areas 
of military/technological development showed the most promise for increasing the security of the 
Soviet Union and its client states?  The Soviet leadership could invest in long-range strategic 
aircraft, bombers, following the path of the United States, or they could develop a new approach 
to match better their own strategic needs.  Technologically, the Soviet Union was far behind the 
United States in long-range bomber development.
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 Under Stalin, Andrei Nikolayevich Tupolev had been ordered to design and construct 
strategic bombers that could reach the United States and return to Soviet territory without 
refueling as the Soviets did not possess in-air refueling capabilities.  The problem with reaching 
the US mainland was in-air refueling.  Soviet strategic bombers were able to reach the US, 
barely, but they were unable safely to return to Soviet or friendly territory without in-air 
refueling.  Tupolev told Stalin the Soviet Union lacked the technological ability to create such an 
aircraft then.18  Khrushchev held Tupolev in the highest regard.  Under Khrushchev’s patronage, 
Tupolev designed civilian and military aircraft, but he never produced a bomber that could 
successfully threaten the United States.  While Khrushchev was in power, the project to build a 
long-range strategic bomber was shelved.  It was a dead-end road in the drive to fulfill the 
defensive needs of the USSR.  
 In fairly short order, Khrushchev answered his own questions.  Focusing on rocketry and 
other modern technologies allowed the Soviet Union to increase its defensive preparedness, 
while at the same time attempting to raise the standard of living for the ordinary Soviet citizens.  
The costs continually to update a bomber fleet were large, whereas, missile technology was 
thought to be more cost-effective in the long run.  In coordination, air defence systems were to be 
switched from intercept aircraft to antiaircraft missiles, such as those which shot down Francis 
Gary Powers’ U-2 over Sverdlovsk on May Day 1960.  Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that, 
‘antiaircraft artillery had outlived its day.”19  In that fashion, the core of the defensive and 
offensive military armaments of the Soviet Union were to be based on ever-evolving military 
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technologies.  Khrushchev thought, ‘the number of bayonets you have is no longer decisive. The 
quality and strength of your missiles determine everything today.’20
 The United States developed a large and modern long-range bomber fleet throughout 
World War II and the proceeding years.  By embracing developing military technologies, the US 
built long-range bomber squadrons, which are still a mainstay of American power projection.  
From April 1952, Boeing’s B-52 Stratofortress became the backbone of the US bomber fleet and 
Strategic Air Command (SAC).21  In contrast to the Soviet Union, the US had the option to 
deploy strategic aircraft alongside ballistic rocketry.  However, in the early years of the Cold War 
and arms race, the US focus was on long-range, manned bombers.  
 Both the Soviet and American ballistic missile programs evolved from the German efforts 
during World War II, specifically the V-1 and V-2 program.  In the waning months of the war, 
working before the division of Germany was complete, Allied forces scoured Germany for 
missile technology and scientists such as Wehner von Braun.  Braun was quickly whisked to the 
United States, while the Soviets plundered their sectors of divided Germany for the same 
technology and manpower.  Despite the initial influx of knowledge, the US missile program was 
not taken seriously until Eisenhower was elected President in 1953.  In 1948, under President 
Truman, missile development stopped completely.  By 1952, only one million dollars were being 
budgeted for the fledgling armament program.22  Partially explained by a general draw down 
from a wartime footing, the lack of spending was also an indication that Truman wasted little 
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money on redundant systems.  In his thinking, bombers sufficed for US defence; that there was 
no need for missile redundancy.
 In contrast to the United States, the Soviets quickly began a ballistic missile program 
under Stalin in the late 1940s.  Sergei Korolev, Vladimir Chelomei, and Mikhail Yangel were the 
three central chief designers under Khrushchev competing for resources for their own ballistic 
missile programs.  An innovative new branch of the Soviet military was created to ‘handle’ those 
new weapons.  The Strategic Rocket Forces (raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznecheniia, 
RVSN) was founded on 17 December 1959.  It was tasked with the overall command for all 
ballistic missiles, with a range of over 1,000 kilometres in the Soviet arsenal.
 In 1946, the development of long-range ballistic missile development was sanctioned by 
the Council of Ministers.23  It was the perception that, ‘the invulnerability of missiles to existing 
antiaircraft weapons provided the hope that missiles could become effective weapons in the 
future, after their combat characteristics had been improved.’24  Podvig divides the history of the 
RVSN into stages of development; his first stage is inclusive of the Khrushchev period, 
1959-1965.  In this first stage of development, missile launchers were built around the concept of 
group-start launch complexes - several launchers located within close proximity to one another.  
In this grouping, Podvig argued the survivability of a nuclear attack was not paramount as the 
development and deployment initially took precedence.25
 The 43rd Rocket Army based in the Kiev Military District and the 50th Rocket Army 
stationed in the Belorussian Military District were the first two units created in the RVSN.  They 
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both went into service in 1960 with the former being taken out of service in 1996 and the latter 
being demobilized in 1990.  Two further units went into service in 1962.  The 33rd Guards 
Rocket Army stationed in the Siberian Military District is still in service.  Stationed in the 
Transbaikal Military District, the 53rd Rocket Army was demobilized in 2002.26  Those four 
units comprised the RVSN during Khrushchev’s tenure.
 The new branch of the Soviet military paralleled a doctrinal shift orchestrated by 
Khrushchev.  Under Khrushchev’s leadership the Soviet government stressed the importance of 
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons over the ‘outdated’ conventional forces, which had always 
been the mainstay of the Russian and Soviet defence structure.  Troop reductions were of utmost 
importance.  Military and economic necessity factored into those reductions to conventional 
forces.  “Mass armies of the traditional type were no longer necessary in an age of battlefield 
nuclear warfare: the extensive demobilization of ground and tactical air forces was a sensible 
means to ‘modernise’ the Soviet Armed Forces with missiles and tactical nuclear weapons.”27
 The decision to structure the Soviet Union’s military forces around missile technology led 
to the commitment by Khrushchev to reduce the conventional forces in the military.  Taubman 
states, “when Stalin died he left the USSR isolated in a hostile world, with a war machine it 
couldn’t afford.”28  In May 1945, the war in Europe was coming to a close with the surrender of 
Germany; the Soviet armed forces numbered 11.5 million soldiers under arms.  Postwar 
demobilisations decreased that figure to 5,394,038 by Stalin’s death in March 1953.  With the 
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emphasis on the military-industrial complex since the First Five-Year Plan in 1928, the civilian 
or consumer economy suffered.  Khrushchev intended to reverse the trend, shifting capital from 
expenditures on the large conventional army to consumer consumption and spending on nuclear 
and missile technologies.  
 Soviet citizens had long done without.  Khrushchev strove to improve the standard of 
living and the overall health and well-being of the common Soviet citizen.  He wanted to provide 
the country with “food, clothing, footwear, and housing, in other words everything a human 
being needs and the Soviet people had gone many years without.”29  Where was Khrushchev 
going to find the money to pay for a consumer economy?  Changing the military doctrine 
allowed funds previously tied up in military expenditures to be shifted to domestic 
improvements.  Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that he believed that military’s point of view 
to be, ‘all resources must be spent on armaments, while you yourself are left with no trousers to 
wear.’30
 The first inkling from the CPSU of a new strategic doctrine, or rather shift in defence 
policy, was in the early post-Stalinist years, before a clear victor in the power struggle emerged.  
Despite Beria’s ouster and subsequent execution, he was the first to advocate more tolerable 
‘face’ to the policies carried out by the CPSU and Soviet state.  Historians can argue whether that 
was a genuine policy of Beria, or whether it was to soften the Soviet citizenry’s image of the 
violent man they knew from the Terror.  Upon Beria’s ouster Malenkov lifted the mantle of 
change.
56
29 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, 89.
30 Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, vol. 2 Reformer (1945-1964), 531.
Military Doctrine and Strategy Debate 1953-1955
 On 8 August 1953, Malenkov gave a speech to the Supreme Soviet concerning the plight 
of the common Soviet citizens.  No longer would the consumer economy suffer for the 
betterment of the military-industrial complex.  Ideology had not died with Stalin, nor did it 
diminish under Khrushchev.  Ideology was the leading source of the Communist Party’s 
legitimacy, and only the Party’s understanding of that ideology, gave it the ability to lead the 
Soviet state.  Therefore, Malenkov first discussed the leading role of ideology in the formation of 
policy and as the guiding principle of his thoughts.  “The Communist Party and the Soviet 
government know where and how to lead the people, because they are guided by the scientific 
theory of social development, Marxism-Leninism, the banner of which has been raised so high 
by our great father and teacher Lenin, and the continuer of his cause, Stalin.”31  Current 
developments in the Soviet Union allowed for the Party to follow ideological dogmas and change 
course in economic policy in the first half of the 1950s.  The time had come to “speed up light 
industry with the aim of a more rapid improvement in the material and cultural well-being of the 
population.”32  Malenkov called for lower investment in the military-industrial complex.  He 
proposed tapping into the strategic reserve of hard currencies and gold to fund new investments 
in the civilian economy.  Malenkov pledged to increase investments in agriculture and the 
consumer-related economy by reducing investments to the military-industrial complex.  Zubok 
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argues that Malenkov’s call was the first since 1928 to echo that shift.33  Domestic policy was not 
the only area where Malenkov wished to chart a new policy course.  In the days and weeks after 
Stalin’s death, Malenkov spoke on the need for a new course in Soviet foreign policy.  Peace was 
to be the basis of a new forward-thinking foreign policy emanating from the Kremlin.
 Peace was to be pursued with the West, as relations were strengthened between the 
communist bloc: the USSR, China, Korea, and the fraternal socialist countries of Eastern Europe. 
The Soviet Union under Malenkov could promote “a policy of international cooperation and 
development of business relations with all countries, a policy based on the Lenin-Stalin premise 
of the possibility of the prolonged coexistence and peaceful competition of two different 
systems, capitalist and socialist.”34  War was to be despised by the peoples of the world.  Days 
later Malenkov, speaking before the Supreme Soviet, articulated those sentiments.  Discussing 
the ongoing Korean conflict, Malenkov told the legislature that there were no problems between 
nations, yes even between the USSR and USA, which could not be solved through peaceful 
means.  War should always be a policy of last resort.  Malenkov, and eventually Khrushchev, 
became the standard bearers of the policy of peaceful coexistence.35
 Interviewed in January 1955, shortly before his removal, Malenkov stressed international 
cooperation on nuclear weapons.  He hoped for peaceful coexistence with the West, specifically 
mentioning the USA.  International controls over nuclear weapons were possible; however, all 
nuclear states must agree to an “unconditional ban of nuclear weapons.”  The Big Four (the 
victorious powers of WWII: France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United 
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States) was an avenue Malenkov saw to solve such major international questions.  He also 
pushed for the eventual formation of personal and cultural links between the peoples of the 
Soviet Union and the West.  Only through understanding, Malenkov believed, could progress be 
made in international relations.36
 Malenkov’s policy initiatives were used against him by those in the Party who wished to 
supersede him as leader.  Could the move against Malenkov been perceived as a move by the 
CPSU to re-impose control over the governmental bureaucracy?  Malenkov had seen Stalin use 
the government bureaucracy to wield power before and after the war.  However, it was 
Khrushchev who better understood the political power that was supreme within the Party itself.  
Khrushchev used the power and prestige of the Party, understanding that true power rested in the 
leaders of the Party.  Moving against Malenkov is an illustration of a move by Khrushchev in 
favor of Party control over the bureaucracy of the Soviet government.  Also, one can see a move 
by Khrushchev to replace Malenkov and followers in the government with Khrushchev’s own 
supporters.  Khrushchev not only practiced the selection of mediocracy over meritocracy in the 
armed forces but also within other institutions of the Soviet Union.
   Khrushchev was the primary antagonist against Malenkov.  However, Khrushchev knew 
he could count on the support of the military as those policies expounded by Malenkov 
challenged the dogmatic strictures they had come to rely on.  Namely, the military, and the 
military-industrial complex, were to be the foundation of the economy and first to receive 
budgetary monies.  To suggest reductions in spending was an outrage.  Money for the consumer 
economy was to be found elsewhere.
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 The military response to Malenkov’s policies was not spontaneous.  Guided by the 
Khrushchev faction within the Party, the military successfully waged a public campaign against 
Malenkov and his policies.  Throughout the next 11 years a recurring pattern developed in civil-
military relations.  The military would come to support a specific policy only insofar as its 
institutional interests and status in the state hierarchy were not compromised.  Malenkov’s 
removal was the first such occurrence of the phenomenon.
   Newspaper articles, speeches at major functions and holidays gatherings, and members 
of the military who spoke out publicly against Malenkov during the Central Committee Plenum 
were all used in the removal of Malenkov.  Kliment Voroshilov, serving in his capacity as 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, opened the Party meeting of that body on 8 
February 1955 with discussions on the future of Malenkov.  Khrushchev was given the floor to 
provide that background to what had already been decided by the CC CPSU plenum of 31 
January.  Presenting the Supreme Soviet with a fait accompli, he told the that body that the 
following was adopted unanimously by the Central Committee: 
having heard the report of Com. Khrushchev about Com. Malenkov and 
completely approving the proposal of the CC Presidium on the issue, the CPSU 
CC Plenum thinks that Com. Malenkov is not providing the proper fulfillment of 
the responsibilities of Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.  Not having 
the necessary knowledge and experience in administrative work nor experience 
with the work of local Soviet organs, Com. Malenkov organises the work of the 
Council of Ministers poorly and does not ensure the thorough and timely 
preparation of questions for meetings of the Council of Ministers.37
The indictment against him castigated Malenkov for his ideological deviations, words 
reminiscent of the debates from the 1920s and 1930s.  Those ideological attacks focused on his 
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speech to the Supreme Soviet two years earlier after Stalin’s death.  “Comrade Malenkov made 
theoretically incorrect and politically harmful contrast between the growth rate of heavy industry 
and the growth rate of the light and food industries.”38  
 Not only were his views on foreign policy a deviation from Party dogma, but his views 
on foreign and defence policies of the Soviet Union only made Western action bolder.  Weakness 
was perceived due to Malenkov’s stated views.  His views would prostrate the defence of the 
Soviet Union.  
The dissemination of such views not only does not support the mobilisation of 
public opinion to actively struggle against the criminal designs of the imperialists 
to unleash a nuclear war but, quite the contrary, is capable of engendering inaction 
in peoples’ efforts to disrupt the plans of the aggressors, which is to the advantage 
of the imperialist inciters of a new world war who are counting on intimidating 
people with atomic blackmail.39
How ironic that Khrushchev and his supporters in the Party would find fault with atomic 
intimidation, which became a keystone in Khrushchev’s foreign policy adventures in subsequent 
years.  
 Moving on to specific military aspects of Malenkov’s failed understanding of ideology 
and the Soviet state, Khrushchev attacked his policy concerning the inevitability of war.  
Khrushchev attacked Malenkov for asserting the threat to the destruction of civilisation with the 
advent of the hydrogen bomb.
We have always raised the question such that if war begins, then victory will be 
ours, that war will not lead to the end of civilisation but to the end of capitalism, 
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to an expansion of our borders, and to the expansion and an affirmation of our 
teachings, teachings created by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.40
Framed as an ideological debate, Khrushchev attacked Malenkov for the exact policies, and in 
some instances, phrases, that he would shortly adopt.  Discrediting Malenkov’s policies 
questioned whether the determined interest of the Soviet heavy industries and military 
technological progression continued to trump the growing need for investment in the civilian 
economy.  Khrushchev ‘reassured’ his audience at the Supreme Soviet that the CC, with the 
removal of Malenkov, maintained the policy of a continued focus on heavy industry.  “The 
absolute main thing for us is strengthening the defence capacity of the country.”41  The military 
leaders could hardly contain themselves; two years of decreased military spending were to be 
halted.  Their support of Khrushchev in news articles and speeches had returned dividends.  
Weaponry procurement was to continue unabated.
 After listening to the prolonged diatribe against him, Malenkov took the floor and 
professed his sincere regret for his antithetical views.  Remorseful toward his removal, he was 
glad to be shown the error of his ways and how to improve his understanding of ideology.  
Acknowledging “gross mistakes,” Malenkov accepted responsibility and was allowed to remain 
a member of the Presidium.42
62
40 “[Uncorrected] Transcript of a meeting of the Party group of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 8 February 1955,” 
Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Fond 52, Opis 1, Delo 285, List 1-34, Cold War International 
History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center.
41 “[Uncorrected] Transcript of a meeting of the Party group of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 8 February 1955,” 
Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Fond 52, Opis 1, Delo 285, List 1-34, Cold War International 
History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center.
42 “[Uncorrected] Transcript of a meeting of the Party group of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 8 February 1955,” 
Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Fond 52, Opis 1, Delo 285, List 1-34, Cold War International 
History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center.
 Marshal N.A. Bulganin was elevated to the post vacated by Malenkov.  Marshal G.K. 
Zhukov was named Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union.  Although there was no love lost 
between these men (Zhukov viewed Bulganin as nothing more than a political stooge within the 
military ranks), the military now had two very strong supporters within the ministries of 
government.  More will be discussed in the next chapter on the role Marshal Zhukov played in 
civil-military relations while in charge of the Ministry of Defence.  
  However, one offshoot of the military’s support of Khrushchev against Malenkov was an 
open debate on military strategy.  An open debate such as that had not been seen since the Civil 
War between those who favoured a centralised military versus those who supported a militia-
style system, between supporter of Mikhail Frunze and Leon Trotsky.  Certainly no strategic 
debate had occurred under Stalin, even during the best of times through the Great Patriotic War.  
 Before we enter into the debate which played out in newspapers, academic journals, and 
within the Kremlin, one must understand the terminology associated with this debate. 
Terminology associated with the debate, which began in the 1950s, generally meant one thing to 
Western armies and academia, and occupies another meaning within the Soviet context.  
“Military affairs, and military theory in particular, occup[ied] a much different position in the 
Soviet Union than in the [West].”43  Ideology focused all definitions around the theories of 
socialism and communism.  According to Lenin, theory was a guide followed by military for 
action.  Theory informed the military on how to mobilize, train, and fight a military conflict.  By 
the 1950s a shift occurred in Soviet thought on military strategy, doctrine, and theory.  Early 
Soviet military theorists were products of Imperial Russian military academies and the Imperial 
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General Staff.  The theorist and practitioners of the 1950s were predominately products of the 
Civil War and proved their mettle during the Great Patriotic War.
 Military doctrine was the political policy of the Party and government in the military 
sphere.  It was an expression of military policies of the state.  Stated otherwise it was the 
directive handed down by the state on any political or military strategy.44  Marshal of the Soviet 
Union A.A. Grechko, stated that military doctrine was “an officially accepted system of views in 
a given state and in its armed forces on the nature of war and methods of conducting it and on 
preparations of the country and the army for war.”  Using Grechko’s definition, doctrine 
answered these questions:
• What enemy?
• What is the nature of the war? What are the goals and missions?
• What forces are needed to complete those goals and missions?
• How are preparations for war to be implemented?
• What methods must be used to wage war?45
Thus, using both Western and Soviet definitions, the military doctrine of the Soviet state was 
proclaimed by the CPSU and the Soviet state to the Soviet armed forces.  Military doctrine 
answered those questions posed by Marshal Grechko; however, those answers will be driven by 
ideological considerations.
 Soviet theorists focused their concern for doctrine on the next war.  Doctrine provided 
guideposts for the formulations of strategy and weapons systems development.  Thus, doctrine 
possibly preceded actual military capabilities by several years.  Scott and Scott focused on the 
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doctrine of the 1960s as “clearly point[ing] the way for the buildup of strategic nuclear forces,” 
which occurred in the next decades of the Cold War.46
 Central to the academicians debate on doctrine was military science.  In the Soviet sense 
it was focused on the broad study of military affairs.  It centered on a unified system of 
knowledge about the preparations for and the waging of war.  Under military science there were 
subsections which were to be studied: the character of war, the laws of war, how to prepare the 
country and armed forces for war, and the exact methods of waging war.  The most important 
aspect of Soviet military science was the theory of military art.  What are the exact methods and 
forms of armed combat?  Strategy, operational art, and tactics are the integral components of 
military art.  Strategy was the centralized focus of war; to be specific, would a country fight a 
defensive or an offensive war?  Operational art delved into smaller areas of war.  Operational art 
was concerned with a specific arena of a war - a battle or front.  Further into this equation were 
tactics.  Tactics were engaged at the level of small unit maneuvers and how each unit had 
assigned tasks to a battle. When the tactics of all the units came together, one has the operational 
art!
 Understanding the definitions above is key to the comprehension of the next sections in 
the debate on military affairs in the Khrushchev era.  From the debates which occurred around 
the time of the removal of Malenkov, to the greater debate on the future of war and military 
doctrine, Khrushchev divided the military leadership.  Some aligned with him in supporting a 
greater reliance and preeminent position on nuclear weapons, while others viewed that as an 
unbalanced, skewed doctrinal policy for the military.  That debate began in the months following 
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Stalin’s death.  The first open debate on military doctrine quickly attacked Stalin’s control over 
it. 
 In a March 1946 interview with Alexander Werth, Stalin stated that he did “not believe 
the atomic bomb to be as serious a force as certain politicians are inclined to regard.  Atomic 
bombs are intended to intimidate the weak-nerved, but they cannot decide about the outcome of 
the war, since such bombs are by no means sufficient for this purpose!”  Stalin’s argument to 
Werth was armies win wars!47  From 1948 to Khrushchev’s first conventional arms reductions in 
1955, the size of the Soviet armed forces and those of the Eastern bloc countries doubled.48  
 Stalin believed that military science and doctrine were guided by what he coined 
‘permanent operating factors.’ Those included: the dominance of the Soviet system, weapons 
development, intensive training and readiness programs (including ideological indoctrination), 
the support of national defence by the national economy and society, and the strong leadership of 
the CPSU.  Within months of Stalin’s death, military publications printed revisions to that 
thinking.  The ‘permanent operating factors’ were no longer the guiding principles of Soviet 
military thought.  
 Malenkov publicly supported policies, which were one-hundred and eighty degrees 
opposite that of the interests the military supported.  In the 1960s, Kolkowicz argued that the 
Soviet military emerged onto the political arena with the debated between Khrushchev and 
Malenkov.  Kolkowicz believed: “by throwing their support to the factions in the Party that 
publicly supported their interests, the military revealed, for the first time in decades, that it could 
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be a crucial factor in the Soviet state in times of internal division and collective rule.”49  As 
stated above, Conquest wrote that only the Soviet army was capable of matching the leadership 
and organisation of the CPSU, and thus had the ability to influence the policies of the CPSU. 
 While Kolkowicz’s argument is valid, it is flawed.  The military did support the faction 
within the inter-party division that supported their professional interests.  However, without 
Malenkov’s views, and Khrushchev’s rebuttal of that, the military would have remained sidelined 
in the debate.  Malenkov’s Supreme Soviet speech in 1953 was quickly rebutted by the military.   
In October 1953, Colonel I.N. Nenakhov published the reasons Malenkov’s policies hindered the 
future defence and stature of the Soviet Union. Weak and reeling from the shift to a consumer 
economy model, the Soviet Union would be vulnerable to an attack from the West.  Only 
vigilance against Western aggression would hinder imperialist action against the USSR.50  
Nenakhov acted as the public voice of the military brass.  Who could question the military on 
their intentions?  Did the military support for Khrushchev over Malenkov in the early post-
Stalinist leadership struggle illustrate a greater political awareness on part of the military’s brass? 
Illustrated below is another viewpoint.  Malenkov was not a political enemy of the military.  He 
did argue for a shift away from a military footing of the economy.  Malenkov attacked the very 
institutional interests of the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff, and the entire armed forces 
of the USSR.  In years to come, the military faced those very same attacks from Khrushchev as 
well.  Once a perceived encroachment was felt by the military leadership, their support of 
Khrushchev and his policies waned.  Partly these conflicts boiled down to perceptions of rights 
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and purview over military policies.  Where did the military feel the CPSU had overstepped the 
boundaries dividing military and Party purviews?  Military doctrine was an area of military 
professionalism.  As Khrushchev’s power in the Party grew in the 1950s, his perceived 
knowledge of doctrine increased.  Whether wholly based on his military career, or his position 
within the government and Party, Khrushchev used both to comment on military subjects, from 
weapons systems to tactics.  As he voiced opinions on various aspects of doctrine, the military 
divided over support for and skepticism toward such opinions.
 From the onset of the post-Stalinist era, the military actively, and publicly, attacked the 
Stalinist hold on strategic thinking and military doctrine.  General-Major N.A. Talenskii, former 
editor of Krasnaya zvezda and in 1953 editor of Voennaya mysl’ (Military Thought), was the first 
to broach the topic of Stalin’s control of doctrine.  According to Talenskii, the ‘basic law of 
armed conflict is primarily the law of victory.’  Thus, the political goal of armed conflict is 
achieved only through victory.  That law permeated societies and was universal.  It applied to 
socialist and capitalist societies.51  
 Talenskii did not exactly attack Stalin’s ‘permanent operating factors’.  “Victory in 
modern war is achieved by the decisive defeat of the enemy during armed conflict by successive 
strikes increasing in force, on the basis of superiority in permanent operating factors, which 
decide the fate of war, and on the base of the comprehensive use of the economic, moral-
political, and military possibilities in their unity and interaction.”52  The factors alone did not 
lead to victory in armed conflict; however, those factors coupled with societal, economic, and 
68
51 N.A. Talenskii, “Po voprosy o kharaktere zakonov voennoi nauki” (On the Question of the Character of the Laws 
of Military Science), Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) no. 9, (September 1953).  Voennaya Mysl’ was the primary 
organ of military leadership.  It had a limited publication and only disseminated to those within the Ministry of 
Defence and General Staff hierarchy.  
52 N.A. Talenskii, “Po voprosy o xaraktere zakonov voennoi nauki.”
technological developments would lead to victory in modern warfare.  Surprise in modern war 
was an important determinant of victory.  Preemption should be considered a national policy of 
defence in modern war if one reads into Talenskii.  Stalin’s ‘permanent operating factors’ alone 
would not win a war; nonetheless, preemptive assaults built around those factors would lead to 
victory.  Nowhere in his article did Talenskii discuss the impact of nuclear weapons on strategic 
thinking and military science.  How would nuclear weapons change the ways Soviet strategists 
think on war?  Talenskii did not discuss how nuclear weapons might have an impact on modern 
warfare.  Talenskii’s historical importance rests on being one of the first officers openly, and in 
print, to question not only Stalin’s tightly held control on military thought, but also on Stalin’s 
interpretations of strategy and doctrine.
 Talenskii’s article was not well-received in all military circles.  It openly challenged the 
Stalinist hold on thought; thus it challenged the Party’s control of doctrine.  Within a year of its 
publication, Talenskii was removed from his editorial position at Voennaya mysl’ and given a 
post at the Institute of History in the Soviet Academy of Sciences.  Marshal Vasilevskii, without 
mentioning his name, castigated Talenskii in Krasnaya zvezda.  Writing the ‘outcome of a war is 
determined not by transitory factors,’ which Talenskii discussed, ‘but by permanent operating 
factors,’53 Vasilevskii showed he was mired in traditional thought.  He was of another generation. 
Not a local commander at the Front during World War II, but a member of Stavka, he was 
unwilling to shift thought.  With some success, Khrushchev was able to play these two groups, 
those who served at the Front and those with central command in Moscow, off against one 
another illustrating his use of divide and rule tactics.  Those Front commanders whom 
69
53 Krasnaya zvezda, 7 May 1954.
Khrushchev fought with, especially at Stalingrad, became integral to his new thinking on 
military doctrine.  The so-called Stalingrad Group owed their position to him; nonetheless, by the 
1960s they became fragmented themselves.  Some remained loyal to Khrushchev whereas others 
realized his infringements on military professionalism and skewed views on strategy might lead 
to a weakened defense posture of the Soviet Union.    
 While most senior officers disagreed with Talenskii’s view on modern warfare there was 
importance to the debate.  The debate itself mattered.  It illustrated the changes within the Soviet 
Union since Stalin’s death.  Openness was welcome in some areas of thought.  The fact that there 
was an open debate occurring in the highest echelons of the military leadership was evidence 
enough that changes had occurred since Stalin’s death.  It took a year, but in time, even Marshal 
Vasilevskii changed course.  Writing in Izvestiya, Vasilevskii came out in favour of Talenskii and 
Rotmistrov’s ideas, as are discussed below, on the importance of surprise in modern war.54
 In the 1980s, Scott and Scott argued that “personal, unofficial, or conflicting views on 
basic military issues simply are not permitted in the highly controlled and censored Soviet press, 
military or otherwise, unless there is a reason.”55 While that may be aptly applied to the Soviet 
Union in the 1980s, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, there was a greater sense of openness that 
military officers operated.  While the military press was used for specific reasons, such as to 
censure Malenkov, it was also openly used by the military against the perceived intrusions by 
Khrushchev into their perceived areas of expertise, which were not to be encroached upon.
 Although Talenskii’s view was criticised early on, over time it was accepted as a 
fundamental shift in strategic thought.  Throughout the 1950s, what was called a “revolution” in 
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military affairs occurred within the Soviet Union.  Khrushchev believed revolutions in military 
affairs occurred with brilliant technological breakthroughs.  Gunpowder facilitated the last 
revolution; nuclear weapons would facilitate the modern revolution in military affairs.  The 
military press, and military officers, published extensively on the subject.  A seminal article was 
written by Marshal of the Armoured Forces Pavel Rotmistrov, who also held a Doctorate of 
Military Sciences.  From 1948 to 1958 Rotmistrov was deputy head of academic department at 
the General Staff Academy; until 1964 he headed the Malinovskii Tank Academy.  
 Marshal Rotmistrov’s writings focused on the next armed conflict because since the end 
of World War II ‘serious quantitative and qualitative changes have occurred in military affairs.  
Lessons were studied from the last war.  While those lessons were folded into doctrine, atomic 
weapons changed the face of warfare.’56  According to Rotmistrov, ‘the tremendous development 
of the productive forces, the unprecedented progress of science and technology in the postwar 
period, and particularly the harnessing of atomic energy could not but influence military art.’57  
Those changes were incorporated into changing military doctrine.  The overarching influence of 
technological developments was not overestimated by Rotmistrov.  
During World War II, tanks and aviation, which were rapidly developed after their 
appearances in World War I, began to influence not only tactic but operational art 
directly.  The case is quite different with atomic weapons, which possess vast 
destructive powers, and with their carriers: intercontinental ballistic missiles; 
long-range aviation; surface vessels and submarines armed with rockets which 
make it possible to deliver crushing attacks on objectives hundreds and thousands 
of kilometers away; rockets for operational-tactical purposes; and atomic artillery.  
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These types of combat equipment influence strategy, operational art, and tactics 
simultaneously.58
Thus, whereas aviation was limited in scope, nuclear weapons touched on all aspects of fighting 
a future war.  Rotmistrov quoted Khrushchev in his article.  In an interview with the Hearst 
newspapers, Khrushchev stated just what effect nuclear weapons might have on the next war.  No 
continent will be untouched by the next war.  That was the focus of Rotmistrov’s article.
 Rotmistrov further focused on the simultaneous action across a broad front.  Normal 
military targets, along with strategic reserves and stockpiles, became possible targets.  Offensive 
maneuvers in depth, the deep attack, pincer movements behind enemy lines to envelope and cut 
of large areas of the battlefield, which had been part of Soviet strategy since Tukhachevksii, 
became even more important with the development of nuclear weapons.  Rotmistrov facilitated a 
doctrinal debate, which in 1955 was ahead of its time.  By the 1960s, military theorists were 
advocating the use of conventional forces alongside those of strategic and tactical forces.  
However, Rotmistrov was the first to advocate that doctrine.  Nuclear weapons should be used 
alongside ‘attacks by large armoured groups and the use of tactical and operational airborne 
landings.’59  Only conventional forces had the capability to hold territory and advance forward 
on the battlefield.  That argument was taboo in the mind of Khrushchev.  Khrushchev wrote he 
could hardly ‘imagine how tanks could survive in contemporary warfare.’60  Conventional 
weapons were to be sidelined and predominately replaced by nuclear weapons and their 
attendant delivery systems.  Even in retirement Khrushchev argued: ‘conventional weapons are 
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not the decisive factor in determining basic policy when we’re talking, not about local conflict, 
but worldwide confrontation.  Today everything depends on skill in handling thermonuclear 
weapons.’61  Khrushchev argued that conventional weapons should be reduced to a level that 
allowed for ‘reasonable sufficiency [razumnaya dostatochnost’].’62  Those ideas were central to 
the debate between Khrushchev and the military throughout the 1960s.
 Central to Khrushchev’s decision to reduce conventional forces was a new line of 
thinking within the leadership of the CPSU.  Once Khrushchev had consolidated power, with the 
removal of Beria and Malenkov, he realized that the ‘nuclear standoff made the Leninist-Marxist 
tenets about the inevitability of another global war obsolete.’63  Peaceful coexistence with the 
West, specifically with the United States, was possible. The exact policy initiatives favoured by 
Malenkov, which led to his removal, were not espoused by Khrushchev.  Stalin’s implications 
that war was inevitable was fearful in a nuclear world.  Any superpower conflict would quickly 
expand into a worldwide nuclear exchange.  Peaceful coexistence only accounted for part of 
Khrushchev’s new thinking.  The other aspect was that the ‘socialist world,’ led by Moscow, had 
been growing stronger, not only in East-Central Europe but in Asia as well.  Mao Zedong and the 
Chinese Communist Party were victorious on the Chinese mainland.  Thus, a larger and stronger 
socialist camp made war less inevitable.64
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 Stalin had pushed for a conventional arms buildup that would create a conventional arms 
race with the United States.  John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, 
feared such a challenge because, on the balance of conventional forces, the US could not 
compete with the USSR.  He feared bankrupting the US.  Khrushchev’s reductions of the armed 
forces began in earnest in 1955-57, when he reduced the size of the military by almost 1.8 
million troops.  Another 300,000 were demobilised in January 1958 (see Appendix B for a table 
of conventional force reductions).65  Production of long-range bombers was halted.  Factories 
were re-fitted to produce passenger planes or ballistic missiles.  Nuclear weapons and missiles 
would provide the defensive capabilities necessary to the Soviet Union under Khrushchev.  He 
told his critics: 
You realize things have changed since the time of Suvorov.  Modern soldiers no 
longer live by the motto ‘a bullet is a fool, but a bayonet is a sure friend.’  Battles 
are no longer won with bayonets, or bullets for that matter.  Even Suvorov used to 
say that a better-trained and better-armed force can defeat an enemy that 
outnumbers it.  In his day, armies met with sword and cannon.  With the invention 
of the machine gun, the nature of warfare changed.  A few machine-gunners could 
now mow down huge numbers of infantry men like a farmer with a scythe.  Now, 
in the age of missiles and nuclear bombs, the number of divisions on one side or 
the other has practically no effect on the outcome of the battle.  A hydrogen bomb 
can turn whole divisions into so much cooked meat.  One bomb has an enormous 
radius of destruction.66
As the Soviet Union developed greater knowledge of advanced military technology, namely 
ballistic rocketry and nuclear weapons, conventional forces became outdated.
 Following Khrushchev’s Secret Speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, even 
greater public debate occurred over the future of warfare.  Writing on the Marxist-Leninist 
ideological implications in war and the army, P.A Chuvikov asserted that ideology guided 
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military strategy.  “Soviet military strategy contemplates first of all the correct preparation and 
utilization in time of combat actions of all reserves for the achievement of military victory.”67  
Even though Stalinist thought suffered its greatest assault at the Twentieth Congress, Chuvikov 
still asserted that the ‘permanent operating factors’ were valid nonetheless.  He did give credence 
to those factors according to Lenin rather than Stalin.  Chuvikov attacked Stalin’s cult of 
personality and its negative effect on the ‘permanent operating factors.’  Stalin’s cult of 
personality hindered original thought, particularly in military thought and technological 
developments.
 Chuvikov went on to quote from Marshal Zhukov’s speech to the Twentieth Congress.  
“In building up the Soviet Armed Forces,” Zhukov stated:
We proceed from the fact that the methods and forms of future war will be 
different from all past wars in many ways.  Future war, if unleashed, will be 
characterised by the mass use of air forces, various rocket weapons and various 
means of mass destruction such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical, and 
bacteriological weapons.  However, we proceed from the fact that the latest 
weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, do not reduce the decisive role 
of ground armies, navies, and aviation.  Without strong ground forces, without 
strategic, long-range, and frontal aviation, and a modern naval fleet, without well-
organised cooperation between them, modern war cannot be waged.68
His Minister of Defence still advocated the use of conventional forces in future wars.  
Khrushchev was against any future involvement in wars of large, massed groups of conventional 
forces.  By 1956, Khrushchev was already an advocate of nuclear weapons serving as the 
dominant weapons of Soviet military capabilities.  It was during the Twentieth Congress that 
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Zhukov was made a candidate member of the CPSU CC Presidium.  Within a year and a half he 
would be removed from all Party and military positions he held.      
 At the Twentieth Party Congress military officers were given membership in the CPSU 
CC.    From the Stalingrad Group, Marshals Konev, Malinovskii, and Moskalenko were made  
full CC members; outside of the Group, Marshals Sokolovskii and Vasilevskii were made full 
members.  Those officers elevated to candidate members of the CC were predominately 
members of the Stalingrad Group: Marshal Bagramyan, Marshal Biryuzov, Marshal Chuikov, 
Marshal Yeremenko, General of the Army Garbatov, Marshal Grechko, Marshal of Artillery 
Nedelin, General of the Army Luchinskii, and Marshal of Aviation Zhigarev.  The old war horses 
Marshals Budenny and Timoshenko, along with Admiral Gorshkov, were also made candidate 
members of the CC.  Twenty members of the CC chosen at the 20th Party Congress were 
military officers, or 7.8 percent of the total CC membership.  That percentage increased to 9.5 
percent at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961.  However, the highest percentage of military officers 
as members of the CC was 11 percent in 1952.69
  Grechko lauded Zhukov’s removal and noted the hinderance the former Minister of 
Defence had on civil-military relations.  Zhukov’s role in civil-military relations will be 
discussed further in the next chapter.  However, a brief discussion on his ouster and civil-military 
relations in relation to the rise of the Stalingrad group is necessary here.  Grechko hailed the 
October 1957 Plenum as “a decisive event in the life of the Party, the country, and the Soviet 
armed forces [which]...launched a significant new stage in the development of the Soviet armed 
forces.”70  The April 1958 Statute on Military Council stressed the importance and size of 
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military councils.  More authority was given to regional military councils, which were increased 
in size to include local party leaders.  A 1958 GPU (Main Political Administration) memorandum 
gave greater authority over Party activities within the military, that authority was to become 
more centralised too.  A year after Zhukov’s removal saw the introduction of the Statute on the 
Political Organs in the Soviet Army and Navy.  The Statute stated that all activities of political 
organs, including those concerned with military training were the sole purview of political 
workers.  More time was to be set aside strictly for political education.71  
 Despite Zhukov’s removal from his military and Party posts, the military never fully 
acquiesced in Khrushchev’s desire for complete Party control over doctrine or military thought 
on strategy.  Reimposed quickly after Zhukov’s removal, Party controls over the military were 
relaxed within the next year.  In Krasnaya zvezda, Malinovskii supported the military over strict 
Party controls.  There was a need for the return to edinonachalie; Malinovskii argued in an 
article he wrote insisting that political workers must support the military commanders of their 
unit.72  It was argued edinonachalie allowed for the commanding military officer to have greater 
control over their subordinates and soldiers under them.  As edinonachalie was re-instituted, 
political officers no longer had to sign off on military commanders orders.
Khrushchev Last Push to Reduce Conventional Forces: From the January 1960 Speech to 
the Supreme Soviet to 1964
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 Khrushchev traveled to the United States on an official visit in 1959.  Khrushchev and 
Eisenhower engaged in official talks at Camp David.  Disarmament was the priority of their 
discussions.  Khrushchev felt that Eisenhower was eager to reach an agreement, and both thought 
that nuclear disarmament could possibly eliminate the inevitability of war.73  The problem was 
how to reach a compromise.  Khrushchev put forth the idea of removing all troops from foreign 
territories.  He argued throughout the 1950s that the United States had encircled the USSR with 
hostile military bases.  Eisenhower was not prepared to discuss that idea; any discussion of US 
troop movement in Europe, or withdrawals, had to be discussed with the NATO allies first.  He 
was ready to float the idea of a nuclear test ban agreement and an end to the production of 
nuclear weapons.  He again argued the idea of an Open Skies program for verification of these 
two ideas.  Eisenhower’s ideas on Open Skies had been first brought to the Four Powers summit 
meeting in Geneva (July 1955).  Eisenhower still understood that such capability of the 
overflight of US territory by Soviet long-range aviation was possible in 1959.  The proposal was 
again rejected by Khrushchev.  No substantial agreement on disarmament was reached at Camp 
David.  
 While at Camp David, Khrushchev asked the President how he made decisions on 
military expenditures.  Both men agreed that the control of spending was a problem for their 
respective nations.  Eisenhower told Khrushchev that his military leaders would come to him 
asking for monies for military programs and weapons systems.  If the funding was denied, the 
military brass returned advising that the Soviet Union was developing those very systems and 
spending monies on those very programs.  The military successfully argued the Soviet Union 
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was advancing and even surpassing the US in military knowledge and capabilities.  At that point, 
Eisenhower would have no choice but to give in and approve the expenditures.74  Khrushchev 
echoed that very scenario back to Eisenhower.  Soviet military leaders argued in the same 
fashion for their spending concerns.  He told the President how his General Staff came to him 
arguing that without funds, the security of the Soviet Union would be compromised; the United 
States would surpass them in the arms race.  Khrushchev elaborated on this subject in his 
memoirs.
If the military men aren’t kept under control, if they’re allowed to charge off in 
whatever direction they please, they’ll drive our country into a budgetary grave.  
They always have to be reined in, and they should not be allowed to pull the wool 
over the government’s eyes in order to get what they want.  They try to frighten 
the government with reports of the enemy’s strength.75
Khrushchev was soft in one area.  He was highly resistant to military procurement requests, but 
he could not resist high- technology weaponry, such as ballistic missiles.76  Both men agreed that 
was wasteful spending and agreed that some sort of deal should be made to end superfluous, 
wasteful spending.  However, no such agreement was reached under their leadership.  
 Both the US and Soviet delegations confirmed that nothing of substance had been agreed 
on at Camp David.  Eisenhower and Khrushchev offered a joint statement, which was 
noncommittal:
Chairman Khrushchev and the President have agreed that these discussions have 
been useful in clarifying each other’s positions on a number of subjects.  The talks 
were not undertaken to negotiate issues.  It is hoped, however, that their exchange 
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of views will contribute to a better understanding of the motives and position of 
each and thus to the achievement of a just and lasting peace.77
That statement answered no questions.  No mention of disarmament whatsoever or cooperation 
in ending the arms race was made.  It was as vague as possible so as not to commit them to any 
policy formulations.
 In the months following his trip to the United States, Khrushchev scripted a speech 
delivered before the Supreme Soviet plenum in January 1960.  In that speech, Khrushchev laid 
out even deeper reductions to the conventional military forces, deeper cuts to defence budgets, 
but in doing so ignited a debate on the future of warfare and the military strategy of the Soviet 
Union.  Khrushchev’s speech outlined the positions of Soviet strategy, defining a new military 
doctrine, which was based on the decisiveness of nuclear weapons in armed conflict.78  In his 
memoirs he remembered 1960 by writing, ‘the correct choice for us today is missiles, nuclear 
weapons, and a submarine fleet.  Our approach toward other means of waging war must be very 
restrained, and we have to think very deeply to justify expenditures on other things.’79  He went 
further writing, ‘above all, the size of the army must be reduced without delay, along with 
conventional weapons, while maintaining our powerful arsenal of nuclear weapons.’80  
Khrushchev, even in retirement, pushed to show his beliefs that conventional forces were 
antiquated tools of war not suitable for modern, possible nuclear warfare.
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 Building what he had already stated at both the Twentieth and Twenty-first Party 
Congresses, Khrushchev continued to stress that war was no longer inevitable.  Achievements by  
Soviet industry had provided the nation with the deterrent power to rebuke the US and its NATO 
allies.  Khrushchev began with: 
the Party, the Government, and the entire Soviet people give their warm thanks to 
the scientists, engineers, technicians, and workers to whose knowledge and effort 
we owe great achievements in developing atomic and hydrogen weapons, rockets, 
and all other means that have made it possible to raise the defence potential of our 
country to so high a level, which in turn enables us now to undertake a further 
reduction of the armed forces.81
A new military doctrine, built on the pillars of nuclear weapons and their attendant delivery 
systems, was going to allow for those reductions.  The Strategic Rocket Force, centered on 
ballistic missiles, was to become the primary arm of the Soviet military negating the former 
importance of naval and air forces.  Khrushchev reiterated that since 1955, “the numerical 
strength of the armed forces in our country has been reduced by a third, but the firepower has 
increased many times over.”82  
 Firepower alone would not win the next war.  Nuclear weapons had changed the face of 
war.  Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet that the sheer territorial size of the USSR allowed the 
country to prevail in future nuclear engagements.  All countries would suffer, but the USSR was 
able to absorb an attack and still have second-strike capabilities.  
 Khrushchev advocated a new military doctrine based solely on nuclear and strategic 
weapons.  Conventional battlefield weapons were outdated and irrelevant in the nuclear age.  “In 
our time, a country’s defence capacity is not determined by the number of men under arms, or 
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men in uniform.”83  The leadership of the military was already questioning Khrushchev openly in 
his push for doctrinal changes and political education in the military.  The 1960 Supreme Soviet 
speech further strengthened their resolve.  Questioning doctrine from a political standpoint, in 
the minds of the military, undermined their institutional realm of military professionalism.  
Reactions varied from 1960 to Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964, but Khrushchev’s speech managed 
to stratify the military.  The Stalingrad Group, which had owed their positions to Khrushchev’s 
patronage, began to question Khrushchev’s ideas on military strategy and doctrine.  Even those 
seemingly most loyal to him began to question his judgement concerning the sole reliance on 
nuclear weapons.  
 Following Khrushchev at the Supreme Soviet in January, Malinovskii spoke in greater 
detail on strategy and developing doctrinal changes.  Although the basis of his argument 
followed that of Khrushchev, Malinovskii pointed out that nuclear forces alone still did not 
provide for total victory in war.  Throughout the following years, this argument became the basis 
for the debate among the military itself and between the military and Party leaders.  “The rocket 
troops of our Armed Forces unquestionably are the main service of the Armed Forces, but we 
realize that one kind of troops cannot resolve all the tasks of war.”84  All branches of the military, 
working together in tandem, must be utilised, and coordinated in their attack or defence, to 
provide victory in war.  Malinovskii meant that conventional forces, even armed with battlefield 
nuclear weapons, were to be used on future, nuclear, battlefields.  Territory must still be 
controlled and held!  A larger question was how a modern force in Khrushchev’s mind was to 
fight a localised war.  How was it to fight a conventional land war?
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 As Minister of Defence, Malinovskii had to act as an intermediary between the Party and 
the military leaders.  Writing for officers in Krasnaya zvezda, Malinovskii stated:
Before a decision is taken on questions of organisation and military development 
and of strengthening the Armed Forces’ combat power, the Central Committee 
and the Presidium with the First Secretary, Comrade Khrushchev, make a 
thorough study of the state of affairs and the concrete conditions in the Army and 
Navy, in consultation with the Army commanders, [which] enables the Party and 
its Central Committee to reach correct, well-thought-out decisions on the most 
complicated questions of military development in Lenin’s way.85
Despite those words, Marshal Malinovskii was not entirely convinced of Khrushchev’s new 
strategic thought.  The Party, including Khrushchev, did meet with military officers prior to the 
Supreme Soviet meeting; however, military commanders were angry the debate was dictated 
from above.  Military circles were presented with a fait accompli.86  Throughout the 1960s, 
Malinovskii tacitly supported Khrushchev in public, but in his own mind reserved judgement on 
new strategic thought.   
 At the Twenty-second Party Congress, held in 1961, Malinovskii further distanced 
himself from Khrushchev’s doctrine.  In his speech to the Congress, Malinovskii stated the next 
war would be one of combined arms despite the development of nuclear weaponry.87  Although 
those weapons change the face of warfare, “we nevertheless come to the conclusion that final 
victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of the joint actions of all the services 
of the armed forces.”88
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 As in the 1953-1955 discussions on doctrine and strategy concerning nuclear weapons 
and the inevitability of war and Malenkov’s removal, the debate amongst military officers for or 
against Khrushchev’s policy was played out on the public stage.  While some officers, such as 
Malinovskii, were guarded in their criticism, other officers were not so contained in the public 
responses to Khrushchev’s new strategic doctrine.  General of the Army Kurasov attacked 
Khrushchev ideas in a strongly worded article published in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal.  
Kurasov argued that mass armies held and important role in modern warfare even with the arrival 
of nuclear weapons.  Thus, the state must maintain investment in heavy industries and 
conventional weaponry.  Monistic theories on warfare doctrine are dangerous.  If your only 
response is nuclear weapons, how do you respond to less violent conflicts?89  Where is the 
proportionality?  Above all, the debate facilitated the schism within the Stalingrad Group. 
Perceived pro-Khrushchev officers, such as Biryuzov, Moskalenko, and Chuikov, were pitted 
against more moderate, professional military (in the sense that the military is their primary duty 
and where loyalties reside) such as Malinovskii, Grechko, Zakharov, and Krylov.  The more 
powerful officers, with a greater sense of military professionalism, specifically Malinovskii and 
Grechko, became opposed to Khrushchev’s ideas and plans for the military.  Khrushchev 
supported those who supported him by elevating them into positions of leadership - illustrating 
the choice of mediocracy over meritocracy.  Marshal Krylov attacked the fundamental ideas 
behind Khrushchev’s plans.  He also reignited the debate over the criticism and self-criticism of 
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officers and the unity of command (edinonachalie).  Krylov advocated  the strengthening of 
unity of command within units.90
 Article after article in Krasnaya zvezda argued against Khrushchev’s new doctrine.  
Nuclear weapons and the element of surprise alone did not guarantee victory.  ‘In [a] new war, 
massive multimillion armies would, without a doubt, be participating, which would require large 
reserves of commanding personnel and vast contingents of soldiers.’91  In Izvestiya, Rotmistrov 
maintained the importance of ground forces in modern warfare.  Rotmistrov simply argued that 
while nuclear weapons have enormous destructive power, they “do not conquer territory.”  As 
nuclear technology advanced, so did advancements and breakthroughs in the technology of 
conventional weaponry.92  Writing the year Khrushchev was ousted, Rotmistrov went even 
further in the argument to maintain a strong conventional force alongside the development of 
nuclear armaments.
Nuclear weapons are powerful and formidable, but they do not occupy territory.  
Soldiers are needed for the final defeat of the enemy in areas of nuclear strikes.  
However, it is difficult for soldiers to move into areas subjected to nuclear attack.  
Under those conditions, tank forces are best suited for carrying out bold, dynamic 
combat operations.93
After 1960, opinions were increasingly voiced for the retention of a sizable conventional military  
force as the Soviet nuclear arsenal was developed and expanded.
 Not only did the military oppose the policies of Khrushchev concerning doctrine, but they 
also disdained the sacking of 250,000 officers.  The sacking occurred without any retraining and 
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often, without recourse to a government pension.  The forced retirement involved the loss of the 
housing allowance afforded to Soviet officers.  The practice of using conscripted soldiers in the 
civilian economy, as had occurred in the 1920s and 1930s, was resumed.  That led to revolts by 
some military construction units such as that which happened at Kemerovo in 1955.  Soldiers 
who still had time left in the military service were transferred to civilian construction brigades 
until the end of their terms of service.  When those who were about to be demobilised had their 
terms of service extended by six months the soldiers revolted against the authorities.94   Above 
all, the military saw Khrushchev’s policies as a threat against the prerogatives as military 
professionals.95
 Matthew Evangelista argued Khrushchev’s conventional force cuts were perhaps the most 
significant in the history of the Soviet Union.  Evangelista showed evidence that those reductions 
were primarily unilateral in nature and focused on Soviet-initiated proposals for disarmament.  
Reductions to conventional forces began in August 1955 with a cut of 650,000 troops (see 
Appendix B); in 1956 another cut of 1,200,000 troops was announced; in January 1958 a further 
300,000 soldiers were demobilised.  Speaking to American journalists in November 1957, the 
recently elevated Minister of Defence, Marshal Malinovskii, stated that the Soviet army had been 
reduced by 1,400,000 “over the last couple of years.”96  In his speech to the Supreme Soviet in 
1960, Khrushchev outlined another demobilisation of 1,200,000 soldiers, which included 
250,000 officers.  The demobilisation announced was never completely carried out.
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 Khrushchev advocated and defended those reductions based on the ideas of modernity.  
Modernisation within the Soviet armed forces allowed for reductions to conventional forces; a 
greater reliance and burden for the defence of the Soviet Union was to rest with its nuclear 
deterrent and the Strategic Rocket Forces.  Mass armies, such that fought World War II, were no 
longer viable on the battlefield in the nuclear age.  How were massed troops to function on a 
nuclear battlefield?  Those last two thoughts were to be the focus of the debate among the Party, 
especially Khrushchev, and the military.  However, the debate which started after the speech to 
the Supreme Soviet was to fracture the leadership of the military as well.  The Stalingrad Group, 
by 1960 firmly entrenched in the commanding heights of the Ministry of Defence, General Staff, 
and the most important military districts in the USSR, fractured in their support of Khrushchev’s 
new military doctrine focused on nuclear forces.  Personalities clashed over the use of 
conventional forces on a possible nuclear battlefield. Some officers argued nuclear battlefields 
and war only fostered greater necessity for such forces.  Only conventional weapons could still 
hold terrain in the next war.  
After Khrushchev
 Soviet power struggles and succession followed no designated process.  Intra-Party 
machinations determined the succession of leaders of the CPSU.  Garthoff argued that because 
there was no clear succession law, the Party, the state bureaucracy, the security organs, and the 
military all conspired to play an important role in succession struggles and had a decisive impact 
on those struggles.97  As argued above, each played an important role in the ouster of Malenkov 
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in 1955.  The Party carried the day over the state bureaucracy.  The military gained prestige over 
the security apparatus due to their tacit support for Khrushchev over Malenkov.  Shifting 
factional elements tried to co-opt the support of the army in various Kremlin power plays.  
 The Soviet military stood idly by as the other interest groups of power conspired to 
remove Khrushchev from the Kremlin.  According to Kolkowicz, the Supreme Soviet speech by 
Khrushchev, in January 1960, hastened the deterioration of relations between the Party and 
military, while at the same time causing a schism within the ranks of the Soviet high command.98  
Kolkowicz attributed the acceleration of Khrushchev to those two developments.  Kolkowicz’s 
emphasis on the military’s role in Khrushchev’s ouster was overstated.  While Khrushchev’s 
policy has been termed riding “roughshod over military concerns and interests,” by Taylor, the 
military decided not to act to save Khrushchev in 1964.99  Irrespective of the fact they were not 
asked to take a political role in 1964, the Soviet military tacitly decided to improve their lot by 
allowing the removal of Khrushchev, who had dramatically tried to change the nature and 
structure of the Soviet Armed Forces.  Above all, the Presidium, whose members conspired to 
remove Khrushchev, had no members from the military in 1964.  Neither Malinovskii nor his 
First Deputy Minister of Defence, Marshal Grechko, were members of the Presidium.  No 
member of the military was told of the decision until two days before the actual move against 
Khrushchev.  Pyotr Shelest, Ukrainian Party Secretary, overheard Malinovskii say to 
Semichastnyi, head of the KGB, that the military was “outside politics.”100
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 After Khrushchev’s removal, there was a shift away from his all or nothing approach to 
doctrine [doctrine in the sense of the handed-down military policies of the CPSU].  Although 
since the early 1960s the military leaders were openly questioning the doctrinaire policies of the 
CPSU, a real shift only occurred after October 1964.  In 1969, a mere five years on, Marshal 
Grechko, at that point serving as Minister of Defence, led a shift of doctrine away from the 
reliance on nuclear weapons and the Strategic Rocket Forces.  Marshal Grechko advocated the 
preparedness to fight the next war without nuclear weapons.  “Although not neglecting the 
continued development of its strategic nuclear forces, the Soviet leadership put new emphasis on 
theater forces, both nuclear and conventional.”101  Although speaking in 1969, Grechko’s words 
echoed those above from officers in the leadership of the military who spoke out against the sole 
reliance on nuclear weapons after Khrushchev’s January 1960 speech to the USSR Supreme 
Soviet.
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the military doctrine of the Soviet Union was heavily 
debated amongst Party and military leaders.  The selection of personalities and individuals into 
military leadership roles by Khrushchev greatly influenced that debate.  Whereas Zhukov was a 
strong-willed personality who privately and publicly voiced support and criticism of 
Khrushchev’s policies, Malinovskii was more veiled in his support for Khrushchev. Khrushchev 
initially supported Malinovskii because the Party leader saw the marshal as a supporter, of one of 
the mediocre officers who would be more easily controlled.  The importance of the Stalingrad 
Group waned as fractures developed in that cohesive body.  Officers such as Chuikov placed 
loyalty to Khrushchev above their own military professionalism.  Time and time again Talenskii 
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wrote in publication of his own concern for the military under Khrushchev to the detriment of his 
own career.  Personal loyalty to Khrushchev, and his elevation of those officers into the central 
apparatus of the armed forces were driving factor in support from officers throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s.
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Chapter 2: Zhukov and Civil-Military Relations
 John Keegan wrote that in Marshal Georgii Zhukov were united all the necessary 
qualities of a great military leader.  Strategic and tactical knowledge, along with courage, 
leadership, and political influence during the Great Patriotic War, made Zhukov one of the most 
respected military commanders on both sides of that conflict.1  Writing at the time of Zhukov’s 
fall from grace under Khrushchev, the Indian ambassador to Moscow, Krisha Menon, wrote the 
following in his personal diary in November 1957:
No star shone in the Russian firmament after Stalin’s death with greater lustre 
than Zhukov’s.  The attempts that are now being made to blot it out can only be 
called pitiful.  The Party may succeed in keeping Zhukov’s figure out of the 
public eye, but it will not succeed in keeping his memory out of the hearts of 
men…Ultimately truth will triumph, and Clio will place Zhukov by the side of 
such favorites as Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov, and Alexander Nevsky…2
This chapter examines the questions and problems associated with Marshal Zhukov in the 
post-World War II period.  The chapter describes the events in Zhukov’s life after World War II.  
Specifically, it investigates the role of Zhukov in the civil-military relations of the Soviet Union 
after Stalin’s death, while Khrushchev was First Secretary of the CPSU.  The broadest question 
is to what extent did Marshal Georgii Zhukov, as Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, from 
January 1955 to October 1957, play a political role?  It is argued that Zhukov was foremost a 
career military professional but was given opportunities to influence Soviet political decisions.  
Zhukov did used his position in the Central Committee (CC), and as a Presidium member after 
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1956, to influence the Party on military matters or to push a military agenda on budgetary and 
spending questions.  As Minister of Defence his influence and role as military advisor to the 
CPSU Presidium was greater than it had been under Stalin.  His access to policy discussions and 
debates was greater once he became a candidate member of the Presidium in 1956 and then a full 
member of that body in 1957.  As an agent of change, Zhukov was given a greater role to profess 
his opinions on the Soviet military, opinions that challenged the demarcation between the known 
areas of Party purview concerning military matters.  Nonetheless, he was given greater access to 
voice opinions when brought into the leadership structure of the state.  Applying Giddens theory 
of structuration and the duality of structure, the argument is made that Zhukov was both enabled 
and constrained by the structure of the Soviet state.  As an agent with a strong personality, 
Zhukov was able to profess opinions now at a leadership level that without those offices held, 
Zhukov may not have become such a perceived threat by Khrushchev and others in the 
Presidium.  As was shown in his service during World War II, Zhukov was a strong, independent-
minded officer, but was not anti-Party yet saw the military as an institution that needed become 
apolitical in order to function.  Those same ideas manifested themselves during his tenure as 
Minister of Defence.
  In two instances Zhukov’s rank and position were used by Khrushchev to remove other 
leadership contenders: against Lavrenti Beria in 1953 and against the ‘anti-Party’ group in 1957.  
Does Zhukov’s acquiescence to support Khrushchev in both of these cases constitute a political 
move?   How were these instances looked upon in the military and in the leadership of the 
CPSU?  Brought into the political fray, Zhukov moved at the order of Party officials; he acted 
politically when called upon by the Party.  Nonetheless, except these two instances, he was able 
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to remove himself from overall political machinations during the 1950s.  He spoke out in the 
Presidium when the military perceived the CPSU had crossed a line and began to make policy in 
areas where the military saw their sole purview - on battlefield tactics versus ‘big picture‘ 
doctrine and strategy and the demobilization of officers without proper re-training or benefits.  
The charges leveled against Marshal Zhukov during the October 1957 plenum of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU were overall unsubstantiated.  They were exaggerations or outright 
fabrications, yet they were political charges that needed little evidence to convict.  Only his 
willingness to end the use of dual command can be proven with specific evidence.  After reading 
the transcripts of the October 1957 CC plenum, the primary charge leveled against Zhukov was 
the creation of his own cult of personality as perceived by Khrushchev and Zhukov’s fellow 
officers.  The history of World War II was the weapon of choice by fellow officers against 
Zhukov in 1957.  A study focused on one actor, such as Zhukov, must attempt to place that 
person into the broader contextual history; for Zhukov that time was the Cold War.  Zhukov has 
to be studied for his role as a decision-maker in the policy decisions of the Cold War.  Zhukov 
commanded the Soviet military in one of the most volatile periods of the Cold War, and he acted 
as a voice of reason in the course of events that shaped Cold War politics of the time.  Were the 
policies supported by Zhukov ultimately used in the case brought against him in October 1957?  
By examining Zhukov in a broader context, this chapter will be connected to the wider historical 
debate on the Cold War and superpower politics.  
 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism in Eastern Europe, sources 
previously unavailable are now open to research and interpretation by scholars.  However, a 
study of Zhukov is still limited by the sources available.  When attempting to research the Soviet 
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armed forces and its highest ranking officers, many archives have yet to be opened for 
examination.  An aura of secrecy remain over use of military archives in the former Soviet 
Union.  The Central Military Archives located at Podolsk, outside Moscow, remain inaccessible 
to Western academicians.  Primary material has been taken from those archival sources currently 
available.  Key documents concerning Zhukov were published in 2001 under the editorship of V. 
Naumov.  Along with those documents, holdings at the Hoover Institute and the Cold War 
International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Institute provided information about 
Zhukov’s interaction with key military and political persons as well as his involvement in key 
events such as the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.  Naumov’s collection of documents contains the 
final version of the stenographic report of the October 1957 CC plenum.  A version of the same 
document can be found in the Davis Center archives at Harvard as well.  The Davis Center 
version, over 500 pages, contains handwritten notations, in Russian, which are barely legible, but 
show an official insight into the document.  While it is not known who made the notations, it 
does show how the document was edited before final production of the official version.3  
Coupled with the available archival sources, an extensive reading of secondary literature on 
Zhukov provided insight into previous studies of Zhukov.  Substantial memoir literature, both in 
Russian and English, has been used.  Memoirs of Zhukov and Khrushchev have been compared 
with each other.  It has also been necessary to compare different editions of the memoirs of both 
men.  Editions published in the 1970s have been compared with the most recent volumes— the 
latest edition of Zhukov’s memoirs was published in Russian in 1993, and the latest edition of 
Khrushchev’s memoirs was published in Russian (4volumes) in 1999.  Time has shown how 
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highly censored both men’s memoirs were during the Soviet era.  Contemporary newspapers, 
such as Pravda, Krasnaya zvezda, Glasnost, and Izvestiya have been consulted.  These 
newspapers were surveyed particularly for articles written during the period from June to 
November 1957 in the lead up to Zhukov’s ouster from the Ministry of Defense and his posts in 
the Party.  Several Soviet journals were consulted; most helpful has been Istoricheskii arkhiv and 
Voennaya mysl’.  Over the past five years I have interviewed and had extended correspondence 
with Sergei Khrushchev on matters dealing with the military policies of the Soviet Union while 
his father led the CPSU.  I have consulted this material and his expertise for pertinent 
information dealing the relationship between his father and Zhukov, yet compared his 
recollections to the available primary sources and other first hand accounts.
Zhukov, Hero of the Great Patriotic War
 
 Zhukov served in the Imperial Army with distinction, earning two St. George’s Cross for 
his acts during the First World War.  He was chosen for NCO (noncommissioned officer) training 
in the Imperial Army.  Many Tsarist NCOs joined the Red Army after the October Revolution 
and became ‘Red Commanders.’  Zhukov was no different.  In 1918, Zhukov joined the Red 
Army, serving in the cavalry.  Throughout the Civil War, he served in Semyon Budenny’s First 
Cavalry Army.  Wounded in 1919, Zhukov received the Order of the Red Banner, and that year 
joined the Bolshevik Party.
 Zhukov served most of his early years in the Red Army with the cavalry.  According to a 
2003 biography, wherever he commanded he made sure the soldiers under his command were the 
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best trained, most-disciplined troops in the Red Army.4  During the inter-war years, he was 
stationed in the Belorussian Military District for a time under Army Commander I.P. Uborevich, 
a colleague of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskii.  He learned indispensable knowledge of military 
operational art from Uborevich’s teachings, and respected his commanding officer.  Because of 
his acquaintance with Uborevich and Tukhachevskii, he was questioned while stationed in Minsk 
by Fillip Golikov, who would later rise to the head of the political administration of the Soviet 
military, during the purges of the military carried out by Stalin.  That began a lifetime of disdain 
for political workers and political commissars.  Despite the interrogation, Zhukov survived the 
purges, unlike his mentors, Uborevich and Tukhachevskii.
 Zhukov appreciated the dictums of Tukhachevskii on mechanized infantry, motorized 
divisions, and tank warfare.  He successfully employed the tactics of encirclement, deep pincer 
movements, and annihilation against the Japanese Army at the Battle of Khalkin-Gol in 1939.  
Mechanized forces were the key to Zhukov’s victory against the Japanese.  “Zhukov had passed 
the test of Khalkin-Gol with flying colors.”5  His victory also showed the Party and armed 
forces’ leadership that mechanized forces were the future of warfare, thereby proving that 
Tukhachevskii was correct in his doctrinal and strategic thought in the 1930s.  As Minister of 
Defence under Khrushchev, he believed those tactics were still valuable and viable on a nuclear 
battlefield.
In June 1940, Zhukov was promoted to General of the Army and sent to command the 
Kiev Special Military District.  It was in Kiev that he first met Khrushchev, who was then the 
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head of the Ukrainian Party apparatus.  He would only serve in Kiev until February 1941, when 
he was called to Moscow to become Chief of the Soviet General Staff.  He held that post when, 
on 22 June 1941, the German Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union.
 Understanding Zhukov’s role in World War II is necessary for contextualizing Zhukov’s 
career after the war when he was cast out of Moscow by Stalin, his rise to the top of the military 
leadership and subsequent fall under Khrushchev.  It was his charismatic, and harsh, leadership 
style in commands he held from the 1930s onward that created the tense relationship with his 
contemporaries as well as Stalin.  Shown throughout the war, those traits would be negative 
qualities associated with Zhukov by Stalin and his successor.  Throughout the war, Zhukov 
showed his sense of professionalism over careerism.  Despite his military professionalism, 
Zhukov was willing to defeat Germany at any cost, especially the lives of his soldiers.  That 
history is still debated today, and certainly was used against him in the CC Plenum in October 
1957.  
Shortly after the beginning of WWII, Zhukov was sent back to Kiev by Stalin to assess 
the situation in front of the Germans advancing into Ukraine.  By July 1941, he had taken 
command of the Southern and South-West Fronts.  Then, Zhukov was replaced by Marshal Boris 
Shaposhnikov as Chief of the General Staff.  Zhukov’s postings throughout the war were 
characterized by frequent movements from Fronts and cities, which were the focal point of the 
German onslaught and the Red Army’s defense against it.  He commanded five different Fronts 
throughout the war; Zhukov was always present, on the orders of Stalin, at the most crucial 
theatre of the war.6  From the south, Zhukov was sent to Leningrad (via Moscow) to reexamine 
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the defenses of the city.  In September 1941, he arrived in Leningrad and replaced Marshal 
Kliment Voroshilov as commander of the defenses of the city.  Zhukov was sent to Leningrad to 
strengthen the defences of the city by primarily fortifying the resolve of those units stationed 
there.  After sternly reprimanding commanding officers and soldiers at Leningrad, Zhukov 
redistributed and strengthened the defenses of the city. By 25 September, the defensive ring 
around Leningrad was stabilized and the Germans began siege tactics.7 
From Leningrad, Zhukov flew to Moscow to fortify the defenses of the Soviet capital.  
Throughout the fall and winter 1941, Zhukov was again on scene at the crucial point of the war 
when the Germans were making their final assault to break through to the Soviet capital.  His 
movement to crucial points of battle was always on the orders of Stalin.  Alongside 90,000 
Soviet soldiers fought 250,000 Muscovite citizens—seventy-five percent of them women.8  
Aligned with Zhukov were some of the greatest war commanders of the Soviet Army.  In front of 
Moscow the German Wehrmacht faced a formidable Soviet command group, including, Zhukov, 
Rokossovsky, Konev, and Vatutin.9  Moscow was to be defended at all costs.  By December 
1941, the Soviets launched their first counterattack, and then launched an assault against the 
whole of the German Army Group Center during January-March 1942.  Moscow was saved.  
Later that year Zhukov, along with Aleksandr Vasilevskii, was sent to Stalingrad, which was to 
be the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front and the Second World War in Europe.
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Despite minor setbacks, from Stalingrad onwards, the Red Army was on the offensive 
right through to the capitulation of Berlin in May 1945.  Zhukov acted together with Vasilevskii 
as Stavka representatives for the planning of the counteroffensive against Germany and Axis 
forces surrounding Stalingrad.  According to John Erickson, the presence of Zhukov and 
Vasilevskii at Stalingrad helped bridge the gap seen by many Front commanders between 
themselves and those handling overall strategy in Moscow.  Front commanders believed Stavka 
underestimated the operational-tactical situations when looking at the ‘big picture.’10  Zhukov 
traveled back and forth between Stalingrad and Moscow throughout the fall 1942.  The plan, 
which called for an encirclement of the German VI Army under the command of Von Paulus, 
began with a Soviet armor strike against the Romanian LI Army on the German flank.  The 
conceptualisation and finalisation of the Soviet counteroffensive began a great debate in the 
postwar years between those who served as Front and Army commanders at Stalingrad (the so-
called ‘Stalingrad Group’) and those who served in Stavka.  Who had formulated the plan to 
counterattack and encircle the German army group polarised officers against one another.  
Commanders at the local level, primarily General Yeremenko, pushed for sole credit of creating 
the successful plan which led to victory at Stalingrad.  Nonetheless, Zhukov and other Stavka 
officers push for credit in creating the overall strategic plan and giving local commanders the 
freedom of how to carry out the central command’s ultimate goals for victory.  That debate 
factored into military officers attacks against Zhukov in 1957.
  Before the battle of Stalingrad, in August 1942, Zhukov was appointed Deputy Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief and First Deputy Defense Commissar; both titles made him second in 
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command only to Stalin of all Soviet forces.  After the victory at Stalingrad in January 1943, 
Zhukov was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union.
From Stalingrad, Zhukov commanded the overall force readied for the battle of Kursk.  
Zhukov was given the task of the defense and counter-strike at Prokhorovka, the site of the 
largest tank battle of the Second World War on either front.  Zhukov did not fail the Red Army, 
and the action at Kursk “bore a typical Zhukov ‘look.”11  The mastery of the use of mechanized 
forces alongside armor was a trademark of Zhukov.  Present at Kursk was Viktor Anfilov, later a 
veteran and a researcher at the Soviet General Staff Military History Department, 1957-1964.  
Anfilov recalled how, at Kursk, cheers of “Where there’s Zhukov, there’s victory,” could be 
heard from Red Army soldiers.12
For Operation Bagration, designed to push the Germany army from Belorussia and make 
inroads into Poland, Zhukov commanded the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts.  He took command 
of these troops in May 1944.  From the successful completion of Operation Bagration, Zhukov 
took command of the 1st Belorussian Front on 16 November 1944, and Rokossovsky assumed 
command of the 2nd Belorussian Front.  Zhukov’s command was to spearhead the assault on 
Berlin.  The final assault on Berlin was being planned. Ivan Konev commanded the 1st Ukrainian 
Front, which was to move on the southern flank of Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front.  Zhukov was 
determined to take Berlin.  “Advance or face dire consequences,” was the order given by Zhukov 
to his commanders.13  Berlin fell to Zhukov on 2 May 1945.  Again, the history of the battle for 
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Berlin became an issue of contention in the post-Stalinist years among Marshals Zhukov and 
Konev.  As one of Stalin’s favoured officers, Zhukov wanted to take Berlin on his own, leaving 
Konev to guard his forces’ exposed left flank.  Konev was to mop up resistance in the southern 
suburbs, while the main attack on Berlin and thus capitulation was to be Zhukov’s alone.  Both 
argued over the timing of the capture of Berlin and the high Soviet casualty numbers.  Zhukov 
faced the stiffest Germany resistance in front of him, especially taking the Seelow Heights, while 
Konev’s path was relatively easier, but difficult nonetheless.  Konev argued that if he was given 
priority, his forces would have taken Berlin sooner than actually occurred.  Konev and Zhukov 
disagreed on the overall strategic plan for capturing Berlin; Konev would bring that historical 
debate to discussion when called to speak out against Zhukov in 1957.  Konev argued, both in 
1945 and in the 1950s, that his forces were better prepared and faced less resistance, thus, they 
could have taken Berlin earlier and quicker than Zhukov.  Zhukov argued the reverse to Stalin.  
Zhukov, with his stubborn personality, wanted Berlin for himself.  
Marshal Georgii Zhukov was a popular hero of the Great Patriotic War.  Soviet citizens 
looked at Zhukov as a popular national hero, not unlike Minin and Pozharsky who liberated 
Moscow in the Time of Troubles.  Zhukov captured Berlin and fought with vigor in the most 
vital and decisive battles on the Eastern Front.  Stalin gave Zhukov the honor of receiving the 
salute of the Victory Parade on 24 June 1945 that took place on Red Square.  Zhukov believed 
Stalin should take the salute of the parade but Stalin said he was “too old to review parades.”14  
Zhukov rode out of the Kremlin’s Spaskii Gate on a brilliant white steed and took the salute from 
his friend, Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal Rokossovskii.  Zhukov was at the pinnacle of his 
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military career.  After the parade, he returned to Germany to command the Soviet forces 
stationed there and to act as the Soviet plenipotentiary on the Allied Control Commission set up 
to administer postwar Germany.
 Zhukov’s Expulsion and Return to Moscow, 1946-1954 
 Zhukov was triumphant; he led the Soviet Union to victory over Hitler’s Germany.  He 
had been promoted to the highest rank, Marshal of the Soviet Union, in January 1943 and 
received its highest honor, Hero of the Soviet Union.  While in Germany, he worked well with 
his allied counterparts, especially American General Dwight Eisenhower, with whom he forged a 
good working relationship and a close friendship.  According to a 2003 study, Zhukov was 
perceived as the people’s hero; Soviet citizens and the military admired him for his brilliance in 
leading the country to victory.  His popularity was a negative attribute in the eyes of Stalin.  It 
was understood that the main credit for the Soviet victory was to go to Stalin.  Axell went even 
further in arguing that Stalin was jealous of Zhukov genuine popularity with Soviet citizens.15  
Stalin was wary of a Decembrist style revolt similar to that which happened when Russian 
officers and soldiers victoriously returned from Europe at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. 
 Working with Allied military officers in Germany, Zhukov believed both sides could 
achieve and maintain peace as long as the politicians did not interfere.  Shortly after the end of 
the war General Eisenhower remembered an incident dealing with omnipresent Soviet political 
officers assigned to Zhukov:
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The Marshal had scant patience with political men.  Once, when I told him that I 
wanted to talk about military matters and had not brought along my political 
advisor, I added that he could have his present if he liked. ‘No,’ he replied, ‘if 
you’re not going to have yours I’m going to throw mine out.’  He turned to Andrei 
[Vyshinskii], his advisor, and said, ‘Get out, I don’t want you here.16 
In April 1946, Zhukov left Berlin for Moscow to take up the posts of Commander-in-Chief of the 
Soviet Ground Forces and Deputy Defence Minister.  Stalin nominated him to the Central 
Committee of the CPSU.  It seemed Zhukov was at the pinnacle of his military career.  Later that 
year Zhukov tried to devise new combat training orders/manuals, but none were approved.  Both 
Lavrenti Beria and Viktor Abakumov, however, had been watching Zhukov and other prominent 
military officers since the war years.  Beria coerced officers, through threats and torture, close to 
Zhukov to denounce the Marshal, through methods that were anything but humane.  Those 
officers who did speak about Zhukov did so only under torture.17  Zhukov was accused of taking 
too much credit for victory.  The security and internal affairs forces repeatedly searched 
Zhukov’s dacha to look for valuables, monies, jewelry, and furniture that he supposedly stole 
from Germany.  Most valuables found were gifts from dignitaries or foreign military officers.  As 
hard as Beria tried, Zhukov remained resilient and strong.  Despite the lack of substantive 
evidence, Beria’s work did convince Stalin that Zhukov was too popular to be kept in high 
command positions and in Moscow.
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 After only three months as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces and Deputy 
Defense Minister, Zhukov was reassigned to lesser military posts outside Moscow.  In June 1946, 
he was relieved of his command posts and expelled from the Central Committee.  He was 
replaced in those military positions by Marshal Konev.  Zhukov was determined not to change 
his command style while exiled to a post of less importance than his postings in Moscow.  He 
stayed as vigilant and demanding as ever.18  Soldier and officers under Zhukov trained for long 
hard hours and discipline was harsh for those who stepped out of line.  Stalin’s removal of 
Zhukov from the high command of the Soviet Armed Forces was to be the first of two removals, 
the second came under Khrushchev in 1957.
In February 1948, Zhukov was transferred from Odessa to Sverdlovsk to take command 
the Urals Military District.  Vigilance and constant training of the men under his command kept 
Zhukov sane and militarily sharp.19  While Zhukov was in Sverdlovsk, Beria continued to search 
for material against him, trying in vain to gather enough to have Zhukov arrested.  In 1948, 
constant worrying caused by hassle from NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs-
Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del) personnel led Zhukov to suffer a heart attack.  While 
posted to the Urals Military District, Zhukov fell in love with Galina Aleksandrovna.  
Aleksandrovna was a medical doctor who attended to Zhukov.20  Zhukov sought a divorce from 
his first wife with whom he had two daughters—Era and Ella.  The divorce from his first wife 
did not become official until the 1960s.  Divorces were hard to obtain in the Soviet Union.  
According to Sergei Khrushchev, when writing about Zhukov’s retirement, divorces in the Soviet  
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Union were frowned upon more severely than in the Roman Catholic Church.21  More stories 
were fabricated about his time in Germany, about stolen valuables, and his thoughts on who 
actually won the war for the Soviets.  1945 to 1953 was a trying time for the Soviet military, 
especially for victorious officers.  The cult of Stalin, as the victorious leader, was everywhere; 
the military had lost all acknowledgment whatsoever in contributing to victory over the forces of 
Hitlerite Germany.  The immediate post-war years were a time of reassertion of Party control 
over the military and the cleansing of the military ranks.22  That, however, was an unnecessary 
reassertion.  In February 1946, Stalin used his so-called “Victory Speech” to put the Armed 
Forces in their place when speaking on the sources of the Soviet victory over Germany.  Stalin 
used the speech to give full credit to the CPSU.  The Soviet Armed Forces were not anti-Party 
after the Great Patriotic War, but they wanted the credit and respect due to them for defending 
the Soviet Union.
While ‘exiled’ to Odessa and Sverdlovsk, in lesser military command posts, Zhukov 
remained vigilant and thorough in his duties training and administering those troops under his 
command.  Notwithstanding his posting outside the power hub of Moscow and the constant 
persecution of Beria and his accomplices, Zhukov remained the quintessential military 
professional.  Examinations of his time from 1946 to 1952 illustrates Zhukov’s duty to his 
country, the highest honor in which he held himself, and that no matter what he was asked by the 
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Party, he was going to fulfill his obligation to the Soviet Union.  From hero to outcast, Zhukov 
proudly served the current authorities of the Soviet state.
Zhukov remained in peripheral military postings for the first five years after the Soviet 
Union’s victory in the Great Patriotic War.  In 1950-51, Zhukov made a few very brief public 
appearances.23  Presumably those appearances coincided with celebrations for the May Day 
holiday and perhaps for the Great October Revolution.  Traveling to Poland in July 1951, 
Zhukov made his first international trip abroad since the war’s end24.   In October 1952, the 
Nineteenth Party Congress of the CPSU, the first Party Congress held since 1939, was convened 
by Stalin.  At the Congress, Zhukov was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU.25  It seemed that Zhukov was again back in the good graces of Stalin.  
Why bring Zhukov back to Moscow?  Why elevate Zhukov to a member of the CC, a 
decision-making body of the Party?  The Cold War was heating up.  War on the Korean peninsula 
was intensifying, and US intervention was greatly improving the military capabilities of the 
South Korean forces.  Stalin presumably brought back his tried and true war horse because 
thoughts of a possible war with the West were not far out of the leader’s mind.  Stalin still held 
Zhukov in the highest regard for his military prowess.  Stalin’s welcome of Zhukov back in 
Moscow only strengthens the argument that his ‘exile’ was an ideological decision by Stalin who 
was wary of any popular support held by Zhukov.  Presumably, Stalin believed Zhukov had 
become less of a threat as a charismatic, people’s hero.  Perhaps he believed Zhukov had shown 
politics was of no interest to him.  Perhaps Zhukov had proved that he had no aims to be the 
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leader of a military coup against the Party.  Whatever the reason, Zhukov was back serving in 
Moscow when Stalin passed away on 5 March 1953.
The Road to Moscow and the Leadership Struggle
 Within one week of Stalin’s death, the Ministries of War and the Navy were combined 
into a newly formed Ministry of Defense.  Nikolai Bulganin was named Minister of Defense; 
Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevskii and Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov became the First Deputy 
Ministers.  Zhukov was also named Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, a 
position he held prior to being ‘exiled’ to Odessa. Marshal Konev had replaced Zhukov then, and 
now Zhukov had reassumed his former role, replacing Konev.
Zhukov’s star was on the rise again.  Out of the shadow of Stalin’s obdurate leadership, 
Zhukov readied to mould the Soviet military into an advanced, superior fighting force.  At no 
time in his career, however, did Zhukov have a need for the political administration within the 
Soviet Armed Forces.  The GPU (glavnoe politicheskoe upravlenie), which controlled political 
workers/officers within the Soviet military, equaled a parallel structure to the Ministry of 
Defense.  The GPU reported directly to the Central Committee, not to the Ministry of Defence.  
At all levels and structures within the Soviet armed forces, the Party-political control organs of 
the GPU operated.  From small squads to the Ministry of Defense itself, the GPU administered 
political workers.26  Throughout his tenure, Zhukov implemented directives that increasingly 
limited interference by the GPU into military affairs and training. 
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 During the first years after Stalin’s death, there were two intensive leadership struggles 
within the collective leadership that took control in 1953.  The military ‘intervened’ on these 
occasions, but they did so only at the request of the Party leadership.  Nonetheless, the issues the 
military chose to voice and opinion on or provide counsel were advantageous to the Soviet 
military.  They also intervened to defend and argue in support of purely military issues such as 
views on the next war, new military technology, budgetary concerns, and the overall defense of 
the Soviet Union, all of which had potential political consequences.
 In June 1953, three months after the death of Stalin, Malenkov and Khrushchev, along 
with most of the members of the Presidium of the CC, moved against Beria.  Beria was known to 
have aspirations of leadership.  He was in a very powerful position as head of the MVD 
(Ministry of Internal Affairs); he thus controlled significant numbers of internal troops, security 
services, and border guards.  Beria had the loyal support of thousands of internal security troops, 
not to mention that he controlled the Kremlin garrison guards.27  His position also allowed him to 
eavesdrop and spy on his fellow Presidium members, to track their movements, and if needed, 
arrest them in the middle of the night if he thought they were planning a move against him. 
By 26 June 1953, Beria had successfully moved two state security units into Moscow.  
Those were the First Red Banner Dzerzhinskii Motorised Infantry and the Second Motorised 
Infantry divisions.28  They certainly amounted to a formidable military presence.  Khrushchev, 
Malenkov and other members of the Presidium decided to request senior military commanders to 
assist in the removal and arrest of Beria.  According to Khrushchev, it was his idea to invite key 
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marshals and generals to arrest Beria.  He first invited Marshal Kirill Moskalenko.  It was after 
this action by Khrushchev that Malenkov and Bulganin invited Zhukov to participate in the 
arrest.29  Malenkov and Bulganin seemed wary of Khrushchev asking for the assistance of an 
officer from Khrushchev’s past in Stalingrad, a close ally.  The leader of the government and the 
head of the military asked for the assistance of a much stronger, higher ranking officer to balance 
a chance ‘threat‘ from Khrushchev and Moskalenko.  Moskalenko would have to defer to 
Zhukov through the military chain of command.  
Colonel-General Pavel Artemev commanded the Moscow Military District in 1953.  
Artemev was a former NKVD officer close to Beria.  His removal was of the utmost importance 
as a precursor to any move against Beria.  O.P. Chaney presumed that Moskalenko replaced 
Artemev as the commander of the Moscow Military District; Moskalenko retained his command 
of the Moscow air defense forces.30  However, Artemev was not removed at such short notice.  In 
June, most of his troops of the Moscow Military District were away from their barracks during 
summer maneuvers.  Moskalenko recruited his command staff take part in the move against 
Beria.  Colonel I.G. Zub, head of the political directorate of the Moscow Air Defence District; 
P.F. Batitskii, Moskalenko’s first deputy; A. Vaksov, Moskalenko’s chief of staff; Lt. Col. V. 
Iuferov, his adjutant, were recruited by their commanding officer.  Those officers along with 
Zhukov met at the Ministry of Defence early on 26 June.31  MVD troops stationed at Lefortovo 
prison were surrounded by regular army forces during the meeting of the Presidium in case they 
heard about the plans against Beria and moved on the Kremlin.
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  On 26 June 1953, the Presidium, with the aid of the Soviet military, arrested Beria at a 
meeting held at the Kremlin.  Zhukov and Moskalenko played an influential role in the actual 
arrest of Beria; they were acting on orders of the Party Presidium and not on their own initiative.  
Zhukov was quoted as saying, “This is a policeman’s mission that I will fulfill with great 
pleasure.”32  He had been haunted and accused by Beria and his henchmen from post to post—
from Germany to the Urals.  Beria tried vainly to have Zhukov arrested many times, and he 
managed to arrest many officers close to Zhukov.  Taking part in the arrest of the man who had 
caused him much angst must have been a sweet moment for Zhukov.  Certainly Zhukov had 
personal motives to participate in the removal of Beria.  Supposedly, he must have known that 
Beria’s removal would elevate the status of the armed forces over that of the security apparatus 
in the spheres of influence in decision making.  Marshals and generals of the Soviet Armed 
Forces participated in the arrest.  They were instructed to wait in an anteroom near that which the 
meeting of the Presidium was taking place.  On a signal from Malenkov, they were to enter the 
room and take Beria into custody.  
Zhukov, Moskalenko, and Konev entered the meeting when called on by the Presidium 
members.  Beria did not know what to think.  He had just been subjected to a verbal barrage of 
the crimes he had committed against the Soviet Union.  Khrushchev read out the indictment 
against Beria.  All the arresting officers had been ordered to wear their side arms into the 
Kremlin that day; that required them to enter the Kremlin through the Borovitskii gate with 
members of the Presidium such as Bulganin so as not to be searched.  The Kremlin guards were 
replaced by regular army officers.  As the officers took hold of Beria, he started asking what was 
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happening.  Zhukov fired back at him, “Silence, you are not in command here.”33  To prevent an 
escape, the buttons on Beria’s trousers were cut off.  If he ran he would have to hold them up to 
keep from falling down!34 
Beria was driven out of the Kremlin at three o’clock the next morning when the guards 
were changed and he was held in the headquarters of the Moscow Military District.  He was tried 
by a special Military Tribunal headed by Konev.  The trial began on 18 December 1953 and 
lasted only five days.  Trial and punishment were swift.  “Death,” was the sentence for Beria, “to 
be carried out without delay.”35  The officer charged with shooting Beria was unable to do it.  
Lieutenant-General P.F. Batitskii walked forward and said, “permit me.”  Batitskii remembered 
battlefield commanders during the war, friends he would never forget, who suffered under the 
harsh hands of Beria. 
 Zhukov participated directly in the ouster and arrest of Beria; however, it was not on his 
own initiative.  He acted because he was asked to do so by the leadership of the Party; 
Moskalenko and other offices acted in the same way.  In the end, the military did benefit at the 
expense of the security services.  The move by the Party and the government bureaucracy was 
against the growing importance of the security services immediately after the death of Stalin.  
The military added in Beria’s ouster because it would gain them prestige and support of the 
government and Party over the security apparatus.  The military officers were called upon by the 
Party to act in its best interest and for the country.  They willingly moved against Beria.  Most 
professional military officers were not supporters of the man whom they had seen destroy the 
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careers, and lives, of many decent comrades-in-arms.  Zhukov’s participation in the move against 
Beria constituted a political tactic, which the military was tasked with carrying out by the CPSU.  
Only with hindsight could we ask if the military would have moved against Beria if there was a 
perceived threat that the Party did not foresee.  The military acted ‘politically’ to remove Beria to 
their own advantage to the detriment of the security services.  Nonetheless, those officers who 
participated moved on the orders and wishes of Party leaders.  They did not move on their own 
accord.  It does not constitute any polito-leadership ambitions on Zhukov’s part, although the 
same Central Committee plenum in September 1953 that had approved the arrest also awarded 
Zhukov Beria’s position as a full member of the Central Committee.
The Kremlin politics between the Party, the Soviet government, and security forces 
manifested by Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Beria in the struggle for leadership of the USSR had 
become one-sided after 1953.  Allied together against Beria, the government bureaucracy led by 
Malenkov and the CPSU led by Khrushchev now quarreled for political dominance in the Soviet 
state.   Khrushchev and Malenkov struggled politically against one another, supporting different 
polices, one trying to overcome the other.  The military played into that struggle because both 
Malenkov and Khrushchev made military concerns—budget, views on strategy and new 
technology, and the defense of the Soviet Union—into issues pertinent to the leadership struggle.  
Whoever supported the views the military held tended to garner the military’s support.  Thus the 
intra-Party struggle coincidently forced the professional military to become more politically 
minded.  
[Officers’] more urgent and immediate objectives center on industrial interests of 
the military, and within that broad concern, on the individual officer’s personal and 
professional interests.  Consequently, the military must continually impress upon 
the political decision-makers the urgency of maintaining a large and efficient 
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military establishment; of assigning the military a prominent, or at least positive, 
social role; of subordinating other social and economic objectives and the 
allocations necessary to their achievement, to the paramount demands of national 
defense.36
Malenkov overlooked how influential the military was when it came to issues such as budgetary 
concerns or questions of the national strategic reserve.  The military found itself in a strong 
position—its support, whether for Khrushchev or Malenkov, decided the leadership struggle.
 The military disagreed with Malenkov over his call for increased investment in the 
production of consumer goods, the use of the state reserves, his acceptance of mutual deterrence 
vis-à-vis the West and the US, and the decrease in military appropriations.  Obviously the 
military and officers would support the political side of this debate that would support their own 
wishes for more money and material.  On 9 August 1953, Malenkov spoke to the Supreme Soviet 
on the ways to restructure the economy to support the production of consumer goods.37  War was 
no longer inevitable; thus, Malenkov supported mutual deterrence.  Vast amounts of money that 
had previously been spent on the military-industrial complex were to be shifted to improve the 
standard of living of Soviet citizens.  Military officers, including Zhukov, did not publicly 
support Khrushchev per se, even though the Malenkov-Khrushchev leadership struggle gave the 
military a public forum for doing so.  Action was not called for if Malenkov was triumphant.  
The military press, however, began to publish articles that supported the ideas expounded by 
Khrushchev, although it is uncertain how much editorial freedom those military media outlets 
had.  Khrushchev said what the military high command wanted to hear.  The state reserves were 
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to be strengthened, not spent; industrial production was not to be decreased in favor of consumer 
production, and the military would not see its budget slashed.
  Between September and October 1953, Voennaya mysl’ published articles underlining 
what policies the Soviet government ought to be considering, namely those policies being 
enumerated by Khrushchev.38  That theoretical and strategy debate has been covered in detail in 
the previous chapter; only the material, which impacts the role of Zhukov is reiterated herein. 
The military press castigated Malenkov’s outlandish ideas, which would threaten the security and 
defense of the Soviet Union if undertaken.  An article published in Krasnaya zvezda, titled 
“Heavy industry is the basis of the strengthening of the Soviet state,” affirmed the supremacy of 
the defence and heavy industries as the guarantor of Soviet defensive capabilities.39  As Minister 
of Defense at the time, Bulganin stated that, “heavy industry is the foundation of the 
indestructible defense capability of the [Soviet Union].”40  For his own part in the Khrushchev-
Malenkov rivalry for power, Zhukov spoke against mutual deterrence as an “incorrect point of 
view.”41  
Malenkov was removed from the leadership of the government.  Bulganin was elevated 
to the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers.  The Supreme Soviet session that voted for 
Malenkov’s removal also voted for a 12% increase for the defense budget.42  Thus for 22 months 
from March 1953 to January 1955 the military opposed Party leaders who advocated policies that  
not only ran counter to the hopes of the military, but, if implemented, would have deeply 
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destabilized those traditional institutional interests that even Stalin felt compelled to respect.43  
By supporting Khrushchev and leaders who promoted military interests, the military was able to 
show that it played an important factor in CPSU politics.  In February 1955, Zhukov was named 
the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union.  The alliance of convenient necessity between 
Zhukov and Khrushchev now became stronger.
 Zhukov and Khrushchev: The Alliance of Convenient Necessity  
 Many changes were implemented in the Soviet military establishment in 1955.  Zhukov 
was named the Minister of Defense.  On 11 March 1955, the first postwar promotions occurred 
with eleven generals and marshals being appointed by the Supreme Soviet.  That promotion 
included many with whom Khrushchev had served at Stalingrad, including: Biryuzov, 
Moskalenko, Grechko, Krylov, Popov, and Malinin.  O.P. Chaney and A. Axell agree that the 
period between Zhukov’s ascension to the top rung of the military leadership and the months 
before his ouster was the political heyday of the military officer in the Soviet Union during the 
Khrushchev era.  In those two years, the military was most free from constraining Party controls.  
Zhukov’s disdain for political officers and political bodies meddling in military affairs was well-
known.  As Minister of Defense, he worked to curb the political apparatuses working within and 
parallel to the Soviet armed forces.  This period also  saw an exponential rise in new military 
technology, namely ballistic rocketry and nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.
 The GPU worked as a parallel structure to the Ministry of Defense.  While Zhukov was 
Minister of Defense, the GPU was headed by Colonel-General Zheltov.  From 1955 to 1957, the 
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GPU was led by Zheltov, a junior officer to Zhukov in rank, stature, and intelligence.  Zhukov 
was assertive, strong-willed, and a militarily intellectual person.  Zheltov was comparatively 
weak in character and a career political officer.  Zheltov and the GPU suffered as Zhukov 
asserted the preeminence of the armed forces and military officers’ authority over that of the 
political administration within the Soviet military.  After Zhukov’s removal in October 1957, 
Zheltov was replaced by Fillip Golikov who was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet 
Union and made a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.  Zheltov was perceived as a 
weak personality not willing to take on strong-willed military officers.
   The role of the political organs with the Soviet Armed Forces was “to observe activities 
in units and to pass information to higher levels of the apparatus” and “to politicize’ military 
personnel through intensive indoctrination and political education.”44  Part of the GPU’s function 
was to regulate the advancement of officers so that only those who were desirable from a Party 
point of view were promoted to authoritative positions.  All political activity within the military 
was to be supervised by the GPU.  The GPU could compel certain actions through intimidation, 
threats of dismissal, public humiliation, or simply, outright coercion.45  Party and military leaders 
disagreed over the extent of officers’ freedom, the historical role of the military in the Soviet 
Union, and the degree of institutional autonomy granted to the Soviet Armed Forces.  As 
Minister of Defense, Zhukov worked to limit the functionality of the GPU within the military 
and restrict their efforts to indoctrinate officers and soldiers.
 Zhukov followed Marshals Timoshenko and Vasilevskii as the third professional officer 
to be Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union; however, neither had been a member of the ruling 
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Politburo while serving as Minister of Defence.  As Minister, Zhukov reduced the role of the 
political administration within the Soviet Armed Forces.  He began by allowing military officers 
voluntarily to attend political education/classes.  He believed that “self-study” was necessary so 
that officers spend more of their time concentrating on military strategy and doctrine, not to 
mention training and discipline, rather than political indoctrination.46  His rationale was simple.  
Officers serving in the Soviet military in the 1950s were in stark contrast to those of the Civil 
War, the 1920s and 1930s when the GPU had been instituted.  Most had served in the Second 
World War.  They had been raised and educated in the Soviet system.  Khrushchev agreed that 
political training and indoctrination were necessary and vital when the Soviet Armed Forces was 
in its infancy, but now it was no longer needed.  Times had changed since former tsarist officers 
were recruited by Trotsky and others to serve the Bolshevik cause.  No political commissars were 
necessary to watch over suspect officers.  The Soviet officers of the 1950s had been tried and 
tested against Hitler’s Germany.  More time was required for training and military study with the 
rapidly advancing breakthrough in military technology throughout the early Cold War.  Zhukov 
was not depoliticizing the military, but changing the form of indoctrination.  There were no 
longer military specialists as there had been during the Civil War, and Zhukov saw the need to 
modernize.47  Technocrats rather than ideological sound officers were necessary.  As 
technological knowledge rapidly advanced, officers needed more time to attain proficiency as 
more complicated, technical weapons systems went into service.  Zhukov argued that officers’ 
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and soldiers’ time was better utilised learning new advanced weapons systems rather than going 
through further ideological training when he perceived little need for indoctrination by the 1950s.
 Zhukov was molding the armed forces with a greater sense of military professionalism.  
There was increased professionalism in the military, along with a greater sense of pride.  Military  
officers became public figures for the first time since the 1930s.  From 1955 to 1957, thanks to 
Zhukov, the Soviet military was relatively free from oppressive Party domination.48  While 
Zhukov was Minister of Defense, the military attempted to be non-Party; it had no intentions of 
being anti-Party.  Zhukov wanted to create a strong modern military force above the fray of Party  
politics.  After allowing officers to decide for themselves whether to attend political education 
classes, Zhukov dissolved the post of political officer (zampolit) at the company level.  Zhukov 
also moved the zampolit at the battalion level to the regimental level.  In May 1956, Zhukov 
“without the knowledge of the Party Central Committee issued orders which introduced 
bureaucratic rule in the management of Party organizations, set off commanders against political 
workers and spread unhealthy relations and disparity among them.”49  However, that was written 
shortly after Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964 at a time when Kolkowicz did not have 
access to primary documents.  The announcement, dated 8 May 1956, was signed by both 
Zhukov and Zheltov, the head of the GPU.50  Zheltov, albeit a weaker personality, knew of the 
orders to the Party workers within the Soviet armed forces.  Thus, the Party was well aware of 
Zhukov’s machinations in curtailing the work of the GPU.  Zhukov followed protocol.  The GPU 
and the Party were well aware of his views of political work within the military.  Perhaps that 
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was an instance of the Party acquiescence to a stronger military leader.  If Zhukov was guilty of 
anything it was inculcating professionalism to the Soviet Armed Forces and trying to mold it 
along the model of contemporary, advanced armies of the time—armies that the Soviet Union 
might have to face one day in the battlefields of the next war.  
 By marginalizing the work of the political administration within the armed forces, 
Zhukov wanted to focus on military training and have the political workers focus only on 
education and morale building.  He saw that political workers and officers went through military 
training enabling them better to complete their jobs of helping morale, discipline, and training.  
Zhukov was a strong-willed person, an advocate for the professional interests of the military, and 
a popular hero.  He was a proponent of iron-willed discipline, the sharp separation of ranks 
(chain of command), and training.  Under Zhukov, military training and preparedness was the 
primary task of officers; political activities were secondary.
 Zhukov’s desire to emphasize military strategy and training at the expense of political 
agitation was made necessary by the significance of newly applied military technologies.  
Throughout the 1950s, military technology was rapidly developing.  To keep pace with those 
developments, the Soviet armed forces had to update strategic doctrines and tactics as discussed 
in the previous chapter.  As Minister of Defense, Zhukov oversaw the development and 
implementation of a new strategic doctrine and military thought to incorporate the new 
technologies of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, coupled with ballistic rocketry.  Throughout 
the 1950s there was no serious conflict between the military and the CPSU over strategy.  The 
rise of Zhukov coincided with the beginning of new military thinking within the Soviet Union.51  
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Zhukov, along with Khrushchev, believed in the viability of new nuclear weapons.  Zhukov, 
however, saw nuclear weapons as complements to traditional conventional armaments—soldiers 
and tanks still had a role to play on a nuclear battlefield. 
Nuclear Battlefield: Military Exercises
 In autumn 1953, field exercises were held in the Carpathian Military District to 
investigate “the methods of conducting combat operations in conditions in which the ‘enemy’ 
uses nuclear weapons.”52  The exercises were directed by Konev with Zhukov aiding in 
preparations and setting out specific goals of the operation.  Nuclear scientist Igor Kurchatov and 
missile designer Sergei Korolev were present to act as consultants.  During the exercises, a 
nuclear explosion was simulated.  A year later in September 1954, an actual nuclear device was 
detonated during field exercises held in the South Urals Military District.53
 Near the village of Totskoe, in the Orenburg Province, 44,000 Soviet troops (armored as 
well as mechanized infantry) took part in the exercises.  Under the command of General Ivan 
Petrov, those soldiers advanced on a position that had been bombed with a “medium-yield” 
nuclear bomb.  The bomb was dropped on 14 September 1954 by a Tu-4 bomber.  Tanks, trucks, 
and live animals had been sent into ground zero before the bombing.  Covered trenches were 
situated 500 meters away and uncovered trenches 1.2-1.3 kilometres from the blast zone.  An oak 
forest 1.5 kilometres away from the drop zone was destroyed by the explosion.  Five minutes 
after the nuclear explosion, artillery opened fire on the position, and then 21 minutes later 86 
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Il-28 light bombers made their runs.  After 40 minutes, a radiation team was sent in to take 
measurements.  Ground troops then made their assault on the ‘enemy’ position but were not 
allowed within 500 meters of ground zero.  Tanks were melted or thrown hundreds of meters 
from the epicenter of the blast.  While watching from a distance, Zhukov had his hat blown off 
his head by the shock wave of the blast.54   After the exercise was completed, the troops returned 
to their barracks, received radiation checks, took showers, and donned new uniforms.55  The 
exercise at Totskoe was hailed as a great success by the Soviet high command and illustrated that 
offensive operations were possible on a nuclear battlefield.
 All who took part in the 1954 exercise were supposedly ordered to sign a silence 
agreement that lasted 25 years.  By the late 1980s, officers and soldiers who were present at 
Totskoe had developed illnesses, including cancer.  Nothing was done for these men who were 
exposed to high radiation levels in the 1950s. 56 
 The 1955 Field Regulations of the Soviet Army took into account the nuclear exercise 
carried out in the South Urals Military District in 1954.  Zhukov and the Soviet high command, 
including the General Staff, formulated Soviet military strategy, but it had to be accepted by the 
political leadership—the CPSU.  Coincidentally, the rise of Zhukov both in the military and in 
the decision-making institutions simplified the process of formulating and accepting strategic 
doctrines in the Soviet Union.  Khrushchev and Zhukov agreed on the development of nuclear 
missiles into the strategy of the Soviet Armed Forces.  However, while Khrushchev pushed for 
more resources to be spent on the development of and sole reliance on ballistic missiles, Zhukov 
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argued that missiles were needed, but not at the total exclusion of conventional forces.  Even in 
the thermonuclear age “Soviet [doctrine] continue[d] to adhere essentially to the classical 
military strategic concept that the path to victory lies in the decisive defeat of the enemy’s armed 
forces.”57
 In 1955, Zhukov expounded his view of the new Soviet military thinking.  He stated that, 
“one must bear in mind that one cannot win a war with atomic bombs alone.” 58  In 1956 he 
stated, “air power and nuclear weapons by themselves cannot determine the outcome of an 
armed conflict.”59  According to Zhukov, the only way to win an armed conflict was by the 
combined efforts of all arms of the Soviet military in their coordinated usage.  Even after his 
ouster from power, his dictums on strategy were upheld.  On 25 November 1957, Marshal 
Rodion Malinovskii, the new Minister of Defense stated:
Considering that victory in combat will be achieved by the combined efforts of all 
arms and components of the armed forces, important significance is given in 
training to the organization of combined operations among the ground and airborne 
forces, aviation, the navy, rocket formations, and air defense forces, in the various 
forms of operations.60
Thus during and after Zhukov’s tenure as Minister of Defence, Soviet strategic doctrine was 
based on the idea that large massed armies still held an integral role in a nuclear war.  Even after 
a nuclear exchange, massed armies must engage one another on the battlefield to decide the 
outcome of such a war, especially to hold territory gained through nuclear exchange.  While 
Zhukov agreed with Khrushchev that nuclear weapons must be folded into the Soviet Union’s 
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arsenal, he did still advocate for conventional weapons used in tandem with ever-developing new 
weapons technologies.
 Another significant doctrinal development under Zhukov was the element of surprise in 
an armed conflict.  In February 1955, Marshal of the Armored Forces Pavel Rotmistrov 
published an article in Voennaya mysl’ stressing the need for preemption and surprise as an 
integral part of strategic thinking in the Soviet military.61  At the time Rotmistrov was teaching at 
the General Staff Academy.  He wrote, “in the situation of the employment of atomic and 
hydrogen weapons, surprise is one of the decisive conditions for the attainment of success not 
only in the battles and operations but also in the war as a whole.”62
 Zhukov supported Khrushchev’s calls for reductions in some of the conventional forces, 
even though Zhukov was simultaneously discussing strategic doctrines that involved the 
utilization of such forces.  Zhukov did not oppose the initial cuts proposed by Khrushchev; he 
was removed from power before more drastic cuts were initiated by Khrushchev in the early 
1960s [See Appendix B].  Reductions in 1955 paralleled the reorganization of the Soviet Ground 
Forces under Zhukov.  In August 1955, the level of troops in the Soviet Army was 4,815,870.63  
In that month, 640,000 troops were supposed to be demobilized; in actuality only 300,000 were 
fully demobilized, and 300,000 were deactivated or assigned to lower strength units 
(nekomplekt).64
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 Zhukov and Khrushchev were not that far apart in their support for conventional arms 
reductions.  Where the differences developed were over the ideas of re-training, salaries, 
retirements, and housing.  Zhukov supported Khrushchev call for a leaner Soviet armed forces 
that would be significantly stronger based on nuclear weapons.  Those were doctrinal and 
strategy concepts, which were the purview of the Party; thus, Zhukov supported the Party’s 
military doctrine.  It was when the Party crossed into the perceived purview of the military over 
training, small group tactics, but for Zhukov especially housing and retirements of demobilised 
soldiers.  Zhukov believed officers should be given opportunities to re-train for their entrance 
into the non-military economy and officers who have served that state should be given housing 
in their retirement.  
  The reductions in conventional military armaments implemented by Khrushchev 
drastically affected the Soviet Navy, which was commanded by Admiral of the Soviet Union, 
Nikolai Kuznetsov.65  In September 1955, Zhukov accompanied Khrushchev on an inspection 
tour of the Black Sea Fleet based at Sevastopol.  A demonstration of developing naval weapon 
technologies, including prototypes of cruise missiles, was to be observed by Khrushchev and the 
Minister of Defense.  The commander-in-chief of the Black Sea Fleet withheld the knowledge of 
such weapons from the ships’ commanders.  Both Khrushchev and Zhukov were dumbfounded 
as to why communications within the chain of command were so secretive.  Zhukov laughed at 
the naval commanders, while Khrushchev burst into a tirade about the vulnerability of naval 
surface ships to cruise missiles.  By October, the fleet was ready to demonstrate those new 
weapons to the leadership from Moscow.  Despite a successful demonstration, Zhukov showed 
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nothing but contempt and disdain toward the Soviet Navy.66  His attitude stemmed from his long-
held view that the navy was inferior to the Soviet Army. 
While in San Francisco on his trip to the US in September 1959, Khrushchev and his 
delegation toured the area on a boat ride of the San Francisco Bay.  With Khrushchev was Henry 
Cabot Lodge, who was to report daily to the President on the progress of Khrushchev’s visit.67  
As they rode the boat around San Francisco Bay a US Navy aircraft carrier entered the harbour.  
Khrushchev told Lodge that he felt sorry for the sailors on board the carrier because he hated to 
see good sailors serving on such a large vulnerable target.68  Khrushchev preached on the ills and 
wastes of resources that large surface fleets are on both the US and USSR.  No longer would 
aircraft carriers and battleships be the main naval workhorses of power.  The future in naval 
power belonged to submarines.  They were to be the naval weapons that would dominate the seas 
for decades to come.  Khrushchev revealed to Cabot Lodge how the Soviet Union was turning 
their surface vessel fleet into scrap metal and was concentrating efforts on building submarines, 
submarines that were capable of firing nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Cabot Lodge also learned 
from Khrushchev that Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov had been demoted, and then dismissed from 
service to the U.S.S.R.69  Khrushchev then went on a tirade about the efficacy of nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles.  He lectured Lodge on the importance of these new weapons and 
how they made manned aircraft and other conventional weapons obsolete.  Khrushchev divulged 
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to Lodge that the Soviet Union had ICBMs with a range of 7,000 kilometers and could carry a 
five-megaton nuclear warhead.70
 Kuznetsov’s career suffered harshly under Khrushchev and Zhukov.  Zhukov told 
Kuznetsov and the Navy that he would “soon put [them] in Army boots.”71  Soon he had his 
reason to get rid of Kuznetsov.  On 29 October 1955, the battleship Novorossiysk exploded and 
sank in the Bay of Sevastopol killing 608 sailors.  Kuznetsov took the blame for the 
Novorossiysk explosion.  During a Presidium meeting on 16 November 1955, Khrushchev 
disgraced Kuznetsov, calling him a very dangerous man and a worthless commander.72  
Kuznetsov was retired, but Zhukov went one step further and had him demoted in rank.  Admiral 
Sergei Gorshkov replaced Kuznetsov.  At that juncture, Gorshkov was a strong advocate of 
submarines over the building and maintenance of a large surface fleet.  His thinking was thus 
similar to Khrushchev’s.
 Zhukov, understanding his boss’s position regarding a surface navy, still lobbied strongly 
for the retention of surface ships, predominately for aircraft carriers, alongside the development 
of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.  Zhukov argued for a diversified navy, arguing 
before the Presidium that the Soviet Union needed “floating bases.”73  His support for retaining a 
surface fleet was brought as evidence against him during the Central Committee plenum in 
October 1957.
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Zhukov in the Cold War
 The period from 1955 to 1957 was a tumultuous time in the Cold War.  Although crises 
erupted within the Soviet bloc as well as in the Middle East, both the Soviet Union and the 
United States believed peace and concessions from both sides of the Iron Curtain were within 
reach.  Peaceful coexistence and disarmament were perceived as goals attainable in the very near 
future.  Khrushchev strongly thought Stalin and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav 
Molotov, mismanaged Soviet foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War.  Stalin and 
Molotov pushed for confrontation with the West, which Khrushchev adamantly viewed as a 
perversion of foreign policy objectives.  ‘Nikita Khrushchev believed that with his new power 
came a responsibility to undertake a revolution in Soviet foreign policy.’74  Khrushchev adhered 
to the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence.  For Khrushchev, peaceful coexistence with the 
capitalist West was not simply a pragmatic solution to the spiraling arms race of the Cold War, 
but an ideologically sound decision based on the ideas of his role model—Lenin.75
 In Khrushchev’s mind, Zhukov was the perfect representative and ally for his program to 
revolutionize Soviet foreign policy due to Khrushchev assumption that the military leaders 
popularity with the Soviet citizenry would be a benefit to the Party and to the government.  
Enlisted by Khrushchev in the drive to facilitate better relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia, Zhukov 
wrote an article published in Pravda on the 10th anniversary of the defeat of Hitler’s Germany.  
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The article praised the sacrifices of Tito in the fight against Hitler.  A week earlier Zhukov had 
been asked by Khrushchev to give a speech during the May Day celebrations.  In his speech 
Zhukov stated that, “the foreign policy of the Soviet Union proceeds from the wise counsel of 
the Great Lenin of the possibility of peaceful coexistence and economic competition of states, 
irrespective of their social or state structure.”76
 Khrushchev brought Zhukov on board as an ally in the drive for détente with the West 
and a disarmament agreement with the United States.  Zhukov traveled as part of the Soviet 
delegation to the Geneva Summit in July 1955.  Khrushchev and the Party leadership hoped 
Zhukov’s friendship with Dwight Eisenhower, now President, could convey the true Soviet 
position during private, friendly discussions among the old warriors.
 President Eisenhower met privately with Defense Minister Zhukov on 20 July 1955.  
Zhukov told his friend that he feared “dark forces were undermining Soviet-American 
relations.77  He reiterated to Eisenhower that the Soviets wanted peace with the West and were 
not looking for war.  The armed forces of the Soviet Union were kept at the ready and a large 
conventional force was maintained in East-Central Europe for the reason that the Soviets feared a 
surprise attack by the stronger NATO alliance.  As articulated by Zhukov, that statement was to 
explain the military policy of the Soviet Union to Eisenhower.  Zhukov wanted to communicate 
to Eisenhower that the Soviets wanted relief from the military standoff of the Cold War.  Both 
men knew that following their current policies was economically irrational.78
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 At that point in their meeting on 20 July, Eisenhower approached his military equal on his 
proposed ‘Open Skies’ program, whereby Soviet and American territories were to be opened to 
over flights by the opposite superpower to facilitate an inspection regime of the military 
capabilities of each state.  According to Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Zhukov 
responded positively to Eisenhower’s proposed inspection scheme.  Zhukov stated that the 
scheme was politically viable in the Soviet Union, saying to Eisenhower, ‘it would be entirely 
possible and while its detail should be studied, he [Zhukov] was, in principle, in full agreement 
with the President’s remarks.’79  Upon welcoming Eisenhower to Geneva on behalf of 
Khrushchev and Bulganin, along with the Soviet people, Zhukov conveyed to Eisenhower that 
the ideas of understanding were of utmost importance in the relationship between the USA and 
the Soviet Union, and those ideas ‘were understood in the Soviet Union.’80
From ‘Open Skies’ the conversation turned to the volatility of a world permeated with 
nuclear weapons.  As military men, Zhukov and Eisenhower understood the destructive power of 
nuclear weapons.  They had both witnessed the ever strengthening power of nuclear weapons 
during numerous tests carried out by each state.  Both agreed that nuclear weapons left the world 
destabilized owing to the power the weapons could bring to bear in a short span of time.  A few 
hundred weapons launched by each side would affect not just the United States and the Soviet 
Union but the entire Northern hemisphere if not the world at large.81  Eisenhower was told by 
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Zhukov during their private meeting that he, Zhukov, was “unqualifiedly for the total abolition of 
weapons of this character.”82
 During his discussions with Eisenhower, Zhukov spoke on his own behalf.  He did not 
speak on behalf of the CPSU or Khrushchev.  Friction increased between the leader of the CPSU 
and the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union.  Khrushchev was against Eisenhower’s ‘Open 
Skies’ proposal.  Khrushchev wondered if transparency between the Soviet Union and the United 
States increased or decreased the threat of a US first strike.  If the US knew Soviet military 
capabilities, or lack thereof, would they mount a first strike to cripple the entire Soviet military 
infrastructure?   Zhukov’s support of Eisenhower’s inspection scheme was later leveled against 
him as evidence of foreign policy adventurism during the October 1957 Central Committee 
plenum, which removed him from all military posts and Party positions.
 Why did Zhukov speak so candidly at Geneva on ‘Open Skies’ and nuclear disarmament?  
Militarily, the Soviet Union was in a weakened position in comparison with the United States of 
America.  Moreover, however, the situation was a closely guarded secret.  As of 1955, the United 
States intelligence services were unknowingly overestimating the capabilities of the Soviet bloc.  
To open Soviet airspace to US intelligence would have blown the top off the pot.  Secrecy was of 
the utmost importance if the Soviets were to attempt to negotiate its foreign policy objectives 
from a perceived position of strength.  That was an ideological reason for the Soviet rejection of 
Eisenhower’s inspection scheme.  Zhukov, in his capacity of the Minister Defense, took a more 
pragmatic approach to Eisenhower’s proposal.  Lacking definitive intelligence on American 
military posture, Zhukov supported ‘Open Skies’ to fill the gaps in Soviet intelligence on its 
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greatest enemy.  What the Soviets lacked in technology, the marshal hoped he could make up for 
with a pragmatic solution, such as the open intelligence flights over US military installations 
specifically called for in Eisenhower’s plan.83  While Khrushchev took a dogmatic, ideological 
view in his refusal of any proposal that would open Soviet territory to American inspection, 
Marshal Zhukov believed a pragmatic approach in supporting the program would have a positive 
impact on the knowledge gaps in Soviet intelligence of American military capabilities.
 Coupled with support for the ‘Open Skies’ proposal was Zhukov’s stance on the need for 
disarmament.  Both positions were required due to Soviet inability to produce enough strategic 
information on American/Western military capabilities.  Zhukov believed diplomacy, through 
disarmament talks, might shed light on those capabilities, which were represented as intelligence 
gaps.  “Under the leadership of Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet military staked out a very pro-
disarmament position” based on the need for strategic intelligence, which could not be provided 
by the GRU or any other intelligence service in the Soviet Union.84  Acquiescing to Marshal 
Zhukov’s rationale, Khrushchev allowed Soviet delegates at the disarmament talks in London in 
November 1956 to offer a plan for limited aerial surveillance.  The plan allowed for partial 
surveillance of sixteen hundred kilometers from Paris to the Soviet-Polish border.85  Zhukov and 
the military hoped that the next round of disarmament talks might extend the coverage area of 
such a plan.  Despite the initial acquiescence to Zhukov and the military establishment, 
Khrushchev was wary of any policy that would legally put American reconnaissance aircraft 
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over the sovereign territory of the Soviet Union.  The emphasis must be placed on the legality of 
plans such as ‘Open Skies’ and those discussed in the disarmament talks in London.  In just a 
few short years, the United States would begin U-2 intelligence gathering flights over Soviet 
military installations in the direct violation of Soviet territorial sovereignty. 
 Zhukov’s support of these specific foreign policy initiatives was again leveled against 
him during his indictment in November 1957.  Zhukov staunchly defended his belief that 
disarmament was a key policy to facilitate peaceful relations with the West as well as 
pragmatically to fulfill the Soviet military’s intelligence requirements.  Zhukov, despite holding 
the highest military position within the Soviet hierarchy, was willing to open up key military 
territory to American planes for inspection if the act was reciprocated by the United States and 
NATO.  He knew the Soviets had to be willing to pay a price to gain intelligence on the United 
States military.86
 Statements on peaceful coexistence, relations with Yugoslavia, support for disarmament, 
and the ‘Open Skies’ proposal all illustrate Zhukov’s influence during the Cold War.  Zhukov’s 
foray into Cold War politics was two dimensional.  Khrushchev purposely used the patriotic 
Zhukov to convey a message of strength and ideology to the citizens of the Soviet Union about 
the need to solidify relations with all socialist countries.  Zhukov was a prime spokesman for 
Khrushchev’s policies against those proposed by Malenkov and Molotov.  Zhukov’s second 
dimension was one of realpolitik.  It was out of a sense of realpolitik that Zhukov actively 
supported President Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ proposal and pushed for an integral agreement 
on superpower disarmament.  In Zhukov’s mind, both policy initiatives would have 
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pragmatically solved a problem of Soviet intelligence gaps concerning US military capabilities.   
These examples stated above show that any study of Zhukov is intertwined in the extensive 
history— political, social, military, and diplomatic—of the Cold War.    
Poland and Hungary 1956
 Zhukov was instrumental in bringing change and fresh thinking into Soviet strategic 
doctrine.  His viewed nuclear weapons as additions to the Soviet arsenal, but Zhukov believed 
that the only way of winning a future war was with combined arms and not reliance on nuclear 
weapons.  As Minister of Defense, Zhukov modernized the Soviet military, a military that was 
used on only one occasion in combat while he was in power.  Zhukov was at the forefront of 
military decision-making during the Hungarian uprising in the autumn of 1956.
 After Khrushchev’s Secret Speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, the policy of de-
Stalinization spread to the peoples’ democracies of Eastern Europe.87  Uprisings in Poland were 
peacefully settled politically by the Poles and the Soviets.  Zhukov had begun planning for the 
use of Soviet forces in Poland.  Zhukov and Bulganin had been sent to Warsaw for the Seventh 
Plenum of the Polish Communist Party during July 1956, but neither was admitted to the 
meetings.  In October, Zhukov supposedly traveled to Leningrad, the headquarters of the Soviet 
Northern Group of Forces, to plan a possible move on Warsaw.  It is more likely that he was still 
in Moscow planning from the Ministry of Defense.88  When the Polish problem was resolved, 
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Zhukov, along with Shepilov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed the treaty maintaining Soviet 
troops stationed in Poland.89  Poland was kept within the Soviet sphere of influence as well as 
within the Warsaw Treaty Organization.  With Gomulka returned to head the Polish Communist 
Party, relations with the Soviet Union improved.  An amicable political solution was not found, 
however, when the revolt began in Hungary in the same year. 
 On 21 October 1956, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum decided to “refrain from 
military intervention” in Hungary.90  Throughout the next days, a unanimous decision could not 
be found for the use of Soviet military force against Budapest.  Mikhail Suslov, Anastas 
Mikoyan, and Ivan Serov were sent to Budapest to appraise the situation.  On 23 October 
Khrushchev ordered Zhukov to use Soviet troops stationed in Hungary to occupy key sites in 
Budapest and to close off the border with Austria.91  At the meeting of the Presidium that day, 
Zhukov appraised those present on demonstrations in Budapest.  Considering Vladimir Malin’s 
notes, it is possible that Zhukov delivered the situational report to the Presidium.  Zhukov told of 
100,000 protestors in Budapest and that the radio station had been set on fire.92  Mikhail 
Pervukhin supported the Presidium in sending an increased number of troops to Hungary.  
Following Pervukhin, Zhukov stated that the situation in Hungary was “indeed different” from 
Poland.  ‘Troops must be sent. One of the members of the CC Plenum should travel there.  
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Martial law should be declared in the country, and a curfew introduced.’93  All Presidium 
members concurred that troops should be sent to Budapest.  By 11:00 that night, 31,550 soldiers, 
and 1,130 tanks and personnel carriers arrived in Budapest from Soviet garrisons in Hungary.94  
Troops of the MVD were also sent into Hungary.  The 128th MVD Infantry division and the 39th 
MVD Mechanised division were sent to positions near Chop, Beregovo, and Vulok.95  Despite 
that show of force, Soviet forces faced a quagmire in Budapest; the military and political 
situations were quickly deteriorating.
 All the while, Zhukov and other Presidium members supported Mikoyan against 
Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov in their calls for stronger responses (both military and 
political) to Budapest’s leadership.  Zhukov was clear headed and knew political avenues had to 
be explored before a military response was implemented.  By the end of October, Zhukov was 
willing to withdraw all Soviet forces from Hungary to solve the crisis.96  Confusion reigned 
within the Presidium in the meeting on 28 October 1956.  As he voiced his backing of Mikoyan, 
Zhukov supported what he called “political flexibility,” while at the same time preparing for the 
suppression of any demonstrations.97  Zhukov advocated support for Nagy’s new government.  
The question of withdrawing Soviet forces was up for discussion.  In Budapest and certain 
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regions of the country, Zhukov advocated returning Soviet forces to their garrisons albeit at a 
constant state of readiness.98
 Zhukov’s mood quickly changed when Imre Nagy called for Hungary to withdraw from 
the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact).99  That was the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel’s back for the Kremlin leadership.  Mikoyan and Suslov requested that Konev be sent to 
Hungary immediately.100  A deteriorating political situation coupled with helpless Party organs 
worsened the situation in Budapest.  Repeating the request for Konev, Mikoyan and Suslov 
relayed to Moscow the difficult relationship between commanding officers of the Hungarian 
army and its Soviet counterpart.101  At the Presidium meeting on 30 October, Zhukov supported 
Konev’s dispatch to Budapest post haste.  Zhukov detailed military planning already taking place 
for transportation of troops and described Nagy as playing a double game against Moscow.102  
“With regard to troops in the GDR and in Poland, the questions is more serious.  It must be 
considered at the Consultative Council [Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact].”  
Allies within the Warsaw Pact were to be consulted before any movement of troops toward 
Hungary from a third country.103  On 31 October, an emergency meeting of the Soviet Presidium 
voted for a full scale invasion of Budapest, and other key cities in Hungary.  Moscow did not 
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want to see similar actions taken in other East European satellites; Hungarian actions were not to 
spill over into the other people’s democracies.  On 1 November, Konev was appointed supreme 
commander of all Soviet forces in Hungary, and the invasion began three days later.  Within days 
of the invasion, the Soviets had achieved their purposes and installed a Soviet-friendly regime in 
Budapest.104  
 From the documents cited above a picture develops of Zhukov’s involvement in 
Khrushchev’s Presidium.  Although only a candidate member, Zhukov acted as a voice of 
moderation.  He acted as the military’s voice on the Presidium, providing information necessary 
for any resolutions, but also acting on directives from the Presidium.  Over the course of 
October-November 1956, Zhukov had not forced opinions on the Presidium.  In consultation 
with other members, Zhukov came to consensual decisions based on accurate information.  
When military action had to be taken, Zhukov was supportive of that decision and carried out 
orders from the Presidium.
Zhukov, the Military and the Anti-Party Group
 Zhukov’s career was reaching a zenith in 1956.  He was a full member of the Central 
Committee and a candidate member in the Presidium.  He and Khrushchev were congenial with 
one another, each supporting the other in terms of military policies and strategy.  In April 1957, 
Zhukov and Khrushchev compromised once again.  This time it was over political organizations 
within the Soviet Army and Navy.  The Central Committee approved the “Instructions to CPSU 
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Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy.”105  Those “Instructions…” were a compromise 
between Zhukov’s wishes for a professional military devoid of political interference and the 
Party’s desire for political control over the military.  Military commanders were given 
responsibility for military as well as political training.  The "Instructions…” also stated 
“criticism of the orders and edicts of commanders will not be permitted at Party meetings.”106  
The past practice of kritika and samokritika by military officers and the soldiers under their 
command was no longer allowed.  These practices allowed for other soldiers and officers to 
criticize commanding officers at Party meetings.  Officers were also expected to practice self-
criticism (samokritika) in these meetings.  Zhukov had always questioned the need for these 
practices, since the majority of officers were members of the CPSU and not the military 
specialists used during the Civil War.  It seemed with the “Instructions…” in April 1957, the 
Zhukov-Khrushchev political alliance was firmly established.  However, it was about to be tested 
in the coming summer months when ardent Stalinists— Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov— 
moved within the Presidium to oust Khrushchev from his position at the head of the 
Party. 
 Sergei Khrushchev believes that if the Anti-Party Group would not have moved against 
his father in July 1957, Khrushchev would have acted differently towards Zhukov in the months 
following the June Plenum of the Central Committee.  Sergei Khrushchev has respect for 
Zhukov and believed that his father was mistaken in the case against him.107  The Anti-Party 
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Group, of which Molotov, Kaganovich, and Malenkov were the driving forces, moved in June 
1957 to remove Khrushchev from his position as First Secretary of the CPSU; they perhaps 
would have made him Minister for Agriculture, but that is not certain.  The move came in the 
Presidium; however, Khrushchev stated personnel changes were purely the prerogative of the 
Central Committee.  Thus, the decision had to be made by the plenum of the Central Committee.  
Khrushchev was a sly politician and knew that the majority of the Central Committee owed their 
position to his patronage.  As a candidate member in the Presidium, Zhukov was present at the 
meetings as the Anti-Party Group began their move.  Zhukov personally knew most of the Anti-
Party Group, especially Marshal Voroshilov.  He knew all were cronies of Stalin and longed for a 
return to more ‘stable’ means of ruling the Party.  Zhukov was not about to support those who 
caused the military grief and heartache during the purges of the late 1930s.  The Anti-Party 
Group, however, knew Zhukov’s strong position within the military and the strong feelings 
Soviet citizens had for one of their most favored sons.  If Zhukov had been co-opted to support 
the Anti-Party Group, he might have been able to garner support for Molotov, Kaganovich, and 
Malenkov from the whole of Soviet society.  The hero of the Great Patriotic War was a 
formidable ally to have on one’s side.  Khrushchev knew this as well.  He used Zhukov’s support 
to his own advantage.  
 Central Committee members in Moscow who were loyal to Khrushchev moved to stop 
what was happening in the Presidium and called for a plenum of the Central Committee.  After 
wrangling among members of the Central Committee and the Presidium, a plenum was called for 
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late June.  Along with Serov, head of the KGB, Zhukov was able to use military aircraft to bring 
a majority of the members of the Central Committee back to Moscow.108
 From 22 to 29 June 1956 a Plenum of the CC was held to discuss the Anti-Party Group.  
The Plenum removed Kaganovich, Molotov, and Malenkov from the Presidium.  They were sent 
out of Moscow.109  After the Plenum, Pravda published articles concerning the unshakable unity 
of the Party.110  Speaking at the Plenum, Zhukov attacked the Anti-Party Group for their attempt 
to reverse the gains of the Twentieth Party Congress and for their non-Leninist ways.111  The CC 
had the authority to control appointments within the Party apparatus.  The Presidium did not 
have that authority.  Zhukov voiced those views at the Plenum, which were echoed by the 
majority of the CC members present who supported Khrushchev.112  The Plenum reassured 
Soviet society that the gains of the Twentieth Party Congress would not be reversed.  Leninist 
principles were to be followed.113  
 For his support of Khrushchev throughout the summer, Zhukov was made a full member 
of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Zhukov became the first professional military officer 
to attain such a high position within the CPSU leadership.  Zhukov was rewarded for his support, 
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but he did not play the vital role in Khrushchev’s victory.  Zhukov was used by Khrushchev.  
Khrushchev knew Zhukov and the political capital that Zhukov brought.  A popular hero with 
Soviet citizens, and the military, Zhukov commanded respect and reverence.  Zhukov was 
essentially a point man for Khrushchev.  Along with a majority of the Central Committee 
supporting him, Khrushchev had the support of Serov and the whole of the KGB.  With the 
KGB, Khrushchev was able to listen and spy on the Anti-Party Group.  This was a greater asset 
to Khrushchev than the air transport provided by Zhukov.  The majority of the Central 
Committee ensured that the Presidium would not take any action without its consent.  Zhukov 
was alleged to have said that no tanks or soldiers would move without his command.  That 
statement, if made, was said to the Anti-Party Group, who were hoping the army rank-and-file, 
including divisional commanders, would support the Presidium’s decision, rather than taking a 
direct preemptive action against the Anti-Party Group.114  Anastas Mikoyan remembered that 
Zhukov said no tanks would move without his orders.  Mikoyan stated that this referred to 
Saburov, a member of the Anti-Party Group, saying that tanks were moving to surround the 
Kremlin.  Zhukov made the statement to refute Saburov.  This version of the incident has been 
supported by Viktor Grishin, member of the Central Committee, and also by Khrushchev’s son, 
Sergei.  Khrushchev believed that Zhukov was important in defeating Molotov and other 
members of the Anti-Party Group.  In his memoirs Khrushchev wrote: “Thanks largely to 
[Zhukov], the military took an active stand [by standing down] against the Anti-Party 
Group…”115  Zhukov was thus a strong ally for Khrushchev to have, but he did not by himself 
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decide the outcome of the leadership struggle in the summer 1957.  Zhukov’s support was not the 
sole determinant in Khrushchev’s victory in the leadership challenge of summer 1957.
 By the end of the summer the Zhukov-Khrushchev alliance had reached its zenith.  
Several times after the June plenum, Zhukov visited the Khrushchev dacha outside Moscow, 
strolling around the surrounding grounds talking as close friends.  Little did Zhukov know that 
after the June Plenum, Khrushchev became increasingly wary of him.  Khrushchev used Serov 
and the KGB to eavesdrop on Zhukov and follow his movements.  Zhukov and Khrushchev’s 
alliance of convenient necessity was about to be severed.
 Zhukov’s Fall and Retirement, 1957-1974
 In 1957 Zhukov was at the pinnacle of his military and political career.  Zhukov had 
traveled earlier in 1957, along with Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, to 
Bucharest for the signing of the Soviet-Romanian agreement on the legal status of Soviet Forces 
stationed in Romanian territory.  Zhukov performed a similar service in May when he traveled 
with Gromyko to Hungary.  Gromyko noticed in conversations with Zhukov that the Marshal 
spoke of the victory over Germany due to the soldiers, officers, and the Soviet people.  Gromyko 
noted that he failed to mention the contributions of the Party.116  Above all else, the Party must be 
mentioned first.  In Soviet history and ideology, it was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
that brought victory for the Soviet state.
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 Shortly after the June Plenum, that had removed the Anti-Party Group, Zhukov attended 
the military exercises held in the Belorussian Military District.  Zhukov was in Belorussia from 
June to August 1957.  During Zhukov’s absence from Moscow, a Lieutenant General Pronin, 
Deputy Commander of the Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, spoke to a 
working plenum of the Party aktiv in the military claiming that Marshal Zhukov worked against 
the Leninist principles of the Party.117
 The accusations made against Zhukov by Pronin were not entirely baseless.  After the 
June Plenum, the Soviet military under Zhukov made three demands of the Party.  First, the GPU 
was to report directly to the Ministry of Defense, not the Central Committee.  Second, the 
military was to be represented in the secret police leadership and assume command of the 
Internal Security troops and border guards.  Finally, the Party was formally to denounce the 
military purges of the 1930s under Stalin, including the removal and execution of Marshal 
Mikhail Tukhachevskii.  The rehabilitation of officers purged by Stalin in the 1930s was a point 
of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech; nonetheless, when Zhukov raised the issue it was a charge 
leveled against him.  Zhukov pushed for a greater professional military without the vestiges of a 
political-Party yoke around the Soviet Armed Forces.  However, any attempt to limit or remove 
the Central Committee’s control over the military through the GPU was akin to political suicide 
for Soviet officers who advocated it.  Zhukov’s relationship with Khrushchev grew even more 
tenuous.
 According to Vladimir Karpov, a veteran of Stalingrad and Russian historian, Marshal 
Zhukov left aboard the Kuibyshev for Yugoslavia while the “executioner’s pistols were aimed at 
143
117 C.P. Markov, “Poslevoennye Gody,” Marshal Zhukov: Polkovodets i Chelovek vol. 2 eds. A.D. Mirkina and B.S. 
Yarovikov (Moscow: Novosti, 1988), 29. 
him.”118  While Zhukov was in Yugoslavia, the cogs of the Soviet political system started 
turning.  His trip was extended to allow him to visit Albania.  Khrushchev and his associates 
needed to keep Zhukov out of Moscow to develop the case against him.  The military leadership 
was divided.  There were those who supported Zhukov, such as Rokossovskii, in his policies and 
goals of curtailing the Party control over the military.  Then there were those marshals and 
officers, such as Konev, Moskalenko, and Malinovskii who were Khrushchev’s allies in the 
Soviet high command.  These were men who were Front and Army commanders at the battle of 
Stalingrad, where Khrushchev had held the rank of Lieutenant-General and had been the political 
officer who served with many of these officers.119  As was argued in chapter one, these officers 
were not necessarily outwardly pro-Khrushchev,, but were primarily driven by a strong disdain 
for Zhukov and his leadership style.  Khrushchev shrewdly used past animosity between Zhukov 
and those officers who served as Front and Army commanders during the war.  Khrushchev used 
military leaders who owed their rank and past and future promotions to him, not Zhukov.120  At a 
meeting of the Presidium, however, held on 19 October 1957 to discuss Zhukov, both 
144
118 Vladimir Karpov, “Tainaya Rasprava nad Marshalom Zhukovym,” Pravda 197 (17 August 1991): 4.  While in 
Yugoslavia, Zhukov met with Josip Broz Tito and Yugoslav Defense Minister Ivan Goshniak.
119 The so-called Stalingrad Group was to become dominant in the Soviet High Command throughout the 1950s and 
1960s, especially after Zhukov’s removal from military and Party posts.  Animosity between Stalingrad Front and 
Army commanders and Stavka representatives, such as Zhukov and Vasilevskii, was strong.  Both groups claimed 
sole credit for the strategic plan for the breakout and counter-offensive against the Germans at Stalingrad.  Front 
commander at Stalingrad was Colonel-General Yeremenko; Army commanders were Lieutenant-Generals Chuikov, 
Malinovskii and Moskalenko.  Major General Biryuzov was Chief of Staff under Malinovskii; Chuikov’s Chief of 
Staff was Major General Krylov.  Other officers commanding troops at Stalingrad were Rokossovskii, Batov, 
Bagramyan, Golikov, and Popov.
120 On 22-23 October 1957, CPSU members of the Moscow garrison and Moscow Military district held a meeting 
concerning political work within the Soviet Armed Forces.  Present at the meeting were First Secretary Khrushchev 
and head of the GPU, Zheltov.  Both Khrushchev and Zheltov made scathing remarks to that meeting of Party 
members attacking Zhukov and his so-called anti-Party stance.  Among Zhukov’s sins mentioned were his attempt to 
foster his own cult of personality and Bonapartism. n.b. I rather like Robert Service’s translation – cult of the 
individual rather than cult of the personality, Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 2004). 
Malinovskii and Konev attacked Zheltov, arguing that the head of the GPU was going after 
Zhukov only to settle personal scores.121   
 Zhukov was recalled from his trip abroad, met at the airport by Konev and others, and 
quickly taken to a meeting of the Party Central Committee.  His removal from power was a fait 
accompli.122  Before his return, it was reported that Zhukov had been replaced as Minister of 
Defense of the Soviet Union by Marshal Rodion Malinovskii.123  According to Sergei 
Khrushchev, Zhukov called Khrushchev for an explanation while abroad when he read of his 
replacement as Minister of Defense.124  In the absence of any evidence of this discussion, 
Khrushchev probably said an explanation was forthcoming when Zhukov returned to Moscow.
 On 28-29 October 1957, a Central Committee plenum was convened in Moscow.  The 
only question to be discussed at the plenum was “about the improvement of party-political work 
in the Soviet Army and Navy.”125  In reality, Zhukov’s removal was the only agenda item for the 
plenum to discuss.  Zhukov was to sit through the plenum listening as military officers and Party 
officials castigated him for his so-called anti-Party, Bonapartist tendencies.   In 1962, Voennaya 
mysl’ published an article concerning the October 1957 plenum.  It stated that: 
 The resolution “On Improving Party and Political Work in the Soviet Armed 
Forces and Fleet’ adopted by the October 1957 plenary meeting of the Central 
Committee of the CPSU played a great role in further enhancing the armed forces.  
The plenum firmly condemned the antiparty activity of former Minister of Defense 
G.K. Zhukov, who spread the cult of his personality, violated Lenin’s principles on 
directing the armed forces, pursued a policy of curtailing the work of the party 
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organizations, political bodies, and military councils, and of nullifying the guidance 
of and control over the army and navy by the Party, the Central Committee, and the 
Soviet state.126
The main accusation against Zhukov in 1957 was his work against Party controls over the 
military and Party work in the Soviet Armed Forces.  Other charges included policy adventurism, 
creating a personality cult within the military, personal crudeness/rudeness, and Bonapartist 
aspirations for power.127  Mikhail Suslov, head of the Central Committee ideology and 
propaganda organs, delivered the initial assault against Zhukov.  Suslov concentrated on 
Zhukov’s “serious deficiencies and perversions in party-political work.”128
 According to Colton, the October Central Committee plenum was “a public indictment 
that amounted to a bill of high treason.”129  Suslov attacked Zhukov for his failure to follow the 
Leninist principles of the Party.  Suslov insisted that Zhukov had breached Party discipline and 
the principles of Leninist leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Soviet Armed Forces.130  
Suslov castigated Zhukov for creating his own cult of the personality within the Soviet Armed 
Forces.  Iconic images of Zhukov in the Museum of the Soviet Army were used as evidence of 
such a cult of personality.  Marshal Timoshenko expanded on those accusations.  While 
supporting Khrushchev’s push against Stalin’s cult of personality and power, Timoshenko 
asserted that Zhukov cultivated his own within the country and the military.131  As Karpov states, 
146
126 “Leninskii Kurs XXII syezda KPSS,” Voennaya mysl’ 4 (1962): 13. 
127 Colton, 178-188.  Leaving out the accusation of Bonapartism, those same charges were leveled against 
Khrushchev in 1964.
128 Karpov, “Tainaya Rasprava…”
129 Timothy Colton, “The Zhukov Affair Reconsidered,” Soviet Studies 29, no. 2 (April 1977): 185.
130 Karpov, “Tainaya Rasprava…”  Suslov added that Zhukov’s sins against the Armed Forces and the Party had 
come in the year of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Army.
131 Georgii Zhukov, Document 19, “plenum tsentral’nogo komiteta KPSS- oktyiabr 1957 goda,” 305.
however, Suslov failed to mention that all members of the Presidium (to include Suslov himself) 
had portraits hung around the country in schools, public squares, and streets.  Suslov ended his 
verbal assault by attacking Zhukov for ignoring the Central Committee, and, without the consent 
of the Central Committee, creating sabotage schools which only a few military officers knew 
existed.132
 After the initial report by Suslov, Khrushchev demonstrated the full extent of change in 
Party politics since Stalinist times by allowing Zhukov to speak to the Central Committee in his 
own defense.  Zhukov admitted to the Central Committee that he recognized his faults in the area 
of Party-political work within the military.  The charges leveled against him by Suslov and the 
Presidium were baseless.  Zhukov told those gathered that he believed that in the 1950s all 
officers/commanders were good communists; thus he saw less need for political officers 
(zampoliti).  Times had changed since the 1920s, now most commanders were members of the 
CPSU.133  
 Throughout the two-day plenum, many military officers spoke against Zhukov.  Indignant 
and harsh words were spoken by Marshal Biryuzov and Admiral Gorshkov.134  Both attacked the 
character of Zhukov.  According to Biryuzov and Gorshkov, Zhukov was rude and showed 
crudeness to fellow officers and officials within the Ministry of Defense.  Chief of the Soviet 
General Staff, Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii, told the plenum that Zhukov tried not only to control 
the Army, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the border troops of the KGB.  
Sokolovskii said that Zhukov had worked to minimize the role of the Party and Central 
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Committee in the military.  He attacked Zhukov for his apparent support of US President 
Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’ plan.  Sokolovskii said that ‘Open Skies’ amounted ‘to [giving] 
freedom of the sky for the Americans over our [Soviet] territory.’135  These accusations were 
used to make a case that Zhukov was supporting adventurism in foreign policy.  Sokolovskii 
asked the Central Committee if Zhukov aspired to climb the political heights just as his 
American counterpart in World War II, Eisenhower, had done in becoming President of the 
United States.  In supporting Eisenhower’s proposal for open airspace over both the Soviet 
Union and the United States for weapons inspection from above, Zhukov was betraying the 
Motherland; he was committing treason in the eyes of some military commanders.  If Zhukov 
supported the ‘Open Skies’ program, he saw it as a possible way to continue the feelings of 
détente occurring between the United States and the Soviet Union, a détente that was a foreign 
policy objective of Khrushchev.
 Konev spoke next.  He said that a close relationship between the armed forces and the 
Central Committee was necessary.  For Konev, Zhukov’s position in the Central Committee, and 
then the Presidium, was very useful in fostering a stronger political-military relationship.  
Zhukov’s position should have allowed the Central Committee closer control and leadership over 
the armed forces.  To Konev’s regret, the situation did not develop along those lines, because 
Zhukov had opposed the leadership of the Party.  Konev stressed that Zhukov’s authority was 
given to him by the Central Committee.  Zhukov did not respect or seem to understand the trust 
given to him by the Party.  According to Konev, that was a major political mistake for Zhukov.136  
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 Konev publicly scathed Zhukov when writing in Pravda on 3 November 1957.137  He 
lashed out at Zhukov’s efforts to hamper political military work within the Soviet Army and 
Navy.  Konev wrote that Zhukov did not look toward the Party organizations to help strengthen 
military discipline and order.  No matter what, the Soviet Army and Navy must always report to 
the Central Committee.  Even though Konev came out against Zhukov he did not assume the 
post as Minister of Defense because Khrushchev saw Konev as too similar of a professional 
soldier as Zhukov was. Marshal Biryuzov testified that the weakened state of ‘party-political 
worker in the Soviet Army and Navy is foolishly linked with the activities of comrade 
Zhukov.’138 
 Marshal A.I. Yeremenko attacked Zhukov for his historical role in the Great Patriotic 
War.139  Yeremenko assailed Zhukov for taking too much credit for planning and carrying out the 
counteroffensive at Stalingrad.  Yeremenko argued as Front Commander he and members of the 
Front Military Council, including Nikita Khrushchev, were responsible for successful planning 
and operational successes at Stalingrad.  However, Zhukov, Vasilevskii, and Stavka had 
attributed success at Stalingrad to themselves.140  Yeremenko went so far as to say that Zhukov 
was not at Stalingrad.  Khrushchev was forced to correct him saying that Zhukov was there at the 
key moments of the battle.  Khrushchev knew that in the meeting hall were present those who 
knew exactly what occurred at Stalingrad—soldiers and commanders who knew the truth.141  
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Yeremenko was willing to take sole credit for the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, while also giving 
the correct amount of tribute to the current political leadership, namely Khrushchev, who was 
present during the battle.  Yeremenko proved to be a shrewd Party-military man.142 
 It was a hard decision for Khrushchev personally to remove Zhukov.  He acknowledged 
whatever personal reasons for believing in Zhukov were outweighed by reasons of the Soviet 
state—security and defense of the Soviet Union and stability of the CPSU leadership over the 
country.  Khrushchev and Zhukov had served together in the first months of World War II.  For 
Khrushchev, “the war confirmed that he [Zhukov] was a really good commander.  And I still 
think so, in spite of sharp differences I had with him at a later time, when he had become 
Minister of Defense of the USSR, an appointment I devoted all my efforts and energies to bring 
about.”143  There was an instance at the October plenum when Zhukov attacked Moskalenko in 
his own defense.  Khrushchev recalled the incident in his memoirs.  According to several 
sources, Zhukov shouted at Moskalenko: “What are you accusing me of?  You yourself said to 
me more than once, ‘why are you standing there looking around?  Take power in your own 
hands.  Take it.’”144  Khrushchev believed what Zhukov was saying about Moskalenko.  
Zhukov’s argument has been substantiated by Sergei Khrushchev and Viktor Grishin.  
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Moskalenko was a capable and brave commander during the Second World War, and he was 
well-respected by Khrushchev.  Khrushchev, however, knew he was a sycophant and a 
weathercock.145  No one took Moskalenko seriously because of his personality.  Moskalenko 
would say one thing one day and turn 180 degrees the next.  Zhukov knew he was on his way 
out.  He had no reason to lie.  Moskalenko did not refute Zhukov’s claims, which further 
substantiates Zhukov’s assertions.146  Thus, while Zhukov believed that he himself did not covet 
political authority within the Soviet Union, and that the claims leveled against him were false, he 
proudly voted for the measures to remove him from his positions within the Party.  He remained 
a Party member and was allowed to retire respectably from the Soviet Army with the highest 
rank—Marshal of the Soviet Union.  
Conclusion
 What evidence were the charges against Zhukov based?  Did Zhukov oppose the Central 
Committee and Party control of the Armed Forces? Did he have Bonapartist goals?  Was Zhukov 
cultivating his own cult of the individual within the Armed Forces?  Let us now examine each 
accusation leveled against him.  
The most damning charge was probably that of Bonapartism.147  According to the Central 
Committee Zhukov maintained goals of instigating a coup d’etat against the governing 
151
145 Sergei Khrushchev, Interviewed by author, tape recording, Pittsburgh, PA. 23 November 2002, and 
correspondence 2002 to 2005.
146 N.S. Khrushchev, Vospominaniya, vol. 1, 651.  
147 Bonapartism is defined as the idea that the military covets power after success in the field in the same fashion 
that Napoleon Bonaparte came to power in France at the beginning of the 19th century.
leadership of the Soviet state.  There is currently no evidence to validate that accusation.  The 
actions taken against Zhukov, furthermore, were such that the leadership could not have 
suspected he was a Bonapartist.  He was kept on active duty until March 1958.  Never was 
Zhukov arrested, exiled, or expelled from the CPSU.  Upon Khrushchev’s ouster from power, 
Zhukov appeared on top of Lenin’s Mausoleum for May Day 1965 in full military uniform along 
with Brezhnev and the new Party leadership.  Further undermining the Bonapartist charge was 
that no major military district commanders were charged with conspiracy or removed from their 
command posts in conjunction with Zhukov’s ouster.  Moskalenko, who in 1957 commanded the 
Moscow Military District (which would have been necessary to have on one’s side for a coup) 
remained at his post until 1960.  Marshal Rokossovskii was sent to command the Transcaucasian 
Military District from October to December 1957.  He was seen as a possible supporter of 
Zhukov; Party officials removed him so that Zhukov did not have his vocal support at the 
October plenum.148  However, Rokossovskii had not held a command at the time of his short 
removal from the Soviet capital, and he posed no real threat.
 The only charge that stands against Zhukov was his work to curtail Party-political work 
within the Soviet Army and Navy.  According to the Central Committee, Zhukov “pursued a 
policy directed toward the curtailment of the work of the Party organizations, political organs, 
and military councils” in the Soviet Armed Forces.149  Zhukov strongly encouraged political 
officers to increase their own military education and understanding, and military training.  These 
would facilitate greater overall discipline.  Zhukov wanted political education to be related to 
combat training.  In fact, with the onset of the arms race and the increased tensions of the Cold 
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War, political education relied less on ideology and more on Cold War rhetoric.  It could be said 
that Zhukov was ahead of his time.  With new weapons of greater destructive power, he was 
incorporating the changing circumstances of the international situation to combat and political 
training.  Since 1964, the indictment against Zhukov concerning political-Party work has been 
lessened and even eliminated from histories of what transpired in the fall 1957.150  In the history 
of the GPU written in 1969, Zhukov’s role in advocating the decrease of political work within 
the Armed Forces went practically unmentioned.  It only states that he is purported to have 
undervalued Party work within the Soviet Army and Navy.
 Khrushchev was ousted from his Party posts in October 1964.  Now both in retirement, 
Khrushchev and Zhukov wrote their memoirs.  Zhukov had started his while Khrushchev was 
still in power.  The KGB had come to Khrushchev to tell him of Zhukov’s memoirs.  He told 
them, “don’t interfere. Zhukov is retired and what can a pensioner do but write his memoirs.  He 
has a lot to remember.”151  According to Axell, Zhukov supposedly had gone home after the 
October plenum taken sleeping pills, woke up, took more pills, and slept more.  For 15 days he 
slept, and then he fished.152   
After Khrushchev’s fall, Zhukov slowly rose out of his persona nongrata status in Soviet 
society.  He attended May Day celebrations, and along with the Victory Day parade, in 1965.  In 
1971, Zhukov was elected a delegate to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress of the CPSU.  While 
writing his memoirs, each chapter had to be approved by the Party propagandists and ideologists. 
The first editions of his memoirs, published in the 1970s, were extensively edited and censored.  
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With the fall of the Soviet Union, Zhukov’s memoirs have been published uncensored in 
Russian.  An English translation of the latest edition has yet to be undertaken.
 On 18 June 1974, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, four-
time Hero of the Soviet Union, died.  Zhukov is buried in the Kremlin Wall, and an equestrian 
statue erected in his honor now stands outside Red Square in front of the State Historical 
Museum.  In 1996, in honor of the 100th anniversary of his birth, the Order of Zhukov was 
established in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.  
 Not since the Decembrists’ uprising against Nicholas I has the military shown any 
Bonapartist or praetorian tendencies; the same held true for Zhukov.  He was a loyal Soviet 
citizen serving the current government of the state.  Patriotic and devoted to the military, he had 
no intention to seek political leadership; however, he was given membership in the highest 
decision-making body of the CPSU.  His time is not so black and white.  Given the opportunity 
and office to do so, Zhukov pushed for greater political autonomy for the Soviet military and 
used his post on the Presidium to participate and influence debates on a number of policies 
beyond the purview of purely military concerns.  He chose to participate in the removal of Beria 
for personal reasons based on the history both men shared, for political gains for the military at 
the expense of the security services, and Zhukov was elevated to the political organ of the CPSU, 
the Central Committee.
 Georgii Zhukov served the Russian people and state both during the Imperial and Soviet 
eras of Russian history.  Zhukov was a Russian officer in Soviet Russia.  In Zhukov’s own words 
‘time will put everything in its place and judge everybody…You can only properly serve people 
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by telling the truth and fighting for it.”153  Ella Zhukova, a daughter of Zhukov, states that her 
“father was not a servant of the government or of any leading groups.  He was a servant of his 
country, as far as he understood it.”154  The sense of duty Georgii Zhukov felt for Russia was 
much deeper than any sense of serving the Soviet government per se.  Zhukov was above all a 
professional military officer.  Serving the motherland, defending his country, and upholding the 
values of a military officer were duties that Zhukov carried out in the service of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union.  
 After the Great Patriotic War, Zhukov was a national hero in the eyes of a majority of 
Soviet citizens.  In the hearts and minds of Soviet citizens Zhukov served the Russian people 
heroically, saving them from the horrors brought by the Germans.  Zhukov’s heroic status, 
however, was not a good quality for him to have in the eyes of Stalin or the CPSU leadership.  
Stalin, and to an extent the Party, claimed to have single-handedly brought about the victory over 
Fascist Germany.  Zhukov was ‘exiled’ from Moscow.  Zhukov had served his purposes for 
Stalin during the war, but in those years immediately after the war, Stalin grew wary, and he no 
longer needed a strong popular military leader by his side in peacetime.
 While Khrushchev was First Secretary, Zhukov was used again as a political pawn to 
sustain Khrushchev’s leadership.  Zhukov supported Khrushchev’s policies that he believed 
would enhance the security of the USSR, but also understood the lines between CPSU domain of 
military strategy and doctrine, and where the domain of the armed forces was being encroached 
upon.  Khrushchev used Zhukov to his advantage and for his own personal gain against others in 
the Party who challenged him for leadership as in the removal of Malenkov.  In the post-Stalinist 
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years, Zhukov did play a role in the political-military relations of the Soviet Union.  It was a role 
for which he was co-opted.  Zhukov did not actively seek out positions granted him by the Party 
leadership in the Central Committee and eventually the Presidium.  Throughout this study, the 
extent of Zhukov’s role in politics has depended on the Party itself.  Given a voice in political 
organs, Zhukov was able to advance and at times attempt to protect the military’s interest.  
Zhukov was given leadership posts as an agent acting within the confines of the structure of the 
Soviet state.  His positions were both within the military, one institution of that structure, and 
after 1956, in the leading decision-making bodies of the CPSU, another institution in the 
structure of the state.  Those posts gave Zhukov the opportunity to speak for and against certain 
policies.  In the end the structure of the state confined and removed Zhukov from his positions 
both in the military and the Party.  When allowed to play a more integral role, Zhukov did so, 
and when the Party curtailed him, Zhukov adhered to Party rules and dictums.  In the case of the 
June 1957 Plenum that ousted the Anti-Party Group, Zhukov did not play such a central role in 
Khrushchev’s political victory, but played a political role in allowing military transports to bring 
Khrushchev supporters in the Central Committee back to Moscow.  While some senior Soviet 
military commanders may have been dragged into the political games of the Soviet Union, the 
masses of the Soviet Armed Forces remained non-political.  Loyalty to the state, whether tsarist 
or communist, was the driving factor in Zhukov’s relationship with governing authorities.
 There is evidence that Zhukov used his Party leadership positions to influence Party 
matters, including the foreign and domestic policies of Khrushchev.  He was part of 
conversations and decision-making votes concerns policies before the Polish and Hungarian 
crises as well as his own pointed views on the necessity of pursuing Eisenhower’s planned Open 
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Skies program.  No clear evidence has been found to prove charges of a possible military coup 
led by Zhukov.  Historians must engage in further scholarship and research on political-military 
relations of the 1950s and 1960s to answer further questions about Zhukov’s and the military’s 
role in Communist Party politics.
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Chapter 3: Malinovskii and Civil-Military Relations
 During a 2006 conference, in Hamburg, Germany, on local conflict during the Cold War, 
several Russian historians referred to Marshal Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovskii as nothing more 
than a sycophantic yes-man fiercely loyal to Khrushchev.1  Those historians argue that 
Malinovskii put his loyalty to Khrushchev before his professional military duties in supporting 
Khrushchev’s policies for reform and change to the Soviet armed forces.  Malinovskii and 
Khrushchev did have a strong professional relationship.  Khrushchev and Malinovskii served 
together at Stalingrad; Malinovskii became one of the members of the Stalingrad Group during 
the 1950s and 1960s.  This chapter will show that, contrary to the historians at the Hamburg 
conference, Malinovskii was a more nuanced personality.  Khrushchev was to believe that 
Malinovskii was more ‘Party-minded‘ than his predecessor.  Khrushchev perceived Malinovskii 
to be concerned with his own career advancement rather than called by a sense of duty to 
military professionalism, thus, Khrushchev considered Malinovskii to be a more malleable 
officer over others than could have been elevated to replace Zhukov.  Marshal Ivan Konev was a 
choice to become Minister of Defence in 1957, but Khrushchev believed he would always speak 
his mind in the presence of Party officials, even if his opinion differed from Khrushchev’s.  
Khrushchev even wrote in his memoirs that Konev was the selected choice of Zhukov to succeed 
to the post.2  The choice of Malinovskii over Konev in 1957 is the clearest sign that 
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Khrushchev’s selection of personalities, of agents, to lead the Soviet armed forces was based in 
the notion of mediocrity over meritorious service.  The two officers different service during 
World War II illustrated the necessity to be a wartime colleague of Khrushchev’s at Stalingrad in 
order to be promoted in the leading posts of the Soviet military in the 1950s and 1960s.  While 
Malinovskii served as Stalingrad, Konev was Zhukov’s man during the Battle of Moscow earlier 
in the war and again during the Battle of Kursk.
 While assumed to be a logical, safe choice by Khrushchev as Minister of Defence, 
Malinovskii was able publicly to support those policies to reform the armed forces and at the 
same time supporting the more conservative military officers who argued for a more balanced 
force structure in the Soviet arsenal.  In that respect, Malinovskii did not entirely differ from 
Zhukov.  As Minister of Defence, both officers supported Khrushchev’s single-mindedness 
toward nuclear weapons while at the same time calling for the retention of conventional forces.  
This chapter will focus on the role Marshal Malinovskii in civil-military relations after he 
replaced Zhukov as Minister of Defence in October 1957.  From his appointment until 1964, 
Malinovskii was able to support Khrushchev while at the same time still maintaining his military 
professionalism.
Malinovskii and Konev: Early Military Careers
 Malinovskii was born in 1898, while Konev was born the previous year.  Just like 
Zhukov, Malinovskii served both the last tsar and the newly founded Soviet state with distinction 
in the First World War and Russian Civil respectively.  When the First World War broke out in 
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1914, Malinovskii left home to join the tsarist army.  He was wounded during the war and 
received the St. George Cross for bravery and devotion.3  In this sense Zhukov and Malinovskii 
had similar experiences during the First World War.  However, while Zhukov served as a non-
commissioned officer, Malinovskii fought as a lowly private in the trenches.  Also, Malinovskii 
fought on the Western Front during the First World War as part of the Russian Expeditionary 
Force sent to France in 1916.
 While stationed in France Malinovskii was again cited for bravery for his service at the 
battle of Fort Brion.  Malinovskii was wounded once more in France and was decorated with the 
Croix de Guerre.  After the Bolshevik Revolution, France disbanded the Russian units serving on 
the Western Front.  Malinovskii took a circuitous route back to Russia via Vladivostok.4  With 
some of his fellow Russian soldiers from France, Malinovskii joined the Red Army in 1919 as a 
machine-gunner in the 240th Tver Regiment.  Malinovskii’s unit served in Siberia fighting 
against the White Forces under Admiral Kolchak.
 Marshal Ivan Konev’s military career officially began two years after Malinovskii when 
he was conscripted into service in 1916.  As the revolutions of 1917 progressed, Konev’s unit 
missed most of the fighting in the First World War.  As a new soldier in the newly founded Red 
Army, Konev first served as a political commissar in the Nikolsk district through 1918.  At the 
end of the Civil War, Konev participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion in 1921.5
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 Konev’s career following the Civil War was punctuated by positive and negative 
performance reports.  In 1932, A. Kork, commander of the 3rd Rifles Corps, and Konev’s 
superior, called Konev, ‘a proletarian commander who took the full weight of his post on himself 
and always led by personal example.’6  Six months after that report came several less flattering 
personal reports on Konev by his commander.
 Throughout the 1920s Malinovskii attended and successfully completed a number of 
command and officer schools.  In 1927 he entered the Frunze Military Academy and graduated 
three years later.  Malinovskii joined the CPSU in 1926 while still at the academy.  After several 
appointments he came to serve as Chief of Staff under Semyon Timoshenko.  Timoshenko was a 
protege of Marshal Semyon Budenny and through Budenny a protege of Stalin.  Malinovskii’s 
interwar service differed in that respect from the experience of Zhukov.  Possibly, Malinovskii 
was protected during the purges from questioning because of his association with Timoshenko 
and Budenny.  As stated in the previous chapter, Zhukov’s association with Uborevich and 
Tukhachevskii had led to his questioning by the NKVD.  Malinovskii served under Timoshenko 
until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936.
 Malinovskii followed other Soviet officers volunteering for service in the International 
Brigades and the Republican forces fighting against the Spanish fascists under Francisco Franco 
and their Italian and German allies.  He dutifully fought during the defence of Madrid.  In 1938 
Malinovskii was recalled to Moscow on orders that if he did not comply he would be considered 
a traitor.7  Unlike other officers who were tainted by their service in Spain and were tortured, 
Malinovskii was rewarded for his service.  He was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Order of 
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the Red Banner.  In 1939 Malinovskii began an appointment as a lecturer at the Frunze Military 
Academy.  He was promoted to the rank of Major-General just months before the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.  
Malinovskii and Konev: Separate Paths to Victory in World War II
 Not only did Malinovskii’s service during World War II differ from that of is predecessor 
but also with Konev.  While Malinovskii served throughout the war in the Soviet south-west 
zone of operations and movement from that area toward Germany and Austria, Konev’s service 
was initially against the German approaches to Moscow and subsequent central push toward 
Berlin.  Zhukov served as a member of Stavka throughout the war, being sent to key battles 
throughout the war.  Malinovskii served as a commander to various armies and Fronts.  His 48th 
Rifle Corps was part of the Odessa Military District on 22 June 1941.  Throughout the early 
defeats suffered by the Soviet armed forces, Malinovskii’s soldiers fought well.  Although 
defeated, they withdrew in an orderly fashion and were able to fight another day.
 On the invasion day, then Colonel-General Konev’s 19th Army was stationed near 
Smolensk.  Outnumbered during the Battle for Smolensk, Konev’s ‘personal courage and 
energetic initiative in difficult circumstances were characteristic of Konev as a military leader 
throughout the war.’8  Despite having to retreat east toward Moscow, Konev managed to set up 
defensive positions along the German western approaches to Moscow.  On 12 September 1941, 
Konev replaced Marshal Semyon Timoshenko as commander of the Soviet Western Front faced 
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with again defending the western approaches to Moscow near Vyazma.  Faced with mounting 
German pressure Konev was forced to retreat toward Moscow and in the process 500,000 Soviet 
soldiers were encircled and taken prisoner.9  Konev was replaced by Zhukov, who had returned 
to Moscow from Leningrad on STAVKA’s orders.  However, Zhukov saved Konev’s military 
career from Stalin. He argued to Stalin that Konev had to be kept in the command structure as his 
deputy in the Western Front.  Subsequent to being retained as Zhukov’s deputy commander of 
the Western Front, Konev was named commander of the Kalinin Front in October 1941 and 
tasked with guarding the northern approaches to Moscow, protecting Zhukov’s right flank as 
Zhukov’s forces were facing the Germans head on in front of Moscow.10  Despite early setbacks 
for Konev around Smolensk and the approaches to Moscow, the advocacy of Zhukov retained 
Konev in the service to the army during the Battle of Moscow.  Konev’s course through the war 
would see his service in this central axis of advance toward Berlin, eventually placing him at 
odds with Zhukov during the final battle to take the German capital.
 During the ill-fated Kharkov offensive in May 1942 Malinovskii’s troops were part of the 
disaster where the German breakthrough was significant.  The panic which ensued gave rise to 
Stalin’s suspicions about Malinovskii’s service to the Soviet Union.  Stalin believed that 
Malinovskii still maintained contact with foreign agents from his time in France during 1916 to 
1917.  Stalin had doubts about Malinovskii’s allegiance, much as the CPSU leader had 
questioned Konev’s mettle during the battle for Moscow.  He questioned Malinovskii’s desire to 
defeat German aggression.11  Throughout most of the war, Stalin would harbor questions about 
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Malinovskii’s allegiance.  According to Khrushchev, he was tasked by Stalin to ‘keep an eye’ on 
Malinovskii, especially while they were both serving in Stalingrad.12  Whereas Zhukov was the 
‘protector‘ of Konev in the early days of World War II, it was Khrushchev, the eventual CPSU 
leader whose protection kept Malinovskii in command during the Battle of Stalingrad.  This 
difference between the two officers is illustrated in their careers in the period after Zhukov’s 
dismissal in 1957.
   In August 1942 Malinovskii moved to the Stalingrad Front to take command of the 66th 
Army that was drawn from Stavka’s reserves.  Malinovskii’s army was to face heavy fighting in 
the German drive on Stalingrad.  After a brief command stint at the Voronezh Front, Malinovskii 
returned to Stalingrad as commander of the 2nd Guards Army that was one of the best-equipped 
and most formidable fighting force in the Red Army at that time.  The 2nd Guards Army was 
composed of five rifle corps and a mechanised corps.13  Malinovskii and the 2nd Guards Army 
played an integral part by holding off German forces sent to relieve Field Marshal von Paulus’s 
encircled VI Army.  
 For the remainder of the war, Malinovskii served as commander to various Fronts.  The 
forces under his command participated in the operations to retake Odessa.  Malinovskii was 
promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1944.  He then commanded forces that 
cleared Romania of German army units and moved toward taking Budapest.  After arguing with 
Stalin on beginning the attack on Budapest after a forced march, Malinovskii’s soldiers struggled 
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in a bloody fight to take the Hungarian capital.  From Budapest, Malinovskii’s units moved into 
Austria and together with the 3rd Ukrainian Front took Vienna on 13 April 1945.14
 Despite his forces taking Vienna at the end of the war, Malinovskii was not appointed to 
the Allied Control Commission for Austria.  That office was presented to Konev.  Unlike 
Malinovskii who served with Khrushchev at the Battle of Stalingrad, Konev’s decision action 
was during the Battle of Kursk the following summer.  Shortly after the actions near Moscow 
were decided in the Red Army’s favour, Konev was again named commander of the Western 
Front, then the Northwestern Front, and finally in June 1943, the Steppe Front, which he took 
into battle at Kursk.15  Although several members of the forthcoming Stalingrad Group of 
officers were present at Kursk, along with Khrushchev, Konev’s interaction with them, especially 
with Khrushchev was limited. 
  Konev commanded the Steppe Front and his Chief of Staff was Matvei Zakharov, who 
was to become Chief of the General Staff twice in the 1960s.  One of the outspoken critics of 
Khrushchev’s military policies and changes to doctrine in the 1950s and 1960s, Lieutenant-
General P. Rotmistrov commanded the 5th Guards Army, under Konev’s Steppe Front.16  Even 
Zakharov, while serving twice as Chief of the General Staff under Khrushchev, was replaced for 
the first time in 1963, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, over his perceived opinions on the 1962 
operation. Zakharov was replaced in 1963 by Marshal Biryuzov, who served a short stint the 
previous year as commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces.
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 Khrushchev was attached to the Voronezh Front as political commissar to its commander, 
Army General Vatutin.  The Voronezh Front’s Chief of Staff was Lieutenant-General S.P Ivanov, 
who was serving in the planning section of the General Staff during the build-up to the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.17  Moskalenko, who proved important in the arrest of Beria, commanded the 40th 
Army of the Voronezh Front - thus in a unit that politically reported to Khrushchev.  At Kursk, 
Malinovskii commanded the Southwestern Front; A. Zheltov served as his political commissar.  
Zheltov headed the GPU from 1955 to 1957 and led the political attacks in the military against 
Zhukov in the summer and autumn 1957.18
 There was a clear division of service in the 1950s and 1960s.  Service at Stalingrad 
clearly was more important than service at Kursk.  However, those in the Steppe Front saw their 
service to the Soviet military ended early in the 1960s, especially when the voiced opinions in 
opposition to Khrushchev’s policies.  From Kursk, Konev’s service took him toward Berlin, as 
Malinovskii’s forces moved southwest toward Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria.  Konev 
and Zhukov’s bitterness toward each other in regards to the battle for Berlin has been covered in 
the previous chapter.
 After the war, Konev was named commander of the Central Group of Soviet Forces 
stationed in Austria and given a place on the Allied control Commission.  He held this post until 
he was recalled to Moscow as Zhukov was being replaced and ‘exiled’ from the highest echelons 
of the military leadership.  Konev was named commander-in-chief of the Soviet Ground Forces 
and Deputy Defence Minister, replacing Zhukov in both positions, in June 1946.19
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 After victory in the European theater, Malinovskii was transferred to the Far East to take 
part in the final days of the war with Japan.  In July 1945 Malinovskii became the commander of 
the Transbaikal Front, which was the main Soviet force operating in Manchuria against the 
Japanese Kwangtung Army.  He was able successfully to implement the tactics of deep 
maneuvers by mechanised forces to encircle the Japanese forces in front of his lines.20  By 
September, Malinovskii’s forces had retaken Dalian and Port Arthur that were lost by Russia in 
the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905).  For his service in the Far East campaign against Japan, 
Malinovskii was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.  The citation specifically mentioned 
his service to the Soviet army and his grasp of both command and operation art.21
Post War Years
 Over the next ten years Malinovskii remained in command posts in the Far East of the 
Soviet Union.  From 1945 to 1947 Malinovskii commanded the Transbaikal Military District.  In 
1947, Malinovskii assumed the command of the Far East Military District; he remained in this 
post until 1956, while Konev was recalled from Austria to Moscow in 1946.22  In Moscow, 
Konev replaced the disgraced Zhukov as Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Deputy  
Defence Minister.  According to Erickson, during the Korean War Khrushchev suggested to 
Stalin that Malinovskii be sent to North Korea, under his former alias from the Spanish Civil 
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War, to counsel Kim Il-sung.  Stalin rejected Khrushchev’s thought.23  At Khrushchev’s behest, 
Malinovskii was recalled to Moscow in March 1956.  Malinovskii was appointed a Deputy 
Defence Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces.  Along with other 
officers from the Stalingrad Group, Malinovskii was elected to the Central Committee of the 
CPSU.
 After Zhukov’s return to Moscow in 1952, Konev remained head of the Soviet ground 
forces and Zhukov’s deputy after February 1953.  Konev was made Commander-in-Chief of the 
Warsaw Pact forces at its founding in 1955.  He held that post until his retirement in 1960.  
 On 26 October 1957, Marshal Zhukov was dismissed as Minister of Defence of the 
Soviet Union and it was announced that Malinovskii was to replace him.  Malinovskii and 
Khrushchev were close associates during the war.  He and Khrushchev were close confidants at 
several key battles, especially at Stalingrad.24  Malinovskii commanded the Southern Front 
during the war, which was one of the Fronts that Khrushchev served as a member of the military 
soviet (council).  Khrushchev believed that his closer relationship with Malinovskii would 
facilitate greater control over his new Defence Minister.  Malinovskii was deemed to be more 
pliable by Khrushchev.  His personal style was unlike Zhukov, presumably making him more 
attractive as a replacement.  In his memoirs, Khrushchev discussed the decision to appoint 
Malinovskii to head the Ministry of Defence: 
In the Party leadership there were no objections to Malinovskii.  Of course his 
authority on a world scale and throughout the Soviet Union was less than 
Zhukov’s.  On the other hand, Marshal Malinovskii had an outstanding record 
during the war to recommend him, and he was by no means an accidental figure 
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in the realm of military affairs.  On a personal plane he didn’t have Zhukov’s 
energy and drive; he was calm and somewhat slow-moving by nature.25
Khrushchev was giving preference to Malinovskii over other well-qualified candidates for the 
post.  Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev was a choice that was also considered.  In 1957, Konev 
was commander-in-chief of the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact.  Zhukov’s choice to replace 
him was Konev who Zhukov deemed as more qualified in military affairs for the post.  
Khrushchev believed that Konev was a good candidate for the Ministry of Defence but 
questioned his personality.  Konev was believed to be too similar to Zhukov.  Khrushchev 
thought that, ‘Konev was capable of conducting himself less candidly in relation to the party 
leadership and the government.’26  Thus, Khrushchev saw Konev as a continuation of Zhukov.  
Seeking someone more predisposed to acquiescing the Party line on military affairs, Khrushchev 
chose Malinovskii to head the Ministry of Defence.  He chose an officer who he had known in 
the war, and that he felt had a personality that would be easily controlled.  It was Khrushchev’s 
decisions that made the choice of personality important in Soviet civil-military relations.  He 
made personality and the choice of agents an issue in that relationship.
 In 1957, Konev held the post of head of the Warsaw Pact forces headquartered in 
Warsaw, a post he held until being retired to the Chief Inspectorate of the Defence Ministry and 
replaced by Marshal Andrei Grechko in 1960.  While Zhukov spoke in favour of Konev’s 
elevation to Defence Minister, and Khrushchev dismissed the notion owing to the fact that both 
officers were perceived to come from similar molds, Garthoff has agreed with the assessment 
that Konev was eventually retired based on Konev’s lack of support toward Khrushchev’s 
169
25 Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer, vol. 2, edited by Sergei Khrushchev (University Park, Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006.
26 Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Reformer, vol. 2, 239.
military policies.  Garthoff argued that Konev was forcibly retired in 1960 because the marshal 
did not actively support Khrushchev’s policies concerning military reform.27  Epitomised in that 
decision was a clear division between military leaders and political leaders.  Military leaders 
were primarily concerned with the requirements for waging war based on proscribed doctrine 
whereas political leaders were more interested in the political usages of military power short of 
general war.28  Konev’s expertise and service were recalled a year after his retirement, he was 
brought back into active service to take command of the Soviet Group of Forces Germany 
during the Berlin crisis over the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.  He was retained in 
Germany until early 1962.  Konev’s recall for service in 1961 is not dissimilar from Zhukov 
recall to Moscow in the early 1950s.  In both situations the Cold War was heating up and 
relations between the main protagonists and the Soviet leaders of the day turned toward their 
military leaders with the education and expertise to lead in times of elevated tensions.
Malinovskii Walking a Fine Line Between Officers and Khrushchev
 ‘In the beginning Malinovskii played a role akin to that of a referee in what became an 
increasingly acrimonious debate, attempting to support Khrushchev’s policies at large, but also 
taking into account the reservations, voiced and unvoiced, of the more conservative elements 
within the Soviet High Command.’29  The first issue that Malinovskii dealt with was his 
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predecessor’s view on the role of the Party in military affairs.  Zhukov increasingly had reduced 
the role of Party controls in the military culminating in the May 1957 ‘Instructions to the 
Organisations of the CPSU in the Soviet Army and Navy.’  Those instructions were replaced in 
April 1958 with a Statute on Military Councils, which increased the size and authority of 
military councils at all levels of military organisations.30  In October 1958, the role and authority 
of the political organs in the military were increased.  All activities including those deemed the 
sole purview of the military, were now included in the scope of work by political organs.  The 
October ‘ Statute on the Political Organs in the Soviet Army and Navy’ also increased the time 
officers and soldiers had to spend in political education classes.31
 Although Malinovskii supported Khrushchev’s goal of the re-imposition of Party 
controls, he spoke out against the return to Stalinist controls.  Less than a year after Zhukov’s 
removal, Malinovskii had play the role of mediator between Khrushchev’s thoughts on Party 
controls and the more conservative line held by the military command.  Malinovskii saw a strong 
correlation between the increased role of the political organs in the army and navy and the 
decline of military discipline.  Writing in Krasnaya zvezda in November 1958 Malinovskii 
discussed the decline of military discipline.  The main problem Malinovskii saw was the 
deteriorating position of officers.  The resumption of the practice of kritika and samokritika after 
the removal of Zhukov increased criticism by soldiers to their officers and the rise of outright 
insubordination.32  Malinovskii argued that a return to edinonachalie was the only way to re-
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establish military discipline; edinonachalie was the best way to practice military life.33  
Malinovskii argued that military and political work within military units had to function together 
by progressing toward a common goal of ‘strengthening the combat capability and readiness of 
the army and navy.’34  While not speaking out against Khrushchev’s policies, Malinovskii put 
into question the need for the strong, stringent reimposition of Party controls after the October 
1957 CC plenum.  Thus, shortly after Malinovskii assumed the Minister’s post, he was already 
speaking for the military’s position on Party controls.  
 Zhukov had one asset as Minister of Defence that Malinovskii did not possess.  After 
February 1956, Zhukov was head of the ministry and a member of the Presidium.  Malinovskii 
never became a member of the Presidium.  In 1956, Zhukov attended thirty-eight Presidium 
meetings but spoke at less than half of those.  Many of those meetings centered around military 
issues necessitated by the twin crises in Poland and Hungary.35  The following year Zhukov 
attended fifteen Presidium meetings, including those that dealt with the Anti-Party Group and his 
own removal in October.36    Malinovskii attended on average less than ten Presidium meetings a 
year and was only invited to key meetings such as those which dealt with the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.37  Malinovskii attended his first Presidium meeting as Minister of Defence on 7 
December 1957.  That meeting included a discussion of the Defence Ministry’s plans for military  
material procurement in 1958.38  On 31 December 1957, Malinovskii and Khrushchev discussed 
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military personnel appointments at a Presidium meeting including new commanders for the 
Transcaucasian Military District and of the Group of Soviet Forces stationed in Poland.39
 Malinovskii’s counsel on military affairs was sought by the Presidium from time to time.  
However, even at some of the most tense moments of the Cold War his counsel was either 
dismissed or not requested.  When Khrushchev ignited the Berlin Crisis on 10 November 1958 
by announcing in a speech on Polish friendship with the Soviet Union that he sought a resolve 
and peace formally to end the Second World War, the military’s advise was not sought.  
Malinovskii was not invited to the Presidium meeting which discussed the implications of 
turning access decisions on West Berlin over to the East German authorities.  No preliminary 
military plans were formulated.40  During a key decision the military’s voice was not sought, nor 
did the Soviet armed forces have the ability to voice its own opinions at the Presidium level after 
Zhukov was removed.  When the Berlin crisis was reignited with the decision to close the East-
West border between Berlin, Khrushchev did seek the advise of his military commanders in 
Berlin and from Malinovskii.  The military commander in Berlin and of the Group of Soviet 
Forces I.I. Yakubovskii was temporarily replaced by Konev in August 1961.  The argument was 
to have a more knowledgeable commander in that post if hostilities erupted.  Control of the East 
German armed forces was transferred to Marshal Andrei Grechko, commander-in-chief of the 
Warsaw Pact forces.41  In September 1961, Malinovskii argued that the East Germans were too 
quick to shoot at those attempting to cross the border to West Berlin and that is was happening 
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more often.  Throughout the Berlin crisis Malinovskii provided military advise when it was 
sought. 
 In Malinovskii, Khrushchev believed he had a much more pliable, Party-minded, 
Minister of Defence.  Malinovskii attended the Paris conference from 16 to 17 May 1960 with 
Khrushchev.  Held shortly after the Soviets shot down an American U-2 over Sverdlovsk, the 
conference came to naught when Khrushchev walked out early.  Khrushchev and Malinovskii 
decided while in France to visit the village where Malinovskii had been station on the Western 
Front during the First World War.  According to Khrushchev’s memoirs numerous French 
residents of the village came to see the leader of the Soviet union and the Minister of Defence 
who had lived in the villages years before.42 With events like the day in the French village, 
Khrushchev believed he had solidified a strong relationship with Malinovskii.  The following 
year the relationship would be tested over Khrushchev’s ideas to modernise the Soviet armed 
forces.
 As previously discussed in the first chapter, the greatest debate among the military and 
the Party leadership was over the direction of Soviet military doctrine and the composition of the 
armed forces’s modern arsenal.  Malinovskii played an integral role in that debate.  Malinovskii 
proved more skilled at toeing the Party line on nuclear weapons while at the same time arguing 
for the retention of modern, conventional forces.  Khrushchev constantly touted the need to rely 
solely on nuclear weapons and their attendant delivery systems.   Malinovskii supported 
Khrushchev in the development of nuclear weapons but also believed the Soviet armed forces 
had to maintain conventional forces.  Speaking in May 1961 after the recent Soviet-German 
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combined exercises under the auspices of the Warsaw Pact, Malinovskii stressed the importance 
of conventional forces even in the event of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict.  Malinovskii 
argued that in a nuclear war, ballistic missiles would play the most important part in the initial 
phase of the war.  However: 
During the first operations in the initial phase of war, the army ground forces 
mainly have to exploit in their area of attack the results of strategic nuclear 
strikes.  Only very sparingly should they use their own nuclear weapons, instead 
keeping the bulk of them for battle behind the enemy lines.  The transition to 
attack must be contingent on the level of radiation resulting from nuclear missile 
strikes with strategic weapons.43
Malinovskii supported military commanders that argued for a role for conventional forces on a 
nuclear battlefield.  Malinovskii argued that personnel could be protected from radiation by 
reinforcing transports, tanks, and helicopters, or by simply moving around radiated areas of the 
battlefield.44  Arguing against Khrushchev call to reduce spending to modern tanks by advancing 
the argument that only modern tanks can successfully maneuver in and around nuclear 
battlefields.  Tanks and mechanised infantry are able swiftly to move into the rear areas of an 
enemy’s lines and disrupt communications.45
 Malinovskii continued to support both Khrushchev and military commanders viewpoints 
on modern warfare at the Twenty-Second Party Congress.  While supporting the development of 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, Malinovskii added that only through combined arms, 
including modern conventional forces, can the Soviet Union hope to be victorious in the next 
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war.46  In that speech Malinovskii successfully appeased Khrushchev’s views on military affairs 
and doctrine as well those more conservative, military professional officers.  As a member of the 
Stalingrad Group, Malinovskii became part of the fracture within that core group of officers in 
the 1960s.  He supported Khrushchev’s military policies but was not as pliable as Khrushchev 
had hoped.  Malinovskii increasingly showed that he put his military duty before his career 
aspirations under Khrushchev.
 Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, Malinovskii again argued for the retention of 
conventional forces.  At an internal military conference held in February 1963, Malinovskii 
stated that all forces must ‘preserve and develop’ conventional forces to be prepared for ‘local 
non-nuclear wars.’  Malinovskii discussed the need for conventional forces after the initial phase 
of a nuclear war.  At the conference he stressed the need for conventional forces ‘to eliminate the 
remnants of the enemy’s forces and keep the captured territory under control.’47  Malinovskii 
had supported the failed missile deployment to Cuba but had become increasingly cautious of 
Khrushchev’s gambit and scheme.  The sole reliance on nuclear weapons was a policy that not 
even a close confidant like Malinovskii could support anymore.
Conclusion
 Khrushchev sought to place close confidants from his time as a member of various 
military council’s during the Second World War, specifically at Stalingrad, in key command 
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posts in the military throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  Khrushchev believed that Malinovskii, as 
a member of the Stalingrad Group would be a more pliable, supportive Minister of Defence than 
Zhukov had been.  According to Khrushchev himself, if the decisions was based on military 
expertise and merit, Konev’s name should be on a shortlist of who was to be the next Minister of 
Defence.  However, Khrushchev also believed that little would change if an officer such as 
Konev, closely resembling Zhukov, were to be at the head of the Soviet armed forces.  It was 
Khrushchev who made the choice of mediocrity over merit in that decision.  Konev was a 
meritorious officer who upheld the ideals of military professionalism.  While his service in WW 
II paralleled Malinovskii, Konev did not serve in direct contact with Khrushchev, which served 
to hinder his career in the 1950s and 1960s.  His forced retirement was based on his lack of 
support toward Khrushchev’s designs on military reform.
 While he was supportive of Khrushchev’s policies, Malinovskii was able to walk a fine 
line between Khrushchev and more conservative members of the Soviet high command.  
Malinovskii was never made a member of the Presidium thus, he did not have the same access to 
policy-making as Zhukov.  He was invited to Presidium meetings when military council was 
sought.  However, on average per year Malinovskii did not attend many Presidium meetings 
simply because he was not a member.  
 In the 1960s, Malinovskii increasingly argued for both the increased development of 
nuclear weapons and their attendant delivery systems and for the retention and strengthening 
modern conventional forces.  Speaking before the Warsaw Pact forces, Malinovskii argued that 
conventional mechanised forces will play an integral role in modern warfare on a nuclear 
battlefield.  Malinovskii was in a precarious position throughout the 1960s as he was head of the 
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armed forces and also a member of the Stalingrad Group that was becoming increasingly 
stratified.  Malinovskii became a more moderate member of the Stalingrad Group who was less 
sycophantic that other officers who placed their position and career before their duty to the 
military as officers.
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Chapter 4: The Soviet Military at Novocherkassk
 Years of Soviet bureaucratic secrecy and silence surround the events of the workers’ 
uprising in Novocherkassk, which took place from 1 to 3 June 1962.  It was not until May 1989 
that any investigation into the tragic means used to end the uprising was undertaken from within 
the Soviet bureaucratic system.  After the implementation of Gorbachev’s reforms, and the 
election of the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies, opinions were voiced to open an investigation into 
the events of June 1962.  It was under those auspices that the Chief Military Procurator of the 
Soviet Union carried out the investigation into the Novocherkassk tragedy over the next several 
years.  Shrouded in secrecy, the uprising in Novocherkassk is an important case study of internal 
policies in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev.  It was an event which he did not ‘remember’ in 
his memoirs.  What was the exact role of the Soviet armed forces, if any, in suppressing the 
Novocherkassk uprising?  We know that Soviet Army units of the North Caucasian Military 
District (NCMD) were sent to Novocherkassk, along with internal troop units of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD).  This chapter will illustrate the secondary role played by the Soviet army 
in supporting the MVD in suppressing the uprising on 2 June 1962.  Herein it is argued that 
troops from the MVD fired into the crowd on 2 June, not those of the Soviet regular army.
 Agents of both the CPSU Presidium and the Soviet army guided the decisions being made 
on the ground in Novocherkassk.  The structure of the Soviet party-state ceased to function well 
during those events.  Tensions between the Presidium members sent to Novocherkassk led to 
indecisiveness on a single course of action.  Anastas Mikoyan served as the voice of calm reason 
as compared to Frol Kozlov’s hard-lined approach for dealing with the revolt.  The failure of 
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clear decision making by the Presidium allowed for the situation to become clouded.  Sources 
point to various agents ‘ordering’ the crowd to be fired upon, if indeed any order was actually 
given.  The crowd was fired upon on 2 June, but is unclear whether the Presidium members, in 
Novocherkassk or in Moscow, or circumstances on Lenin square, led to that course of action 
being taken.
 Officers are trained to follow the military chain of command.  Thus it follows that orders 
directly given to military commanders on the ground by CPSU leaders were not followed.  Those 
orders were followed once they were relayed to those same officers from Marshal Malinovskii 
and the Ministry of Defence.  Resistance of provincial Party officials by the military was logical; 
but one those orders came from the military chain of command in Moscow, they were followed.  
Officers made decisions to followed those orders but in their own fashion, which is illustrated 
below by General Matvei Shaposhnikov and his dealings with the crowds crossing the Tuzlov 
Bridge on 2 June.  General of the Army, Issa Pliyev, commander of the NCMD, made sure to 
follow the chain of command from Moscow.  In this chapter and the following it will be argued 
that Pliyev’s handling of the Novocherkassk situation was a prime reason he was given overall 
command for Soviet Group of Forces sent to Cuba that same year.  Despite a more experienced 
officer, especially when dealing with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, available to take 
overall command, Khrushchev entrusted the Cuba military gambit to Pliyev, a friend from 
WWII, and someone he had trusted after Novocherkassk. 
The second question that this chapter addresses is the development of military 
professionalism within the Soviet Armed Forces and the impact of this on the actions of the 
Soviet military during the events in Novocherkassk. Did the actions of Soviet army officers 
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represent their understanding of military professionalism? Had the Soviet armed forces 
developed a strong sense of professionalism, with the military as a professional caste, since the 
death Stalin?  During the Khrushchev era, military officers increasingly felt a strong sense of 
esprit de corps.  A more cohesive command structure was able to voice the military’s purviews 
and walk a fine line in civil-military relations.
In a study published in 1983, William Fuller Jr., stated that the Soviet army was not 
assigned the duty to control internal disputes that arose between the CPSU and the Soviet 
government on one hand and the population on the other. He does, however, state that the 
internal troops of the MVD were tasked with carrying out an internal function ‘relating to the 
control of dissatisfied elements in the population.’1 Contrary to the work of Fuller is that of 
William Odom, specialist in civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. Odom, in his work on 
the disintegration of the Soviet armed forces, states that, ‘during the entire post-1945 period, the 
Soviet military conducted combat operations almost exclusively against the peoples inside the 
Soviet camp,' and that an integral function of the regular military was the ‘maintenance of 
communist parties’ rule in countries where they already held power.'2  Odom continues to state 
that the Soviet army was used as reinforcement for the internal troops of the MVD to put down 
domestic uprisings and protests in the USSR, giving as an example Novocherkassk in 1962.3  
Odom argued that the primary function was to maintain the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe 
as can be seen in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.  Internally, Odom argued that 
the Soviet military was used secondary to the MVD, only if needed.  Mark Harrison supports 
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Fuller’s characterisation of the role of the Soviet armed forces.  During collectivasation Stalin 
and the OGPU knew an army of conscripts were not to be relied upon when it came to internal 
conflict with its own people.4
How to evaluate these studies, which show polar opposites on the role of the military at 
Novocherkassk, is the primary task of this study. However, pinpointing the exact role of the 
regular military at Novocherkassk is difficult. A primary hindrance to the study of the Soviet 
military is a lack of primary documentation, especially concerning the armed forces’ role from 
military sources. Therefore, military information has been accessed from those archives of the 
Communist Party and the state that are available for research. Given the current status of archival 
work on defence and military issues in the Russian Federation, it may never be possible to 
pinpoint exactly the role of the Soviet army during the Novocherkassk uprising in 1962.  
However, through those primary sources currently available, coupled with the secondary sources 
concerning the subject, the aim is to provide information about a period of Soviet history that 
warrants greater evaluation. 
Dilemmas arise when researching Novocherkassk.  Files pertaining to the trials following 
the uprising are easily accessible; however, those of the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff 
are inaccessible.  Documents that would provide insight into the operations of the Soviet armed 
forces in connection with the uprising in Novocherkassk have not yet been made available. The 
lack of primary documentation from the Soviet military is a problem when researching events in 
Novocherkassk; the problem will not be solved in the foreseeable future as access to this material 
remains closed. All information concerning the role of the military in Novocherkassk is in the 
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form given by those military personnel who were present in June 1962.  There is the possibility, 
however, that these sources are biased in order to skew the events to present the interviewee in a 
better light.
Secondary sources debate the role of the Soviet military in suppression of the uprising in 
Novocherkassk.  Two monographs which focus on Novocherkassk differ in their interpretations 
of the events and available archival sources.  Samuel Baron’s account is primarily based on an 
abbreviated, distilled version of the Chief Military Procurators findings from the early 1990s.  He 
unabashedly acknowledges his liberal, in a political sense, bias when researching and writing his 
account of Novocherkassk.  His research is supported by V.A. Kozlov, whose own work on 
uprisings in the post-Stalinist USSR has two chapters covering the events of June 1962.  Kozlov 
led Baron to several key sources for his own work.  Baron concludes that the military forces 
colluded with those of the MVD in suppressing the uprising, whereas Kozlov offers a different 
interpretation.  While Kozlov’s work reads as a fact sheet that the reader can use to formulate 
their own opinion of the events, Baron’s reads as a biased indictment of the entire Soviet system.  
Kozlov argued that the most thorough, yet journalistic, accounts from Novocherkassk during the 
late Gorbachev years are useful for historians but must be read with a judicious eye for the bias 
of those who have lived throughout the events or have been told of the events from firsthand 
accounts of those repressed.  Baron’s account uses those same sources to validate his 
interpretation of the events.  Below it is argued that while Baron has a grasp of events, his 
account is skewed by his own negative views of the Soviet system.
The Novocherkassk Uprising - Causes
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The workers’ uprising in Novocherkassk arose from a myriad of reasons. On 17 May 
1962, the Central Committee approved a Council of Minister’s proposal to raise the state 
purchase and sale price of basic foodstuffs, such as meat, milk and butter. Beginning on 1 June, 
the prices of meat and poultry were to increase by 35 percent, while the prices of milk and butter 
were to increase by 25 percent.5
Dissatisfaction with the decision was widespread throughout the Soviet Union. Leaflets 
circulated in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Chelyabinsk and Donetsk calling for workers’ strikes to 
protest against the price increase.  Students at Kiev State University protested, in solidarity with 
workers, against the price increases.6  As we know now, large-scale, and the most dramatic, 
resistance to the increase in prices occurred at the Novocherkassk Electric Locomotive Works 
named in honour of Budenny (NEVZ). The NEVZ factory employed 13,000 workers at the 
facility seven kilometres from the city of Novocherkassk, in the Rostov region.7 To make matters 
worse, on 1 January 1962, wages of the workers at NEVZ were lowered by 30 to 35 percent. 
This was due to an increased production target, meaning longer hours at the same pay.8 Workers’ 
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take home pay, or real wages, decreased as they were now expected to work longer and produce 
more.
The uprising in Novocherkassk lasted from 1 June through to 3 June. Local militia and 
police units arrived at NEVZ after a significant number of workers gathered in the main 
courtyard demanding ‘meat, milk and higher wages’. It was not until the evening of 1 June that 
the local militia, numbering approximately 220, arrived at NEVZ.9 They were turned away by 
the striking workers. Subsequent attempts by the militia and local garrison to enter NEVZ were 
unsuccessful, but thus far there had been no violent clashes between the local militia and police 
and the workers. The situation was greatly inflamed by the poor actions taken by the Party 
officials from the Rostov regional committee, the Novocherkassk City Committee, and the 
director of NEVZ, B.N. Kurochkin.  Speaking to the protesting workers at the factory, 
Kurochkin’s insensitive remarks fanned the flames of an already tense situation within the gates. 
A.P. Basov, the First Secretary of the Rostov regional Party organisation, merely restated the 
government decree on the price increases. These events sent the crowd into frenzy and sparked 
them to hurl objects at the balcony of the administrative building being used as a rostrum for the 
speakers.10 At that point the Party officials and administrative staff of NEVZ were captives 
within the administrative building. They were unable to leave through the ever-increasing crowd 
of workers.
The Role of the Soviet Armed Forces
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The role of the military during the uprisings in Novocherkassk began in the late evening 
of 1 June. General of the Army, Issa A. Pliyev, was commander-in-chief of the North Caucasus 
Military District. Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union, Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, on 
Khrushchev’s instructions, cabled Pliyev on 1 June and ordered him to ready his troops and 
concentrate them in and around Novocherkassk. V.A. Kozlov states that Malinovskii told Pliyev 
to: ‘Raise a formation. Do not use tanks. Restore order. Give me a report.'11 Pliyev and troops of 
the North Caucasus Military District arrived in Novocherkassk on the evening of 1 June.
Reports are varied on the interaction between the Communist Party and the military in the 
early stage of the events in Novocherkassk. Party officials made numerous calls to military 
commanders to bring forces to Novocherkassk. The calls were rebuffed repeatedly. Sergei 
Khrushchev writes that Rostov Party Secretary Basov called Colonel Shargorodskii and ordered 
him to re-impose order at NEVZ; Shargorodskii refused on the basis that he, and the military, 
were not subordinate to the provincial Party apparatus. Pliyev approved of Shargorodskii’s 
actions in opposing the orders from the Party. Only after the orders came from Malinovskii, as 
stated above, did the Soviet armed forces take action and move into Novocherkassk.12  Logically, 
the military were to only follow order passed down through the chain of command from the 
Ministry of Defence.  While the orders were the same, they followed the proper chain of 
command and communication to those officers in Novocherkassk.  The younger Khrushchev’s 
research, relying on primary investigation sources from the time, illustrates how the military 
chain of command was followed throughout the events in June.  Also illustrated in his work is 
186
11 Kozlov, Mass Uprisings, 239.
12 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2000), 497.
the role of Party officials sent to Novocherkassk from Moscow.  Andrei Kirilenko, member of the 
Presidium and First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk province committee, had been sent to 
Novocherkassk.  When orders had been sent to the military from Kirilenko and not followed, he 
telephoned Moscow before Malinovskii ordered the movement of forces to the factory.  Once 
again this illustrated that the chain of command was to be followed over the direct orders from 
CPSU officials in the city.  Commanders such as Shargorodskii relied upon the chain of 
command and not orders from the Party officials directly.  Below the same phenomenon will be 
explored in the case of Frol Kozlov.
Three thousand Soviet army troops arrived in Novocherkassk under the command of 
Pliyev. Immediately, the military took up positions at the gas depot, the city Party headquarters, 
police and KGB buildings, the bank, post and telegraph offices, and the radio station. General 
M.V. Shaposhnikov, Pliyev’s second in command, ordered a curfew for the city, and he posted a 
military guard outside of NEVZ. Accounts differ as to the willingness of the military to become 
involved in an internal dispute between the Soviet state and its population. Throughout the three 
days the KGB maintained that ‘officers and soldiers involved lacked determination and stood as 
if paralyzed.’13  V.A. Kozlov, S. Khrushchev, and Baron all give variations of the release of Party 
and factory officials at NEVZ.
On the heels of the arrival of the Pliyev’s forces, over a hundred KGB operatives came to 
Novocherkassk. The Communist Party leadership sent Colonel-General Pyotr Ivashutin, the First 
Deputy Chair of the KGB, to Novocherkassk with the operatives. It was their task to infiltrate the 
workers gathered at NEVZ and to gather information on the ringleaders, taking note of who was 
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making speeches, secretly taking photographs of those involved. The KGB operatives were 
dressed in plainclothes as workers.14  Reporting to the Presidium after the uprising, Frol Kozlov 
singled out the successful work of KGB Chairman Semichastnyi, Deputy Chair Ivashutin, and 
CC Secretary Shelepin in crushing the uprising.  No military officers were mentioned, which is 
telling in the reports to the Presidium on who was responsible for the successful repression of the 
workers in Novocherkassk.15
When the Soviet armed forces arrived at NEVZ, the Party bosses from the region and the 
city, along with the factory administration, were still felt trapped within the factory, unwilling to 
venture out of the administration building. According to the account by V.A. Kozlov, it was the 
regular military units, operating alongside members of the KGB and army intelligence (the 
GRU), who rescued the men held up within the factory. Late in the evening on 1 June five trucks 
with soldiers and three armored personnel carriers arrived at the gates of the factory. They were 
not there to use force to suppress the strike but to free the Party bosses. The army units stopped 
short of the gate and took the verbal abuse from the workers while members of the KGB and the 
GRU liberated the hostages. The units at the gates were intended to distract the workers’ 
attention while their counterparts safely retrieved the hostages without the use of weapons. At no 
point in this operation were weapons used against the hostile crowd.16  However, according to 
Sergei Khrushchev it was partly an airborne reconnaissance team from the 8th Division who 
successfully extracted the hostages from the administration building. Sergei Khrushchev goes 
further to say that those soldiers entered the factory in plain sight of the workers, who did not 
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molest them and let them carry out their mission.17  V.A. Kozlov and S. Khrushchev paint a 
similar picture of the military’s role in extracting the officials.  Each support the other in the 
primary details which allows us to say in all probability that the Soviet military provided the 
distraction for the real move to release those holed up in NEVZ.
Samuel Baron painted another picture of the events that led to the successful removal of 
the hostages from the administration building. According to Baron, orders were given to Pliyev 
from Kirilenko to send a force in strength to liberate Basov and the others from the factory 
grounds. Pliyev then ordered the commander of the 406th Tank Regiment, Colonel Mikheev, to 
go to NEVZ to carry out the order from Kirilenko. Thirty to forty troops accompanied Mikheev 
but were barred by the workers from entering the factory grounds. That contingent left NEVZ 
without incident. By the time another sortie to the factory was ordered by Kirilenko, under the 
command of General I. Oleshko, commanding officer of the Novocherkassk garrison, Basov and 
the other hostages had already been released by the combined operation of the KGB and military 
intelligence led by General M.V. Shaposhnikov.18 At that juncture, Shaposhnikov advised the 
striking workers to send a delegation to state their grievances and needs to the members of the 
CPSU CC Presidium who had arrived in Novocherkassk.19 Shaposhnikov was to play a key role 
in the events of the following day.
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The Role of Matvei Shaposhnikov, 2 June 1962
Shaposhnikov, awarded Hero of the Soviet Union for his service during World War II, 
played an integral role in the events of 2 June. Shaposhnikov was born in 1906 in Voronezh; he 
was university educated and had been a member of the Communist Party since 1930. He had 
been Deputy Commander of the North Caucasus Military District since 1960.  Shaposhnikov was 
a vocal critic of the policies of Nikita Khrushchev, both with respect to the military as well as the 
Party. Despite the suffering the Soviet officer corps endured under Stalin, he believed more than 
anything that the XX Party Congress had hurt the image and standing of the Party. Shaposhnikov 
was a popular Stalinist in that sense; despite this, he believed in the rehabilitation of Stalin’s 
victims.20  
Shaposhnikov became an outspoken political critic of Khrushchev’s military policies, but 
shown above he was also a critic of Khrushchev’s policies toward internal Party matters and 
ideology.  Shaposhnikov disagreed with Khrushchev’s military doctrine, specifically the sole 
reliance on strategic rocketry. He opposed troop reductions to the conventional forces, as well as 
budgetary and military expenditure cuts. He was of the opinion that nuclear weapons were 
nothing more than a diplomatic tool; perhaps in that respect he was very similar to Khrushchev.21 
An officer of Shaposhnikov’s stature, second in command of a provincial military district, did 
not have access to the CPSU and the leadership to voice his opinions and have his concerns 
taken up by the decision-making bodies of power.  While the commanding officers of the Soviet 
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armed forces were asked to provide authoritative opinions on the military to the CPSU 
leadership, Shaposhnikov was seen as a dissident at best, espousing judgements that should 
remained his private thoughts.
After General Pliyev was given command of the Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Shaposhnikov became Commander-in-Chief of the North Caucasus 
Military District. On Pliyev’s return, he reverted to his former position as Deputy Commander. In 
1966, he was transferred to the reserves.22  However, his misfortune was just beginning. On 7 
September 1967, he was indicted on charges under Article 70 of the Soviet constitution, 
concerning anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. The indictment stated that Shaposhnikov, in 
July 1962, had ‘prepared and preserved in his apartment an anonymous letter-appeal with anti-
Soviet content,' and that he circulated various letters of protest against the Khrushchev regime 
under a pseudonym.23 Only after an appeal to head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, were the charges 
dismissed, but the damage had been done. Hero of the Soviet Union, General M.V. 
Shaposhnikov was expelled from the Communist Party.
That first night, when Shaposhnikov arrived at NEVZ, he explicitly ordered those under 
his command to unload their weapons.24  There was to be no live ammunition. When General 
Pliyev arrived in Novocherkassk he told Kirilenko that the Soviet army had no role to play in 
internal disputes between the population and the Soviet government. Its sole mission was to 
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defend the Soviet Union against outside aggression from foreign foes. What was happening in 
Novocherkassk was the responsibility of the police and the MVD’s security forces. Civil disorder 
did not fall under the purview of the Soviet army.25 Both Shaposhnikov and Pliyev’s actions on 
the night of 1 June illustrated the mindset of the military. Military professionalism had 
strengthened. Although the Soviet armed forces were created in the October Revolution as the 
Red Guards, with the sole aim of usurping and retaining power, they had developed into a 
modern professional army. The Party’s hold on power was no longer in question, and the Soviet 
military strongly felt the time had well passed when it should be called upon to defend the Party 
and the state from an internal threat, especially at the height of the Cold War.26
Events of 2 June 1962 - Clear Orders to Suppress the Crowd?
It was in that mindset that the Soviet military operated throughout the Novocherkassk 
uprising. Shaposhnikov and Pliyev were foremost military professionals; both felt that internal 
policing was not within the framework of a modern military. Shaposhnikov was to play a key 
role in the events the following day, 2 June 1962. Still in the morning of 2 June, the soldiers 
posted at NEVZ, under the command of Shaposhnikov, did not have live ammunition.  However, 
192
25 Baron, Bloody Sunday, 46.
26 By June 1962 the decision to place medium and intermediate range ballistic missile in Cuba had been made. The 
largest Soviet logistical, highly secretive, operation since World War II was being organized and carried out as 
events in Novocherkassk unfolded!
forces posted elsewhere, both regular military and troops of the internal forces of the MVD, were 
given live ammunition on the orders of Frol Kozlov.27
The workers gathered at NEVZ on the morning of 2 June at 7:00 and were joined by 400 
workers from the Neftamash works.28 A decision was made that if the leaders of the Communist 
Party in Novocherkassk would not come to hear their complaints and grievances, then the 
workers would go to them. To reach the city centre the workers had to cross the Tuzlov River, 
which served as a natural border between the city and its industrial area. Estimates of the number 
of people marching to the city centre from NEVZ are anywhere from 5,000 to 12,000 citizens. 
The procession of workers, women and children has been described by V.A. Kozlov as a Leninist 
march; harkening back to the early days of the Soviet state to a more pure, untainted idea of 
Marxism-Leninism. Despite the column of workers marching to the city centre behind a large 
portrait of Lenin and red banners, the crowd became raucous and increasingly aggressive as 
drunks and loiterers joined the procession.29  Semichastnyi believed the workers marching 
toward the city centre were joined by anti-Communist agitators from Moscow and Kursk.30  
Vadim Makarevsky, a member of Pliyev’s staff, compared the procession to that of the workers 
marching on the Winter Palace in 1917; Baron compared the procession to that of 1905 led by 
Father Gapon, which ended in the events of Bloody Sunday.
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Shaposhnikov positioned his units on the bridge over the Tuzlov River as ordered to by 
Pliyev.31 He was not to let the procession move into the city and was to stop it at the river. As he 
had done the previous night, Shaposhnikov made sure that the soldiers and tanks on the bridge 
were armed but had no ammunition. Despite the presence of armed forces across the span of the 
bridge, the workers continued their march. At this point the soldiers could have acted forcibly to 
stop the demonstration; however, Shaposhnikov had no desire to use force against the workers.  
His order not to distribute ammunition is a testament to that. The workers moved in and about 
the soldiers and tanks making their way across the river and into Novocherkassk. They made 
their way through the shallow waters of the river or simply over and around tanks. At no time 
was there serious moves by the military to stop the procession even as workers climbed over and 
on tanks. The testimonial of one worker, Peter Suida, describes how individual soldiers even 
helped men and women climb onto and over the tanks blocking the way over the Tuzlov River.32 
Shaposhnikov’s reactions to events explicate the motives of an armed force cautious of using its 
power against its own citizens.  Those actions exemplify the ideas put forth by Harrison, and that 
of the security forces, themselves that the Soviet military was not to be used against an internal 
conflict due to the fact the military could not be relied upon when tasked with fighting its own 
population.
In Novocherkassk, the City Committee (gorkom) of the Communist Party had their 
offices in a building on Lenin Square. It was here that the final confrontation between the Party, 
the police, the KGB and the military was to occur. The Party leadership from Moscow, along 
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with Basov, were in the gorkom building. The workers had decided that if the Communist Party 
would not come to them at NEVZ to discuss their grievances, then they would go to the 
leadership. Once across the Tuzlov River, the demonstration turned towards Lenin Square. A 
small group of people, between 30 and 50, made the decision to go to the headquarters of the 
police and KGB, housed in the same building, to free the workers who had been arrested the 
previous night. E.P. Levchenka, a woman arrested on the night of 1 June, called for the workers 
to liberate their fellow workers from the police and KGB headquarters. Baron describes the 
events at the headquarters on 2 June; however, documents published in the early 1990s illustrate 
that already by 2 June those being held by the police and KGB had either been released or had 
been taken out of Novocherkassk.33  The misfortune of attempting to free workers who were no 
longer there had dire consequences and placed the workers and the Soviet army on a collision 
course.
Once at the KGB and police headquarters the workers continued to act very irrationally. 
The Soviet army had taken up positions in and around the key government office building, along 
with the 505th MVD Regiment, commanded by N.S. Malyutin. Worker Levchenka told the 
crowd that there was no chance that the soldiers could shoot all of the 30 to 50 workers 
converging on the building. The workers entered the building by force, as the soldiers fired a 
warning shot into the air. The troops inside the building fired another warning shot before one of 
the workers grabbed for a rifle. At that moment the soldier fired into the crowd. The workers fled 
into the courtyard, where more troops opened fire. In this exchange five workers were killed and 
30 were arrested.34 According to V.A. Kozlov, only one of the attackers was killed by the 
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soldiers. In all the confusion of these events, N.S. Malyutin defended himself stating that he 
never gave orders to open fire on the protesting workers, and once he got a handle on the 
situation ordered those in the courtyard to stop firing their weapons.
In all the confusion at the KGB and police headquarters it was difficult to ascertain 
exactly who began shooting. Was it the regular army troops from Pliyev’s divisions, or was it the 
internal troops of the MVD?  Sources given divergent views of who fired, but more importantly 
they do not agree as to who actually gave an order to use force, if indeed an order was given.  We 
can be certain that the incident was sparked by the forceful entry and subsequent behavior of the 
workers led by Levchenka. Loss of life had resulted, but the worst was about to happen on Lenin 
Square, where it has been estimated that from 50 to 100 people were killed when forces of the 
Soviet state opened fire on the crowd gathered in front of the gorkom building. Which troops 
shot into the crowd of thousands, not just workers, but their families, including women and 
children? Who gave the order to use deadly force? Did the order come from Moscow, from the 
leadership of the CPSU?  Did this represent Khrushchev attempting to re-establish a sense of 
control after the thaw following the XX Party Congress?
Close to noon on 2 June, tanks and personnel carriers of the 18th Tank Division were 
brought into Lenin Square. General Ivan Oleshko commanded these forces; he was commander-
in-chief of the Novocherkassk garrison.  According to Sergei Khrushchev, Oleshko, a former 
officer in the MVD, ordered the troops to form a semicircle between the gorkom building and the 
demonstrating workers.35 However, both V.A. Kozlov and Baron, as a result of their research, 
challenge this version of events.
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Baron states that Soviet army soldiers peacefully cleared the gorkom of any protesting 
workers. Then General Oleshko, not with regular army troops, but with 80 MVD internal forces 
soldiers, entered the square. They formed a semicircle in front of the gorkom building, and 
Oleshko took up a position on the balcony.36  V.A. Kozlov’s research has led him to a similar 
version of the events on Lenin Square. Under the command of Oleshko, MVD internal forces 
arrived on the square. Oleshko addressed the crowd, ordering them to disperse and return to 
work or home. One volley was fired over the heads of the gathered workers as a warning shot. 
Someone in the crowd on the square screamed, ‘Don’t be afraid, they are shooting blanks’.37 
After that was said, men from the crowd rushed towards the soldiers. Another warning shot was 
fired. A single shot third volley was fired directly into the crowd. Baron disagrees. He states that 
one warning shot was fired, and then Oleshko counted to three. On three, the soldiers under his 
command opened fire into the crowd and sustained their fire for three to four minutes.38 
However, Baron, through his research findings, has come to the conclusion that Oleshko never 
gave the order for the second, deadly volley of gunfire.39 V.A. Kozlov strongly stated that 
Oleshko never gave the order to fire into the crowd; he stood from his vantage point on the 
balcony of the gorkom building ordering his troops to cease fire.40
Sergei Khrushchev reiterates the position of V.A. Kozlov in his own work. According to 
Sergei Khrushchev, the soldiers fired into the crowd until they had spent all their ammunition, 
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but there had never been an order to open fire on the unarmed, predominantly peaceful, crowd. 
Kozlov stated that there was no evidence that the crowd moved forward to attack the soldiers or 
reach for their weapons.41 Conversely, William Taubman interviewed Vadim Makarevsky, an 
officer on Pliyev’s staff, who does give evidence to the contrary. Makarevsky told Taubman that 
the shooting was accidental when protestors on the square moved forward and grabbed for the 
soldiers’ rifles.42 However, central to this study is who fired those deadly shots: was it the Soviet 
army or the MVD internal forces?  Can this question be answered?
A recent fictional account of the events in Novocherkassk was written by Francis 
Spufford.  In Red Plenty, Spufford, based on secondary source research, paints a picture where 
Soviet army soldiers are on the ground in the square, while troops from the MVD are positioned 
on the roofs covering the square.  As the army soldiers fired warning shots into the air, the MVD 
troops fired down into the crowd, expending all their ammunition.43  Immediately before this 
happened, fictionalized army soldiers swear seeing plain-clothed MVD and KGB officers 
leaving the crowd.  While this is a fictional account, Spufford builds the scene around Lenin 
Square.  The reader can visualize the geographic and architectural feel of the square.
Roger Reese bluntly stated that internal troops of the MVD fired the deadly shots into the 
crowd on 2 June 1962. Further, Reese asserted neither Shaposhnikov nor Oleshko would have 
ordered their men to fire into an unarmed crowd of Soviet citizens.44 Baron offers two different 
scenarios for what may have occurred on Lenin Square. Captain V.P Chetverikin, a member of 
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the intelligence battalion in the 18th Tank Division, stated that some regular army soldiers were 
involved that day.45 However, Chetverikin’s post as an intelligence officer gives more support for 
a cooperative operation between military intelligence, the MVD and the KGB. Perhaps certain 
units, and even certain officers, were chosen to take part in the operation Lenin Square. Baron’s 
conclusion is that the KGB, the MVD and to a small extent the regular army carried out the 
operation clearing Lenin Square in front of the gorkom building.  Thus, the MVD and other 
intelligence agencies of the Soviet state played a much greater role than the Soviet army in the 
violent end to the uprising in Novocherkassk. The MVD and KGB sent divisions of internal 
troops and operatives to Novocherkassk. Evidence shows that MVD forces were on Lenin 
Square when the workers were shot. Officers and troops in the MVD were more predisposed to 
handling internal disputes of the state. It was their main function, unlike that of the Soviet armed 
forces.
V.A. Kozlov stated that the use of weapons was not motivated by any need for a policing 
action but was more a political necessity.46 This is certainly a valid statement, especially when 
taken in retrospect and hindsight looking at the whole of the Khrushchev era. Already by the 
early 1960s, Khrushchev had decided that de-Stalinisation had gone too far. He had lost control 
of it somewhat. Also, through de-Stalinisation, Khrushchev had lost the one tool the Soviet state 
used to maintain compliance with the system, coercion. Novocherkassk represented a re-
imposition of coercive measures. Dmitri Volkogonov stated that Novocherkassk ‘was the 
Stalinist accompaniment to Khrushchev’s reforms’.47  Nonetheless, there is an opaque sheet over 
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the events in Novocherkassk.  Uncertainty over an order to repress the revolt with force exists 
still.  While V.A. Kozlov and Volkogonov see a change in Khrushchev’s policies in 
Novocherkassk, Baron argued that those hard-line members of the Presidium in Novocherkassk, 
such as Frol Kozlov, likely ordered the use of force.  No clear consensus can be made to date.  
There is no discussion of the use of force, certainly no decision to sanction the use of force, in 
the Presidium minutes published in recent years.
There were many reports of non-Russian, non-Slavic, military units being brought into 
Novocherkassk.48 Certainly there were non-Russian soldiers in the North Caucasus Military 
District solely based on its geographic location. Further accounts by Boiter and Solzhenitsyn, 
cited by Charles Ziegler, tell of ethnic Russian, Slavic, troops brought in to Novocherkassk, after 
2 June, to replace the troops from the Caucasus.49 ‘Although the army could be relied upon to 
suppress revolt in the satellite nations of the Eastern bloc, its willingness to kill Slavic Soviet 
citizens was not assured.'50 Moreover, Suida argued that the soldiers at the police and KGB 
building and on Lenin Square were soldiers from the Caucasus and not of ethnic Russian 
origin.51 No longer could the Communist Party look to the Soviet armed forces to quell an 
internal uprising; no longer were the Soviet armed forces to be the coercive baton of Soviet 
power. 
By the 1960s, there was already widespread dissatisfaction within the Communist Party 
with Nikita Khrushchev. Popular dissatisfaction with Khrushchev increased at the same time, 
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especially after the incident in Novocherkassk. According to one report, for the citizens of the 
Soviet Union, Novocherkassk epitomized the failure of Khrushchev to forge an alliance with the 
masses, an alliance necessary to garner support for his ill-conceived reforms.52 By introducing 
the Soviet army into Novocherkassk, the Soviet government provoked a strong reaction from the 
gathered masses. Not one person gathered at NEVZ, marching over the Tuzlov River or gathered 
on Lenin Square believed that ‘their’ Soviet army would fire at its own people. V.A. Kozlov’s 
work on this aspect of the Novocherkassk uprising illustrates how the Soviet government 
predetermined the ‘socio-psychological’ shape of events in Novocherkassk.53
Up to 300 citizens were arrested in the search for the key individuals who led the 
protests. A few days after the shooting on Lenin Square, 146 ringleaders remained in custody 
awaiting trial. Found guilty, many were sent far from Novocherkassk. Despite amnesties earlier 
in the Khrushchev period, the penal camp system was still in use against peoples deemed to be 
politically harmful to the Soviet state. Those convicted of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda 
were sent to the Komi ASSR.54 Of the 14 who were brought to a show trial in Novocherkassk in 
the succeeding days, seven were given death sentences.55 To this day we do not have an accurate 
figure for those killed at Novocherkassk. Figures from the Chief Military Procurator’s 
investigation into Novocherkassk, carried out on the orders of the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies 
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in the early 1990s, state that 25 people were killed, more than 50 wounded, and over 20 more 
were injured in the rush to leave the square.56
Immediately after the events, Generals Shaposhnikov and Oleshko were not punished for 
any actions they had taken in the three-day uprising. As stated above, Shaposhnikov replaced 
Pliyev, when the former was given the post of commander-in-chief of the Soviet Group of Forces 
in Cuba.  General Oleshko was stationed to the Far East as a deputy corps commander. Later he 
went on to be an instructor at the General Staff Academy. 
Pliyev’s new command illustrated that Khrushchev was keen to promote mediocrity over 
experienced officers who had served with distinction in their commands.57  Pliyev was a 
controversial choice for commander of a Soviet Group of Forces, especially one stationed in 
Cuba, which resulted in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Firstly, Pliyev was an artillery officer by 
training. Fursenko and Naftali argue that he was given preference of command in Cuba because 
of his handling of Novocherkassk. Pliyev was also known personally by Khrushchev and the 
Minister of Defense, Marshal Malinovskii. Dmitri Volkogonov posited that Pliyev was a last 
minute replacement as commander in Cuba over P. Dankevich, who was the choice of the 
military high command for overall commander in Cuba. Volkogonov stated that was because of 
Pliyev’s role in Novocherkassk.58  Baron argued that posting Pliyev to Cuba was a way to 
ameliorate the public in Novocherkassk and the surrounding areas. According to Baron, public 
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opinion of Pliyev was that he was a murderer of innocent workers. Thus, Baron believed his 
move to Cuba was to appease the public.59
The local Communist Party and NEVZ officials fared much worse than the military 
commanders. Basov, the first secretary of Rostov region, was removed from his post and joined 
the diplomatic corps. On 4 June, Kurochkin, the director of NEVZ, was relieved of his post. P.A. 
Abroskin replaced him; Abroskin was director at NEVZ in the 1950s, he was well-liked, and 
worked for improvements in the conditions of the workers.60 For its part, the KGB laid the blame 
for the outcome of events at the feet of the Soviet military. One 4 June 1962, Semichastnyi 
reported to Khrushchev grumblings from the military. Semichastnyi told Khrushchev of 
‘unhealthy utterances’ coming from the military. According to Semichastnyi, the military were 
blaming Khrushchev’s cult of personality for the woes of Soviet society. Soldiers were overheard 
stating that under Stalin at least prices had remained stable if not reduced. Semichastnyi finally 
reported that the military were heard to say: ‘if the people were to revolt now, we would not try 
to put them down.'61  These were outright political statements made by the rank and file members 
of the Soviet armed forces.  Disenchantment with Khrushchev’s policies on the military were 
spreading from the divided officer corps in Moscow to those living barracks life.  The 
Communist Party leadership remained cemented in their position on the price increases.  The 
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leadership took no blame for what happened in Novocherkassk. Khrushchev blamed everyone 
but himself. He stated it was the ‘local idiots [who] started shooting.'62
The interaction among the top Party leadership in Novocherkassk can only be described 
as tense. There was a natural division within the group. Kozlov and Kirilenko were allied 
together in their almost Stalinist, staunch, conservative outlook on the situation in 
Novocherkassk.  Novocherkassk represented a clear problem of leadership in the USSR.  The 
CPSU Presidium failed to take a clear line of action.  One could argue that Kozlov and Kirilenko 
represented a ‘local’ focus of political power versus Moscow during the crisis.  Neither the 
members on the ground in Novocherkassk, nor those in Moscow, were providing clear guidance 
to a plan of action against the uprising.  When Frol Kozlov arrived in the city he took control of 
the Party apparatus, the militia and police, and believed he could control the army. However, as I 
have already stated, Pliyev and his staff ardently stood by their military professionalism and took 
orders only through the military chain of command, with Minister of Defence Marshal 
Malinovskii at the apex of that structure.63 Frol Kozlov believed force should be used to crush 
the striking workers back into submission. Sergei Khrushchev quoted Kozlov as stating that, 
‘weapons should be used. A thousand people should be placed in railroad cars and removed from 
the city.'64 As we can see from the interaction between Kirilenko and Pliyev on the first night in 
Novocherkassk, the latter was ready to use brute force to rescue the Party and factory officials 
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holed up in the factory’s administration building. However, according to Sergei Khrushchev, his 
father ordered Shelepin and Kirilenko to end the standoff with the workers through peaceful 
solution. Throughout the three day uprising, Shelepin and Anastas Mikoyan were the stalwarts; 
they were always looking for a peaceful end to the Novocherkassk uprising. Mikoyan wanted to 
go to the workers and discuss their grievances with them. Kozlov vetoed that move. There was to 
be no negotiation with the anti-Soviet agitators.  What is clear is that the decision-making 
mechanisms of the Presidium failed to function during the Novocherkassk uprising.
Military Professionalism
S.E. Finer, in his work on civil-military relations, wrote that military intervention can act 
against the wishes of the government, or the military may refuse outright to act when called upon 
by its own government. Being asked to fire against its own citizens, the Soviet army acted just as 
Finer predicted and acted against the wishes of the Soviet government and Communist Party.  
What is important to remember here is Finer is discussing the professional, standing army, as 
distinct from those forces of the MVD.  Reese states that Novocherkassk ‘reflect[ed] the growing 
professionalism of the army in that it rebelled against being used as a police force, and until the 
late 1980s the regime refrained from putting the army in such a position again.’65  For Finer, any 
society must be based on the premise of civil supremacy. As military professionalism develops, 
the military consciously views itself as servants of the state rather than the government in 
power.66 Certainly by 1962, the military viewed itself as a profession, a separate caste of Soviet 
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society. Marshal Zhukov had seen to it that this was the case, and his successors within the 
Soviet high command had continued that process. Above all the military was to fight a foreign 
enemy, not to act as an internal control. Finer went on to discuss the Soviet Union in depth, 
stating the Soviets were ‘extremely careful not to use the armed forces as an internal police 
force; instead it has established hand-picked troops, the MVD regiments, for all such repressive 
work.’67
Mark Harrison argues that the Soviet military was ‘naturally adapted to meet the foreign 
threat, while repression could neutralize the threat at home.’68  Since 1930, Stalin was against 
using the Soviet military for suppressing domestic uprisings and domestic enemies.  In decree 
no. 44/21 of 2 February 1930, the OGPU set out procedures for the “liquidation of the kulaks as 
a class” by arresting and imprisoning or deporting hundreds of thousands of people from the 
countryside.  It warned the local secret police organisations “in no circumstances to involve units 
of the Red Army in the operation.69  Thus, by calling for military intervention in Novocherkassk, 
the Party leadership in 1962 went against precedents set over 30 years earlier.  Harrison 
continued that Stalin’s reasoning was simple, the Soviet Army was composed of men and women 
from all strata in society.  Can they be trusted when asked to go into conflict with their own 
people?70  For exactly this reason, Caucasian troops under Pliyev’s command were not sent to 
Novocherkassk.  Stalinist dictum was half-heartedly followed; nonetheless, the military strongly 
believed internal, domestic threats were clearly outside the purview of its operating parameters.
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The founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir Lenin, agreed on the primary task of a regular 
standing army.  Lenin argued in 1903 that a Russian state ruled by social democrats needed no 
standing army for defence or protection. Lenin stated, “a standing army is an army that is 
divorced from the people and trained to shoot down the people.”  “If the soldier were not locked 
up for years in barracks and inhumanely drilled there, would he ever agree to shoot down his 
brothers, the workers and the peasants?”71  Writing in 1905, Lenin stated: ‘In every State, 
everywhere, a standing army serves as a tool against the internal enemy rather than against an 
external one. Everywhere it turns into a tool of reaction, serving capital against the toilers, a 
hangman strangling the liberty of the people on the gallows...’72  Prior to 1917-1918, Lenin had 
argued against a standing army and for the abolition of the tsarist Imperial Army. Nevertheless, 
once he had taken power with the Bolsheviks, he was a staunch supporter of a standing army 
because one was needed to maintain the sovereignty and security of the newborn Soviet state. 
Capitalism and imperialism were the enemies of the new Soviet state from which a standing 
army was to protect against. That threat had not passed in the 1950s and 1960s.  Only then, 
Khrushchev argued capitalist and communist societies could economically and culturally 
compete rather that by military means.
Khrushchev’s Cold War rhetoric made necessary a strong, modern, standing army. Lenin 
was opposed to the idea of a regular standing army used for the internal control of the state; thus, 
it was a founding tenet of the first socialist state, which Khrushchev, as an avowed pure Leninist, 
should not have forgotten and put the Soviet army in a position where it had to choose between 
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military professionalism and subservience to the state.  Lenin quickly saw the necessity for a 
traditional, standing army in 1917 to combat against the new state’s external enemies, as well as 
an internal security force, the Cheka, to fight against internal enemies of the Bolsheviks.
Stanislav Andreski, in Military Organization and Society, wrote that “so long as the 
government retains the loyalty of the armed forces, no revolt can succeed.”73 Certainly the 
uprising at Novocherkassk was crushed with violence. The Soviet armed forces remained loyal 
to the regime from its inception in October/November 1917 until the final day of the regime in 
1991. However, the Soviet armed forces became a strong professional military during the 1950s 
and 1960s. Released from the Stalinist stranglehold on military professionalism, the Soviet 
armed forces strongly believed their role was not as an internal policing unit but to defend the 
Soviet Union from an outside aggressor. The officers at Novocherkassk—Pliyev, Shaposhnikov, 
and Oleshko—argued time and time again that the military had no role to play in suppressing the 
uprising, even though this role was being thrust upon them by the Communist Party. 
Shaposhnikov’s individual action at the gates of NEVZ on 1 June, and at the Tuzlov River bridge 
the following morning, illustrated the lengths to which the military was willing to go to limit 
their role in the containment of the workers. Without Shaposhnikov’s actions, the death toll 
would have been considerably higher.
An interview with General Shaposhnikov was published in Komsomol’skaya pravda on 2 
June 1989.74 The interview caught the eye of the Dean of the Law Faculty of Leningrad 
University, Anatoly Sobchak. It was Sobchak and other members of the soon to be Congress of 
Peoples’ Deputies who called for a formal government investigation into the events of 
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Novocherkassk. The Chief Military Procurator’s office carried out that investigation. Despite the 
investigation being carried out during Gorbachev's glasnost’, the findings were inconclusive on 
this issue of which forces fired upon the crowd gathered on Lenin Square. The verdict, however, 
does place the blame for the outcome directly on the shoulders of Khrushchev and the Party 
leadership, as follows:
Materials of the investigation allow one to conclude that the decision made on the spot by 
members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU to use firearms was not 
agreed upon beforehand with Khrushchev. As already noted, initially Khrushchev was 
against the use of extreme measures. Then, as the situation deteriorated, he began to 
demand that order be restored by any method up to the use of weapons—however, with 
the proviso: if the government offices are seized.75
Thus, from the findings of the investigation, one can conclude that the use of force was approved 
by Khrushchev in the event that the government offices came under assault. However, the final 
decision was in the hands of the Communist Party officials, Frol Kozlov, Kirilenko, Shelepin, 
and Mikoyan. It was their decision when force was necessitated by the actions of the striking 
workers. 
 More strikingly, in all the reports sent from KGB Chairman Semichastnyi, there was no 
mention of military force being used against the protesting crowds.  His reports from the first 
two days were concerned with the size of the demonstrations and their actions.76  Semichastnyi’s 
reports specified numerous workers leading the demonstrations but never a military officer nor 
military response.  On 2-3 June, the KGB was aware of protests against the price increases and 
news that seeped out of Novocherkassk, which occurred in Moscow, Kursk, Riga, and Minsk.  
Amy Knight has done extensive work on the interactions the Party, the KGB and the military, 
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within a power triangle. Knight argued that the KGB acts on behalf of the government and Party, 
protecting it from society, while the military protects the government and population from 
external threats.  At the apex of the triangle is the CPSU. At the base, one corner is represented 
by the military and the other the KGB.77  The interaction along the vertices determines which 
agency is in favour with the Party.  Throughout the Khrushchev era, Knight saw the rise of the 
military at the expense of the KGB.  It was the purview of the KGB and MVD to carry out 
operations against internal threats to Soviet power.  Semichastnyi could only benefit from the 
security services’ successful operations in Novocherkassk.  How Shaposhnikov was handled 
after 1962 further illustrated a push-pull between the military and security forces.  In an 
interview with Augumenty i fakty in 1989, Semichastnyi argued that the KGB alone played the 
central role in the removal of Khrushchev from power in October 1964.78
Military professionalism achieved great status while Khrushchev was in power. However 
hard he tried to rein the military under the control of the Party, the military resisted.  Individual 
agents spoke out against the policies Khrushchev advocated for the military.  This chapter argued 
that while General Shaposhnikov disliked the use of force in Novocherkassk, he became a vocal 
critic of Khrushchev’s military policies, criticisms that led to his dismissal.  There is no concrete 
evidence to prove that the military did not play some role in the events at Novocherkassk.  We 
can argue that the MVD did participate in the shooting of Soviet civilians on Lenin Square.  
There has been no evidence to suggest who ordered the suppression of the worker uprising in 
Novocherkassk, nor if an order from the CPSU was ever given.  Sources given an unclear 
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picture, especially on the role of the Presidium in June 1962.  Dithering on the part of the 
Presidium created an opaque decision-making organ in those vital moments.  No clarity on 
control of the situation or what officials were deputized to issue direct orders from Moscow 
existed.  Despite this, there is enough evidence from participants, both military as well as worker 
participants, to conclude that the Soviet armed forces acted with a sense of military 
professionalism throughout the events of 1 to 3 June 1962.  Officers refused to issue live 
ammunition to their soldiers and even helped the marchers cross into the city.  Upholding the 
tradition that the military was to be used solely against external threat to Soviet power, the armed 
forces provided support and ancillary services to the main aggressor at Novocherkassk-the 
security forces of the MVD, GRU, and KGB.  However, Pliyev garnered support from 
Khrushchev.  Khrushchev choice of Pliyev to command all Soviet forces being sent to Cuba 
clearly illustrates the idea of the choice of personalities, the choice of agents.  Khrushchev chose 
a mediocre officer who was familiar with from WWII, and had fared well at Novocherkassk, 
over an officer with greater expertise in nuclear weapons and their attendant delivery systems.  
Novocherkassk charts the rise in opinions by the Soviet military, the rise in a sense of 
professional service, but also it showed how Khrushchev was willing to chose mediocrity over 
merit.
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Chapter 5: The Soviet High Command and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis
Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov divide the Cold War into two distinct phases. 
According to Zubok and Pleshakov, “the Cold War of bipolar brinksmanship had begun amid the 
blooming linden trees of Berlin in 1948 and ended in the green waters of the Caribbean in 
1962.”1  It was toward the end of first tense period of the Cold War that the world was on the 
brink of a nuclear exchange.  When Khrushchev sent nuclear ballistic missiles to Cuba, the 
Soviet military was called upon to carry out a logistical feat unmatched since the days of World 
War II.  This chapter discusses the motives for sending missiles to Cuba, the decision-making 
process before and during the crisis, and how and in what role the Soviet military, specifically 
the Soviet high command, participated in the decision-making processes of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis.  This chapter looks at the duties of military in their official capacity as consultants and 
advisors to the Presidium as well as their deference to political authority in decisions made by 
Khrushchev and the Party leadership.  Which participants of the inner circles of decision-making 
were selected and how was this decision made?  How involved were leading officers, such as 
Marshals Malinovskii, Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, and Matvei Zakharov, Chief of 
the Soviet General Staff?  The Cuban ‘gambit’ further illustrated the fractioning of the Stalingrad 
Group after the removal of Zhukov.  The cracks in the military leadership were created during 
the debates on military doctrine and strategy after the removal of Zhukov, and grew wider after 
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the 1960 discussions on further conventional military reductions.  To what extent was the Soviet 
military command consulted by Khrushchev and the leadership of the CPSU before and during 
the crisis?  Was the military command consulted prior to Khrushchev making his decision to 
send missiles to Cuba?  Finally, what were the commanders’ reactions to those decisions?  
The reactions of a minority of the Stalingrad Group were to question the necessity of the 
deployment; those questions led to two officers being dismissed and replaced with more 
compliant counterparts.  In the case of Marshal Moskalenko, questioning the rationale and 
feasibility of sending ballistic missiles to Khrushchev represented a political move by the 
military, and a line that was not be crossed.  Khrushchev understood Moskalenko had moved 
from advising to attempting to make policy decisions and replaced the Marshal with an officer 
that would carry out his duties to the Party and the state.  A sense of consensus then developed 
within the Ministry of Defence and General Staff.  
Throughout the development and implementation of the plan to station ballistic missile in 
Cuba, officers did voice concerns and express dissenting opinions.  It was the Party’s and 
Khrushchev’s reaction to any defensive or questioning opinions by military officials, which 
moved beyond a consultancy role that illustrated the idea of the selection of agents.  It also 
showed that the military command established Khrushchev, perceived to be compliant and in 
lock step, was not always in line with him.  The command group built by Khrushchev after 
October 1957 had indeed fractured.  Through the 1960s, as officers questioned his policies, 
Khrushchev was forced to change the composition of his military leadership.  While the 
structures, the Party Presidium and the military establishment remained in the same relationship 
their interaction changed as Khrushchev tweaked the leading commanders of the armed forces.  
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The political reactions to those opinions were telling as to how Khrushchev viewed the expert 
analysis and concerns of the military. 
By 1962, Khrushchev had successfully combined in himself the positions of First 
Secretary of the CPSU and Chairman of Council of Minister of the Soviet Union.  He had further 
strengthened his hold on the Party with his defeat of the Anti-Party Group in 1957, and tightened 
his control over the military when he dismissed Marshal Zhukov from his post of Minister of 
Defense.  In October 1957, Malinovskii replaced Zhukov as Minister of Defense of the Soviet 
Union.  The move against Zhukov showed Khrushchev’s attempt to rein in the military command 
after having successfully moved against the security services in 1953 and his detractors in the 
Party in 1955.  In 1962, Marshal Zakharov was Chief of the Soviet General Staff—a position he 
held since 1960.  Marshal Sergei Biryuzov commanded the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces 
(SRF), replacing Moskalenko in April 1962.  Khrushchev perceived the selection of Moskalenko 
as flawed by 1962 when the officer spoke out against Khrushchev’s plans.  The replacement 
illustrated the notion of the selection of personality on the idea of service to Khrushchev rather 
than merit in that Biryuzov quickly upheld Khrushchev’s ideas for Cuba.  These three officers, 
Malinovskii, Zakharov, and Biryuzov, were integral in the planning mechanisms of the Soviet 
military.  Together they had one significant similarity.  They all owed their postwar promotions 
and positions to the patronage of Khrushchev.  Malinovskii, Zakharov, and Biryuzov were all 
members of the so-called ‘Stalingrad Group,’ and in 1955, were promoted by Khrushchev.  That 
group of officers had served as military commanders at the battle of Stalingrad during World War 
II where Khrushchev served as a political officer at that battle and throughout the push from 
Stalingrad westward against the German Wehrmacht.  Relationships were molded then among 
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these officers and Khrushchev.  The reconstruction of the commanding echelons of the Soviet 
military after Zhukov’s ouster led to the “first truly homogenous group ever to rule over the 
Soviet armed forces.”2
Historians must not understate the importance of such a cohesive military establishment, 
which owed their advancement in office to Khrushchev.  Khrushchev, after the ouster of Zhukov, 
surrounded himself with competent military men, but they tended to be ‘yes-men.’  Khrushchev 
chose officers on the selection of personality rather than merit; he chose compliant officers 
whose counsel would support his machinations for the Soviet armed forces.  The example of the 
planning for the Cuban missile deployment further illustrates this position.  Little by little, men 
appointed by Zhukov were replaced with those from the ‘Stalingrad Group.’  Although militarily 
competent, men such as Malinovskii, Zakharov, and Biryuzov were intent on serving 
Khrushchev and maintaining their positions rather than serving the motherland in the Soviet 
Union’s best interests.  Consequently, Khrushchev was given advice by his commanders that 
they believed he wanted to hear in order to cement them in their positions at the top the military 
hierarchy.  It was out of personal loyalty rather than professional military expertise that 
Malinovskii, Zakharov, and Biryuzov counseled Khrushchev.  These officers’ counsel was 
skewed to support Khrushchev’s plan for Cuba.  With their military education and experience, 
which those officers forgot during 1962, they should have counseled against surreptitiously 
deploying missiles to Cuba.  However, at key moments in the crisis, dissenting opinions were 
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Administration of the Soviet Army—he served as a member of the Front Military Council at Stalingrad.
voiced from within the Soviet high command as discussed above.  Even Malinovskii was 
unwilling to escalate the situation as will be illustrated below.  In that way institutional lines 
between the government and its military advisors became blurred.
However, despite the cohesive command framework among the military command and 
Khrushchev, problems arose.  Roger Reese argues that “Khrushchev had a contentious 
relationship with the officer corps throughout his tenure as general secretary of the Communist 
Party.”3   Because he was committed to a peaceful foreign policy, détente, and a strengthened 
civilian economy, Khrushchev often was at loggerheads with his officers.  His policies called for 
a smaller military establishment; thus, pitting himself against the proud, patriotic, and dutiful 
Soviet officer corps.  Officers within the Stalingrad Group took positions against or supporting 
Khrushchev’s Cuban gambit.  Fractures that first came into view over doctrine and policies in 
early 1960s (as discussed in Chapter 1), broke open over Cuba.  Some officers sacrificed their 
careers for their sense of professionalism, while others were more easily persuaded by 
Khrushchev to disregard their institutional expertise, which was one of the key facets of 
professionalism according to Huntington.  Nonetheless, it was a sense of advise and consult.  
Khrushchev and the Party had already come to a decision on the deployment; the officers were 
consulted after the initial political decision and were given a task to complete, not questions 
whether or not it was viable.
The Decision 
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Why did Khrushchev send missiles to Cuba?  Since the Cuban revolution occurred in 
1959, the Soviet Union had been sending conventional arms, mostly via the satellite countries of 
Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Castro’s Cuba.  As late as March 1962, the Soviet Union was 
facilitating these sales as well as the shipment of other industrial necessities, such as stainless 
steel.4  However, in July 1960, Khrushchev spoke of extending the Soviet nuclear umbrella to 
protect Cuba.5  Although that was merely more nuclear boasting by Khrushchev, it was an insight 
into his future thoughts.  The deployment of Soviet ballistic missiles to Cuba was the most 
dangerous moment in the Cold War.  Zubok and Pleshakov argue that it was a possible bold 
stroke to ease tensions caused by the Berlin crisis and the strategic balance between the Soviet 
Union and the United States.6  Raymond Garthoff alludes to the fact that protecting the Cuban 
revolution was the main priority for Khrushchev.  Garthoff stressed the US-planned Bay of Pigs 
invasion and on-going US military exercises, while in Moscow the decision to deploy missiles 
was still being debated.7  Anatoli Gribkov, in 1962 an officer in the Soviet General Staff, 
believed Khrushchev’s decision was an “Old Bolshevik’s romantic response to Castro and to the 
Cuba revolution,” and “an old soldier’s stratagem for deploying Soviet force to defend an 
endangered outpost and ally.”8  Others see Khrushchev’s missile gamble as a quick and cheap 
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way to change the nuclear balance or strategic parity (throughout the chapter I will use these two 
terms interchangeably)—if not in favor of the Soviet Union, at least to lessen the widening gap 
between itself and the United States.9 
 Khrushchev, in his memoirs, wrote that the Soviet Union “stationed [their] armed forces 
on Cuban soil for one purpose only: to maintain the independence of the Cuban people and to 
prevent the invasion by a mercenary expeditionary force which the United States was then 
preparing to launch.”10  Khrushchev’s own words argued against those who suggested that the 
missiles were sent to Cuba to redress the strategic balance with the United States.  Khrushchev’s 
son, Sergei, argues that the small number of missiles and warheads deployed to Cuba in 1962 
were in no way an attempt to redress or improve the strategic imbalance.11
Moreover, writing to Kennedy on 18 April 1961, the day after the Bay of Pigs invasion 
began, Khrushchev stated that “any so-called ‘small war’ can produce a chain reaction in all 
parts of the world.  As for the Soviet Union, there should be no misunderstanding of our position: 
we shall render the Cuban people and their government all necessary assistance in beating back 
the armed attack on Cuba.”12  Khrushchev viewed the deployment of missiles to Cuba as a two-
pronged policy intended to redress the strategic balance as well as the only way conclusively to 
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protect the ‘gains’ of the Cuban revolution against what he perceived as the threat from the 
United States.  
When was the decision made to send missiles to Cuba and what was the role of the Soviet 
high command in making that decision in the spring 1962?  Sometime in April, Khrushchev 
thought about the possibility of sending missiles to Cuba.  At that point he began to solicit key 
members of the Soviet hierarchy to include Malinovskii.  In April 1962, while visiting 
Khrushchev as he vacationed on the Black Sea coast, Malinovskii reported on the strength of the 
US strategic nuclear forces, noting the disparity between the US and Soviet arsenals.  Both 
peered out over the Black Sea as the Defense Minister mentioned the US intermediate range 
ballistic missiles (IRBMs), US-designated Jupiter missiles, stationed in Turkey, only a few 
hundred miles from where they were standing.13  Turning to Malinovskii, Khrushchev said, 
“Rodion Yakovlevich, what if we throw a hedgehog down Uncle Sam’s pants?”14  For years 
Khrushchev had complained to US Presidents, first to Eisenhower and then to Kennedy, that they 
had surrounded the Soviet Union with hostile forces—namely missiles based in Turkey, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom and US ballistic missile submarines capable of launching against the 
Soviet Union.  Now he wished to return the favor and let America live with Soviet ballistic 
missiles on its own doorstep.  
Khrushchev believed missiles in Cuba might change the strategic balance.  By 1962, the 
Soviet Union had only a handful of ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) operational yet 
had a greater number of medium and intermediate range missiles operational.  Stationing those 
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medium and intermediate range missiles in Cuba, within striking distance of the United States, 
nearly doubled Soviet missiles capable of reaching the US.  While still visiting Khrushchev on 
the Black Sea, Malinovskii told Khrushchev that he and Chief of the Soviet General Staff, 
Marshal Zakharov, had discussed the possibility of deploying strategic weapons to Cuba.  
However, both believed that such a deployment was more a political than military question/
decision.15  That was the key understanding of these two officers, unlike Moskalenko.  They were 
tasked with using their military knowledge and expertise to implement a decision the political 
authorities had already decided upon.  They were not being asked on opinions or whether it 
should be done but to make sure they accomplished the task set to them.  That was a guiding 
principle of all civil-military relations, advise and consult but do not questions decisions already 
made.  Just as in the United States or the United Kingdom in the buildup to the second Iraq war, 
decisions were made and each military establishment was tasked with carrying it out and 
presenting their operational plans.  So it was in the USSR in the summer 1962.  Were 
Malinovskii and Zakharov showing deference towards Khrushchev and acknowledging his role 
in their advancement and promotions through the ranks?  No, Malinovskii and Zakharov knew 
how the Soviet system operated when making such bold, significant decisions.  Political, and 
thus Party considerations were of utmost importance.  All final decisions were in the hands of the 
political apparatus of the Soviet state—the Presidium of the CC, and thus Khrushchev.  Again, 
that deference was no different in western governments.  Political authorities made political 
decisions on when to use or deploy military power, and the military was tasked with following 
those orders.
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Khrushchev, consistent with military-budgetary decisions made since the mid-1950s, also 
believed stationing missiles in Cuba narrowed the strategic missile gap on the cheap.16  Missiles 
in Cuba carried the same strategic value as ICBMs stationed within the Soviet Union but at a far 
lower cost than the far more expensive ICBMs. The cost of deploying missiles to Cuba equated 
to about half of what it would to deploy missiles with similar payloads and targeting ability in 
the Soviet Union. 17
Prior to meeting with Malinovskii, Khrushchev had chaired an extended session of the 
Defense Council, in February 1962, while on vacation at Pitsunda.18  As a mixture of Party and 
military officials the Defense Council was the supreme body in military decision-making in the 
Soviet Union.  At Pitsunda, the Defense Council discussed the inadequacy of the Soviet ICBMs 
that were currently deployed.  Problems included long preparation times before those missiles 
could be readied to fire due to the nature of the highly toxic and corrosive liquid fuels and 
oxidizers being used in Soviet ballistic missiles.  While it might take over an hour for a Soviet 
missile to be readied for firing from the time the order was given, US missiles sat ready to fire at 
a moments notice due to more advanced technology including the US’s usage of solid rocket 
221
16 In October 1961, Deputy Defense Secretary of the United States, Roswell Gilpatric, gave a speech, which for the 
first time, publicly stated that a missile gap in favor of the Soviet Union did not exist.  Speaking to the National 
Business Council, Gilpatric stated that US “confidence in [its] ability to deter Communist action, or resist 
Communist blackmail, is based on a sober appreciation of the relative military power of the two sides.”  Gilpatric 
went on to say that the US “has nuclear retaliatory force of such lethal power that an enemy moved which brought it 
into play would be an act of self-destruction on his part.  The US has today [October 1961] hundreds of manned 
intercontinental bombers capable of reaching the Soviet Union…”  See: Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: 
Profiles in Power (New York: Touchstone, 1993), 246-47.
17 Zaloga, Target America, 199.  At the beginning of 1962, the Soviets had deployed only 4 operational ICBMs.
18 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2000), 468.  The Defense Council included Khrushchev, Frol Kozlov, Leonid Brezhnev, 
Aleksei Kosygin, Anastas Mikoyan, Marshal Malinovskii, Marshal Grechko, Army General Epishev (GPU), and 
Colonel General S.P. Ivanov (General Staff, Secretary Defense Council).  The Defense Council was a forum in 
which the Kremlin’s top political leaders met with senior military advisors; it convened irregularly, and as events 
warranted.
fuels.  Khrushchev’s question to his ‘advisors’ was how to overcome those shortcomings of the 
Soviet strategic arsenal.  Colonel General Semyon P. Ivanov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff’s 
Main Operations Directorate, served as secretary for the Defense Council.  As the spring 1962 
progressed, Ivanov served as the main link between the Defense Council and his Directorate, 
which was responsible for planning, in detail, the Cuban deployment.  Throughout April-May 
1962, the Defense Council continued to meet to hash out the question of sending missiles to 
Cuba. 
On 14 May 1962, Khrushchev flew to Bulgaria on an official visit.  According to Sergei 
Khrushchev, it was in Bulgaria that his father ultimately decided to send missiles to Cuba.  
Taking a break from an official meeting, Khrushchev peered out over the Black Sea from Varna 
on the Bulgarian coast toward the US missiles in Turkey.19  He argued that the missiles directly 
threatened the Soviet Union and were a thorn in his side.  Why not station Soviet missiles close 
to the US as they had done to the Soviet Union?  
That was the question Khrushchev asked his Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, while 
flying back to Moscow from Bulgaria.   Sergei Khrushchev stated that Gromyko supported such 
a decision, believing that the US would not risk war over Soviet missiles in Cuba.20  However, 
Gromyko expressed some reservations about the idea of a missile gamble in Cuba.  He told 
Khrushchev that he believed, “frankly that putting our missiles in Cuba would cause a political 
explosion in the United States.  I am absolutely certain of that, and [that] should be taken into 
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account.”21  Gromyko seemed ambiguous.  Nevertheless, when Khrushchev asked Gromyko’s 
opinion on the flight to Moscow, it was not so much to receive counsel before making a decision 
but informing the Foreign Minister that Khrushchev was about to announce to the Presidium a 
decision that he had already committed himself to.  Any reluctance by Gromyko had no bearing 
on Khrushchev whatsoever.  Perhaps that was Khrushchev’s way of telling Gromyko that it was 
going to be a difficult year for the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
The Plan 
After returning from Bulgaria, Khrushchev widened the circle of Party and military 
officials he ‘consulted’ about sending missiles to Cuba.  On 21 May 1962, the Defense Council 
was again convened in the Kremlin.  According to General Anatoli Gribkov, who in 1962 worked 
in the Soviet General Staff in the Operations Directorate under Colonel General Ivanov, that 
meeting was the first time Malinovskii, Zakharov, and the rest of the military high command 
were informed of Khrushchev’s planned missile deployment to Cuba.22  That is implausible since 
Malinovskii, at least, had to have some prior knowledge or inkling after his discussions with 
Khrushchev at the Black Sea the month before.  Nonetheless, at that Defense Council meeting, 
Khrushchev told his comrades of his intentions.  Soviet missiles in Cuba created protection for 
the island nation as well as strengthening the Soviet Union’s capabilities against the US 
mainland.  Ivanov remembered that the meeting did not go as smoothly as Khrushchev had 
hoped.  A long drawn out debate ensued.  Anastas Mikoyan, a longtime friend and confidant of 
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Khrushchev, opposed the stationing of missiles in Cuba.  Mikoyan believed the gains of non-
deployment outweighed the risks of deployment.  He also had prior knowledge of Cuba—its 
terrain, culture, and history.  Perhaps he knew that it was a simply unfeasible operation.   
However, in the end, the Defense Council instructed the Ministries of Defense, the Navy, and 
Foreign Affairs to “organize the concealed movement of troops and military technology by ship 
to Cuba.”23
Protocols required that the relevant governmental institutions manage the implementation 
of the Defense Council’s decision.  Before a final decision on the deployment was made, a plan 
had to be drafted and presented before the Presidium of the CC.  Colonel General Ivanov, as 
head of the Soviet General Staff’s planning directorate, was charged with planning the 
operation.24  Once Ivanov returned to the General Staff, he seemed unnecessarily agitated 
according to Gribkov.  From Ivanov’s notes of the Defense Council meeting, Gribkov was 
charged with formulating the operational plan for the deployment of medium-range and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles.  Gribkov worked with his two deputies, Major General 
Gennady Ivanovich Yeliseyev and Colonel Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Kotov.  Together the troika 
had to turn Ivanov’s notes into a formal General Staff proposal to Nikita Khrushchev.25
Malinovskii and Zakharov presented the General Staff’s plan, which Gribkov and his 
deputies organized, to Khrushchev and the Defense Council on 24 May.26  In a memorandum 
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from Malinovskii and Zakharov to Khrushchev, the General Staff’s plan was laid out.  The 
Ministry of Defense proposed:
• To deploy on the island of Cuba a Group of Forces comprising all branches 
of the Armed Forces, under a single integrated staff of the Group of Forces 
headed by a Commander in Chief of Soviet forces in Cuba.
• To send to Cuba the 43rd Missile Division (commander of the division 
Major General Statsenko) comprising five missile regiments: 
o The 79th, 181st, and 664th R-12 [SS-4] missile regiments with eight 
launchers each, in all 24 launchers.
o The 665th and 668th R-14 [SS-5] missile regiments with eight 
launchers each, in all 16 launchers.
• In all, 40 R-12 and R-14 launchers.
• With the missile units to send 1.5 missiles and 1.5 warheads per each 
launcher (in all 60 missiles and 60 warheads), with one field missile 
technical base (PRTB) per regiment for equipping the warheads and rocket 
fuel in mobile tanks with 1.75 loadings per R-12 missile and 1.5 per R-14 
missile at each launcher.27
The memorandum went on to state that construction of the launch platforms would take four 
months.  Along with the missile division, all necessary construction and support equipment was 
to be shipped from the Soviet Union to Cuba.  Shipments of military and support equipment 
were to begin in July in two phases—the first to be the R-12 regiments and the second to 
encompass the R-14 regiments.28
Deploying ballistic missiles to Cuba entailed the risk of shipping Soviet military 
technology oceans away, past NATO allied countries, such as Turkey and the United Kingdom, 
by way of the Turkish Straits and the North Sea respectively.  To protect military ‘investments’ in 
Cuba, the Ministry of Defense planned to send air defense forces and coastal defense forces to 
Cuba as well.  The anti-aircraft forces included two anti-aircraft divisions, to include six anti-
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aircraft battalions, one fighter regiment equipped with MiG-21s, and two radar battalions.  The 
coastal defenses sent to Cuba consisted of ‘Sopka’ missile launchers (three battalions) and 
missile patrol boats.29  Along with these forces, the General Staff recommended sending FKRs 
(frontal cruise missiles) to Cuba.    These cruise missiles had an effective range of 180 
kilometres, and were capable of being used against a threatening amphibious invasion force.30  
FKRs were also capable of being fitted with nuclear payloads.  The Soviet General Staff’s plan 
envisioned sending four motorized infantry regiments and two tank battalions to Cuba as well.  
Each motorized regiment was composed of 2,500 soldiers, and the tank battalions were outfitted 
with the latest T-55 tanks.31  
In total, the General Staff’s plan called for 50,874 Soviet military personnel deployed to 
Cuba.32  Malinovskii and the Soviet military saw the Cuban mission as a projection of Soviet 
military power.  The operational and logistical feats that were necessary to carry out the General 
Staff’s ambitious plan had seldom been seen in the Soviet Union, certainly not since World War 
II.  Logistically, the Cuban deployment was one of the Soviet military’s greatest 
accomplishments.  In sheer tonnage and arms, to include troops and support personnel, moved 
across vast oceans, the Soviet Union had never attempted such an expedition.33  Such an 
operation had to move with the utmost secrecy.  Despite having a high-ranking officer within the 
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GRU, Oleg Penkovskii, the US intelligence community was unaware until the U-2 photographs 
showed Soviet missiles already in Cuba.  At the height of the crisis, Penkovskii was arrested by 
the KGB on 22 October.  Before his arrest however, previous intelligence given to the US had 
allowed Kennedy’s national security team properly to identify the missiles.  Earlier in the year, 
Penkovskii had turned over manuals on the Soviet R-12 MRBMs to US and British intelligence; 
those manuals allowed analysts correctly to establish what the U-2 photographs meant.34  From 
other debriefings of Penkovskii the West learned that not all Soviet elites were happy with 
Khrushchev’s leadership.  Penkovskii reiterated to his Western handlers that some elites were 
saying, ‘if Stalin were alive, he would everything quietly, but this fool [Khrushchev] is blurting 
out threats and intentions and is forcing our possible enemies to increase their military 
strengths.’35  Cuba was a surreptitious operations; it would have been completed and presented 
as a fiat accompli had it not been for the US U-2 and the intelligence on Soviet missile systems 
passed on by Penkovskii.
Such was the plan presented by Malinovskii and Zakharov to Khrushchev and the 
political leaders of the Soviet Union.  Comments were made by Khrushchev; however, all 
present at the 24 May Defense Council meeting approved the operational plan put forth by the 
military.   The meeting decided to send a fact finding mission to Cuba, which had two main 
objectives—to discuss the deployment of ballistic missiles with Fidel Castro and to allow the 
military to assess the feasibility of deploying missiles and other military hardware to Cuba 
surreptitiously.
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Feasibility
Sharaf Rashidov, candidate member of the Presidium and First Secretary of the Uzbek 
Central Committee, headed the mission to Cuba in May.  From the military, Biryuzov was sent 
and tasked to decide if missiles could be deployed to Cuba secretly and camouflaged once 
deployed and operational.  Colonel General Ivanov, of the General Staff, was supposed to 
accompany Biryuzov to Cuba; however, it was decided that he was too busy to leave Moscow.  
In his place, Major General Petr V. Ageyev (General Staff Operations Directorate) and Lt. 
General Sergei F. Ushakov (Deputy Head, Air Force Central Staff) went to Cuba.  Rashidov and 
Biryuzov’s mission lasted two days—28 and 29 May 1962.36  While Rashidov discussed the 
details of the operation with Castro and looked for the Cuban leader’s approval to station Soviet 
missiles on his island, Biryuzov traveled around the tiny island nation deciding on areas to 
station the missiles and to consider how to camouflage them, thus disguising them from 
meddlesome US intelligence over flights.  The commander of the Soviet Military mission to 
Cuba, Major General A.A. Dementiev, accompanied Raul Castro to Moscow in July 1962.  
Dementiev had reservations concerning whether the missiles could be concealed.  Dementiev 
expressed great concern of overflights by US U-2 planes over Cuba; those flights, despite 
concealment, would make any deployment difficult.37  Biryuzov found that the missiles were 
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easily camouflaged, as coconut palm trees nonetheless!38  However, saving face for the military 
by placing blame on the Party, Gribkov stated that Rashidov, not Biryuzov, was the individual 
who mistakenly thought that missiles could be disguised as palm trees.  Gribkov saw Rashidov 
as a Party hack without the military knowledge or background to advise on such a sensitive 
issue.  Thus, the Soviet deployment of ballistic missiles was able to be carried out secretly.  Were 
Biryuzov’s findings entirely accurate?  How could a camouflage scheme based on tall, somewhat 
lean, palm trees conceal fuel trucks, command and support buildings, holding tanks, cables and 
hoses, and the concrete slabs shipped from the Soviet Union for the base of the missiles’ 
launching platform?  Two days of rushed meetings and reconnaissance produced a flawed study, 
which was presented to Khrushchev and the Presidium by Rashidov upon his return.39
Khrushchev wanted to present Kennedy with a fait accompli in November, after the 
Congressional elections in the United States.  According to Steven Zaloga, Khrushchev was 
convinced by his military advisors that missiles could be easily installed in Cuba surreptitiously 
without any US knowledge of Soviet actions.40  Upon his return from Cuba, Biryuzov briefed the 
military and Party officials on his findings.  Khrushchev believed that the missiles could be 
easily disguised as coconut palms as Biryuzov stated.  Sergei Khrushchev believes that his father 
was misled by the military on the viability of the Cuban deployment, on the chance of it 
succeeding secretly.41  It was left to the military to decide the feasibility of the operation.  The 
“military saw this as a task to be accomplished (for an objective they desired) rather than an open 
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technical question.”42  In other words, the military believed that Biryuzov’s mission to Cuba was 
a mere formality.  Sergei Khrushchev does place some blame for poor intelligence about the 
feasibility of the missiles deployment directly on Rashidov.  According to Sergei, Rashidov did 
not allow enough time for Biryuzov thoroughly to carry out the military aspects of their trip to 
Cuba.  Insufficient time was spent in gathering intelligence on the proposed missile launch pad 
sites.43  Returning from Cuba with a negative report on the feasibility of the mission was not an 
option open to Biryuzov.  If it was not feasible, then the military had to make it feasible.  Party 
officials did not come right out and tell the military that there were no options open to them; 
however, the Party did want the military to carry out the mission assigned to it regardless of any 
military concerns including the level of success.  Their task was to find a way surreptitiously to 
deploy missiles to Cuba.  Therefore, the Cuban deployment was a mission carried out by the 
military, in which the high command had no choice but to carry out the wishes of the Party 
regardless of their own opinions on the operation. 
Again, the question of feasibility illustrated the degree to which military expertise was 
supplanted by personal loyalty to Khrushchev.  The ‘Stalingrad Group,’ surrounding Khrushchev 
tacitly knew that the mission had to be carried out expediently and that it had to be 
accomplished.  Biryuzov and Rashidov (a Khrushchev political appointee to the Presidium of the 
Central Committee) returned from Cuba with the news that they knew Khrushchev wanted to 
hear and that guaranteed their standing in the Soviet system.
The cases of Marshal Moskalenko and Marshal Fillip Golikov clearly illustrate the limits 
to which Khrushchev was willing to tolerate any military opinions that differed with the Party 
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position on sending missiles to Cuba.  In April 1962, Moskalenko was commander of the Soviet 
Union’s Strategic Rocket Forces, a post he had held since 1960 and a post that was integral to the 
Cuban plan.  Golikov headed the Main Political Directorate, the Party’s control organ over the 
military.  During the military purges of the 1930s, it was Golikov who questioned Zhukov on his 
relationship with Uborevich and Tukhachevskii.  When Zhukov was dismissed in 1957, Golikov 
replaced Zheltov as head of the GPU.  In April, both Moskalenko and Golikov criticized 
Khrushchev’s plan for missiles in Cuba.44  It is still unclear why they were critical, but one can 
assume both officers understood the difficulties in sending nuclear weapons and their launching 
systems to Cuba surreptitiously and what the US reaction might be.  Nonetheless, Moskalenko 
was the commanding officer of the Soviet’s nuclear arm, and he understood the arduous task that 
the Soviet state was about to undertake. Khrushchev did not take kindly to unsolicited criticism 
of his plan.  Moskalenko was replaced by Marshal Biryuzov (from 1955 until his new 
appointment head of the Soviet air defence forces, see Appendix A), who was considered a “can-
do” man and who believed the covert missile deployment was feasible.45  Army General Epishev 
replaced Golikov.  Both Epishev and Biryuzov were members of the ‘Stalingrad Group’ and 
easily complied with the wishes of their benefactor, Nikita Khrushchev.46  Thus, Khrushchev 
strongly discouraged dissent among military commanders to his ambitious plan for Cuba by 
removing those who counseled caution.  The cases of Moskalenko and Golikov illustrated the 
fractures within the Stalingrad Group.  Those two officers fates also show the practice of 
selecting officers that comply with Khrushchev policies out of a sense of duty to retain their 
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posts.  Moskalenko and Golikov each were removed and replaced with other members of the 
Stalingrad Group but officers that did not voice concerns.  Not willing to bend to Khrushchev’s 
wishes, both were willing to sacrifice their careers rather than their sense of military 
professionalism and expertise. Alas, it was also insubordinate to question policies already 
decided by the Presidium.  Past experiences illustrate that without the questions raised, 
Moskalenko and Golikov would have retained their posts.  Both were members of the Stalingrad 
Group and had supported Khrushchev through 1962.  Moskalenko was who Khrushchev turned 
to in helping to remove Beria. 
Another aspect of the division between military officers was brought to the forefront over 
the decision to send submarines as part of a navy flotilla to Cuba.  Four Foxtrot submarines, each 
carrying a nuclear-tipped torpedo, sailed for Cuba.  On 23 October, Khrushchev was advocating 
that the submarines run the US naval blockade of Cuba.  Anastas Mikoyan opposed such a notion 
outright; he argued that it would be a clear sign of escalation on the part of the Soviets.  That was 
in addition to Mikoyan’s initial concerns of stationing missiles in Cuba as a costly gambit if 
revealed to the US prior to completion.  Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander-in-chief of the 
Soviet Navy, sided with Mikoyan in that argument.  Malinovskii supported Khrushchev and 
argued for the submarines to continue their mission towards Cuba and sail closer to the 
blockade.47  It was on Mikoyan’s suggestion that Gorshkov addressed the members of the 
Presidium and officers gathered.  Mikoyan knew that Gorshkov and Malinovskii were cordial 
with one another in the best of circumstances.  Once the Presidium heard from Gorshkov, they 
nonetheless supported keeping the submarines safely out at sea.  With Gorshkov providing the 
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superior naval and technical knowledge, Malinovskii was shown to be incompetent; thus, 
Malinovskii did not object to the decision made.48  This example provides another illustration of 
the division within the Soviet high command.  Gorshkov was an officer first, and he saw it as his 
job to counsel with the best possible knowledge and intelligence available.  Though his caution 
was not heeded by the Presidium, he did his duty as an officer by providing military advice.  
Unlike Biryuzov, Admiral Gorshkov was willing to be a bearer of bad news, upholding a 
standard of military service, thus, illustrating military professionalism.  By 1962, officers from 
the Stalingrad Group commanded key positions within the General Staff and Ministry of 
Defence.  While some of those officers supported Khrushchev’s ideas and policies over their own 
professional values, a number of officers saw it their duty to speak out against harebrained 
schemes, such as deploying missiles to Cuba.
Anadyr
Bureaucratically, the Presidium of the CC had to vote on the approved plan to deploy 
missiles to Cuba.  On 10 June 1962, the Presidium convened to rubber-stamp Khrushchev’s 
missile gambit.  Military officers, who were not members of the Presidium, acted as advisors at 
that meeting and presented the General Staff’s plans to the Presidium.49 The meeting was 
presented with the findings of Biryuzov and Rashidov’s mission to Cuba.  Now the wheels and 
cogs began turning.  Operation Anadyr, as the missile deployment was codenamed, began.  On 8 
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September 1962, the Soviet freighter Omsk arrived in Cuba with the first shipment of missile 
equipment.  The first nuclear warheads for the R-12s arrived onboard the Indigirka on 4 
October.50 
Before Operation Anadyr commenced, one final decision had to be agreed upon between 
the military high command and senior Party officials.  Who was to command the Cuban 
expedition?  Army General Issa Pliyev was given the command of the Soviet Group of Forces 
Cuba.  Why?  He had no prior experience commanding Soviet nuclear forces nor did he ever 
previously command forces of the RVSN.  Prior to his command in Cuba, Pliyev had only been 
known for commanding the Soviet troops of the North Caucasian Military District that were sent 
to Novocherkassk earlier that year.  Pliyev had been chosen to be given the command in Cuba 
over Lt. General Pavel B. Dankevich, who was a commander of the rocket forces stationed in 
Ukraine and Belorussia.  Secrecy was of utmost importance to Khrushchev; thus, he did not want 
someone associated with rocket forces to hold the overall command position in Cuba.51  
Malinovskii and his deputies in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff wanted the overall 
most competent and capable commander for the mission.  That would mean someone familiar 
with those forces being deployed, even if a RVSN commander might allude to the actual forces 
being deployed to Cuba risking the element of surprise.  With hindsight, Pliyev was neither 
capable nor competent to manage a Soviet Group of Forces; he lacked the necessary skills for 
handling the strong personality of Castro and was inadequate in his overall command of those 
subordinate to him.  According to William Taubman, Lt. General Dankevich was the choice of 
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the Soviet General Staff, but Zakharov and his staff had their man rejected by the Party.52  To 
carry out a mission for which First Secretary had great expectations, Khrushchev turned to his 
World War II comrade, Pliyev.  Whatever orders Pliyev was given, Steven Zaloga believed that 
I.D. Statsenko, commander of the missile division in Cuba, was the de facto commander of the 
Soviet Group of Forces Cuba.  Pliyev only had de jure command of Soviet conventional forces. 
 Once again, Khrushchev chose mediocrity over merit.  He chose a commander he was 
familiar with and had personal dealings with during WW II over a commander with experience 
in the field with ballistic weapons.  Selecting Pliyev further illustrated the idea of selecting 
agents that were compliant over those deserving through meritorious service.  Patterns are now 
starting to develop where Khrushchev has chosen officers less deserving of promotion over those 
with service and merit.  He has chosen officers to command posts whom he can trust and he feels 
can be controlled to a greater extent.  Perhaps his experience with Zhukov made him adverse to 
choosing based on merit.
Dissecting Khrushchev’s Kremlin office appointment log for 1962 showed no discernible 
patterns of meetings.  It shows that throughout the year he met with key members of the military 
and foreign ministry establishments.  Gromyko and Malinovskii were frequent visitors to his 
office.  However, after the top was blown off the crisis, Malinovskii and military officers became 
less frequent visitors.  Dmitri Ustinov, who was influential in the military-industrial complex of 
the Soviet Union, was a regular visitor to Khrushchev’s office in April.  While most of Ustinov’s 
meetings lasted no more than ten minutes, he would have kept Khrushchev apprised of industrial 
planning necessities for the deployment.  While the log of Khrushchev’s appointments does not 
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provide information about what was discussed at those meeting, it is an indicator of who 
Khrushchev was seeing throughout the year and how frequently from October onward, Party 
officials increased their visits.53
As shipments of weapons continued throughout the summer and into the autumn, further 
safeguards were taken to protect Soviet missiles then being installed in Cuba.  Not only were 
strategic nuclear weapons sent to Cuba, but the Soviets deemed it necessary to send tactical or 
battlefield nuclear weapons to deter and repel any invasion force sent against the island.  The 
General Staff’s deployment plan called for the FKR cruise missiles to be coupled with either 
conventional or nuclear warheads.54  
 In August 1962, Khrushchev had left Moscow for his summer holiday in Pitsunda.  It 
was there, in September, that Khrushchev decided to increase the protective security measures in 
Cuba.  While on vacation, he asked Malinovskii whether tactical nuclear weapons could be 
flown to Cuba.  Malinovskii responded positively stating that short-range ‘Luna’ missiles were 
able to be flown to Cuba.  However, the Defense Ministry cautioned against rushing tactical/
battlefield nuclear weapons to Cuba.55  Their caution was on the transportation of those weapons 
over long distances to Cuba from the USSR.  The Defense Ministry, despite its reservations, 
recommended sending one squadron of Il-28 light bombers, with six 8-12 kiloton nuclear bombs, 
and two to three divisions of ‘Luna’ missiles.  It was also recommended that the warheads for 
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those missiles should be shipped to Cuba.56  Khrushchev approved the recommendations of the 
Ministry.  Tactical nuclear weapons were to be sent to Cuba.
Who was to have operational control over battlefield nuclear weapons, weapons that were 
thousands of miles from Moscow’s direct control?  In what circumstances was Issa Pliyev to use 
those weapons sent to repel a possible invasion of Cuba by the United States.  Pliyev was to be 
given control to use those nuclear weapons in the event that communications between his 
headquarters and Moscow were severed and an US-led invasion had begun.  Contingency plans 
were created in case of such a change of events.  An order to that effect was drafted by the 
General Staff, which required the signatures of both Malinovskii, as Minister of Defense, and 
Zakharov, as Chief of the Soviet General Staff.  Zakharov signed the order, while Malinovskii 
did not as a precaution.  Only when the order needed to be implemented would Malinovskii sign 
it.  If invasion was imminent based on solid intelligence, Pliyev was to be given control of the 
tactical nuclear weapons under his command.57  After the escalation of the crisis, once the US 
discovered the Soviet strategic missiles, Pliyev requested the use of tactical nuclear weapons in 
the event of an invasion.  Both Malinovskii and Khrushchev disagreed with Pliyev and did not 
relinquish Moscow’s safeguarding control of those weapons.  Throughout the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, General Pliyev was categorically forbidden to order the use of nuclear weapons—whether 
tactical or strategic.
To illustrate the tense command authority situation in Moscow and within the Soviet 
forces in Cuba one has only to examine the situation surrounding the downing of Colonel Rudolf 
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Anderson’s U-2 over Cuba on 27 October 1962.58  Commanders of the Soviet air defense forces 
were no where to be found while Anderson was making his photographic reconnaissance flight 
over Cuba.  Who gave the order to fire SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) at Anderson’s U-2?  
A decision taken by two local Soviet commanders in Cuba resulted in the downing of the U-2.  
That decision was taken without orders from Moscow.  Major General Igor Statsenko, 
commander of the SAM sites in the eastern part of Cuba made the decision to fire on Anderson’s 
U-2 after clearing it with Lt. General Stepan Grechko, deputy to Pliyev.  Neither General 
Davidkov, commander of Soviet Air Defense forces in Cuba, nor Pliyev were cognizant of the 
decision prior to the SA-2 being fired at Anderson.  It was on the decision of Pliyev’s deputies, 
Grechko and Major General Leonid Garbuz, that Statsenko gave his command.59  The 
commander at the SAM site and his immediate superior, Statsenko, gave the orders to fire on an 
American spy plane.  A local commander escalating the crisis was a consistent worry for both the 
Soviet and Americans leaders.  What if the local Soviet commanders gave orders to fire tactical 
nuclear weapons or the strategic rockets on the island?  Safeguards taken by the Soviet Union 
prevented an incident such as Anderson’s U-2 occurring with nuclear weapons.  Command for 
the use of any nuclear weapons on the island was to be given only from Moscow.  Delivery 
vehicles and nuclear warheads were separately stored.  As stated above command authority of 
those weapons rested solely in the hands of those in Moscow—specifically Khrushchev.   
Sophisticated technology safeguards were not developed yet; however, unless orders came 
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directly from Khrushchev, through the Ministry of Defense, nuclear weapons on Cuba were not 
to be used or even armed and coupled with their attendant delivery systems.
Thus, the die was cast for the standoff that began when President John F. Kennedy 
addressed the American public on 22 October 1962.  The crisis began that day for the Soviet 
Party and military leadership.  The night of 22-23 October was a tense night for those in the 
Kremlin waiting to hear the US President’s words and what actions might be taken now that he 
knew the Soviet Union had installed nuclear missiles surreptitiously in Cuba.60  While walking 
with his son, Sergei, at their Lenin Hills home, Khrushchev received word of Kennedy’s 
upcoming speech and immediately called for a meeting of the Presidium, also inviting 
Malinovskii and Vasily Kuznetsov, deputy Foreign Minister, to the meeting.61
Response and Reaction
The Kremlin’s first thought on Kennedy’s speech was one of relief, because it did not 
mean immediate war.  Malinovskii’s assessment of the situation was, as of 22 October, the US 
was not yet capable of launching an invasion force against Cuba.  Malinovskii continued, 
cautioning against an accidental nuclear exchange.  Orders were to be sent to Pliyev putting all 
forces on alert, to include the tactical nuclear weapons.  However, after reading the entire text of 
Kennedy’s speech, the orders were not sent.62  Days later, on 27 October, Malinovskii sent 
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another order to Pliyev in Cuba: “It is categorically confirmed that it is forbidden to use nuclear 
weapons from the missiles, FKRS, and Lunas.”63  Command and control of all nuclear weapons, 
including tactical nuclear battlefield weapons, was solely in the hands of the Kremlin.  
Malinovskii’s latest order was sent once the Kennedy-Khrushchev deal, including the Jupiter 
missiles in Turkey, was firmly established. 
At the Presidium meeting, permission was granted to the Ministry of Defense to raise the 
level of alert and readiness of Soviet armed forces and those of the Warsaw Pact. Malinovskii 
ordered Marshal Grechko, commander of the Warsaw Pact, to “call together the officers of the 
countries of the Warsaw Pact and order the implementation…of measures to raise the military 
readiness of the military, navy, and air force of the United Military Force.”64  Leaves and 
furloughs were cancelled.  A transfer of troops from active duty to the reserves was canceled.  
However, no redeployment of forces within the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe occurred.  
While, readiness was increased, Soviet forces did not attain a wartime footing throughout the 
entire crisis.65
What would the Soviet reaction have been if the US had moved against Cuba?  On 22 
October, only the Foreign Ministry made any suggestion that a parallel move should be made 
against Berlin.  Vasily Kuznetsov, Gromyko’s deputy at the Foreign Ministry, suggested that 
Soviet pressure be leveled against West Berlin.  In front of the full Presidium, Khrushchev 
harangued Kuznetsov for such a dangerous statement.  Khrushchev chastised Kuznetsov for 
implying the Soviet Union begin another crisis when they had no way out of the Cuban debacle 
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yet.66  The question has yet to be answered whether the Soviet military command suggested such 
a move against Berlin or whether and contingency plans were developed for a military move 
against Berlin or Western Europe should the Cuban Missile Crisis expand into a shooting war 
between the Soviet Union and the United States.
The General Department archives contain daily reports of the military situation 
concerning East German and Soviet forces in Berlin dating from November 1961.67  Reports 
contained both the line of battle for both the Soviet allied forces as well as those of the United 
States and NATO.  All reports were cosigned by both Malinovskii and Chief of the General Staff 
Zakharov; however, at times reports were only signed by S. Ivanov from the General Staff.  The 
first report on 2 November reported on the overall strength of US strategic air power within the 
European and Far Eastern zones of operations.  Although dated only from November to 
December 1961, those reports show that Berlin was a concern; nonetheless, it had always been a 
Cold War hot point since the end of World War II.  Over the course of that period, the Americans 
had increased their air power by 20 strategic aircraft.68  Those reports followed the erection of 
the Berlin Wall two months earlier and the standoff between US and Soviet forces at Checkpoint 
Charlie the previous month.  Reports to the Central Committee illustrate the concern from the 
Ministry of Defence and the General Staff.  As 1961 came to a close, concern shifted to internal 
problems and across the Atlantic to Cuba.  
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If the Soviets did not link machinations in Cuba with a move against West Berlin, 
Malinovskii, along with Zakharov and Ivanov, kept the political leadership apprised of the 
military situation in Germany in October and into November 1962.  These were similar reports to 
those that followed the erection of the Berlin Wall.69  Malinovskii and Zakharov maintained 
close surveillance of NATO strategic airpower within West Germany.
However, the meeting on 22 October and Khrushchev’s reaction to Kuznetsov’s 
comments showed the leadership’s position on Berlin.  The military may have had a plan for a 
move against Berlin—merely a military operational plan, which was to show how a Soviet 
military force, could move against Berlin.  A plan such as that doubtlessly existed during the 
entire Cold War.  Nonetheless, a special plan seems never to have been outlined for a move 
against Berlin in response to a US move against Cuba during the Crisis.  Khrushchev’s barking 
harangue at Kuznetsov illustrated that at no time did Khrushchev, and thus the Party, feel it 
necessary to order the military to plan for such a situation.  This is an important aspect of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, and it is important to telling the military’s story of its role in the Crisis.  
Khrushchev did not tie Cuba to Berlin.  It was not a diversion but its own separate move in the 
chess game of the Cold War.  A feint tied to Berlin was not Khrushchev’s plan; thus, it was 
unnecessary for the military to work out a contingency plan against Berlin as a countermove to 
US action against Cuba.70 
After Kennedy’s speech, diplomacy won out.  The Cuban Missile Crisis ended without 
escalating into an all-out war between the Soviets and the US.  On 28 October, Khrushchev, 
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through his Defense Minister, Malinovskii, issued Pliyev with orders not to allow anyone near 
the missiles; to not launch under any circumstances, and not to install the nuclear warheads.71  
The Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba, allowing US military planes to inspect the 
removal by inspecting Soviet freighters with missiles uncovered on their decks from the air.  
Such a situation caused embarrassment not only to the crews of the freighters but to the Soviet 
military establishment as a whole.  Both Pliyev and Gribkov were recommended for the title of 
Hero of the Soviet Union; however, if awarded, Pliyev would have become a third time recipient, 
more than Khrushchev at the time.  Consequently, both Pliyev and Gribkov were awarded the 
Order of Lenin. 
Fallout and Repercussions
Anatoli Gribkov argued that before the August putsch of 1991, “Soviet political leaders 
made the policy decisions; Soviet military men, even if they disagreed, obeyed.”72  Steven 
Zaloga states:
Operation Anadyr was as much the military’s fault as it was Khrushchev’s.  Senior 
officers, such as Malinovskii and Biryuzov, had given him bad advice.  But it was 
Khrushchev who paid for their mistakes.  Although the armed forces do not appear 
to have played a major role in the 1964 coup to overthrow Khrushchev, it is quite 
likely that the KGB and Party conspirators knew that the armed forces would no 
longer support him as they had…73
243
71 Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev, 626.
72 Gribkov and Smith, 18.
73 Zaloga, Target America, 217.
While I believe that the Soviet military has to share some culpability in the Cuba Missile Crisis, I 
do not agree with Zaloga when he states that specific military leaders gave “bad advice.”  
Officers, such as Malinovskii, Biryuzov, and Zakharov, were given a task to complete by the 
Party.  They acted in their roles as consultants and advisors to the political authorities in the 
Presidium.  Let us remember that those officers owed their positions to Khrushchev, and they 
knew what had happened to Marshal Zhukov when he became ‘too independently-minded’ from 
Party discipline.  Khrushchev’s ‘Stalingrad Group’ advisors toed the line and counseled 
Khrushchev in the manner they did in order to retain their positions within the military hierarchy.  
Those officers carried out the tasks assigned to them by their Party and their government.  
Officers, including, Moskalenko, who voiced concern were quickly removed and replaced with 
more pliable men.  These officers did not toe the Party line and voiced military advice that went 
against what senior Party leaders wanted.  While the Cuban Missile Crisis did not erupt into war, 
it certainly was politics through other means.  The Cuban Missile Crisis was a political not a 
military gambit.  Even the military officers themselves realized that, as can be seen from their 
own words quoted above.
The military was perceived as a scapegoat by the CPSU leadership for a failed Cuban 
fiasco.  In all the speeches at the Party Plenum, held from 19-23 November 1962, there was no 
mention of the Cuban missile crisis, its outcomes, or what was to be next concerning Cuba. 
Khrushchev focused on the national economy, agriculture, and the upcoming changes in the 
Party’s structure.74  However, on 7 November 1962, during the parade to commemorate the 
October Revolution, Malinovskii praised Khrushchev in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis, 
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and added his endorsement of peaceful coexistence.  Malinovskii seems to be fulfilling a 
political role with those words.  The removal of the missiles from Cuba was an embarrassment 
for the Soviet military—one they would not soon forget.  Supposedly, on 12 December 1962, at a 
meeting of the Supreme Soviet, while Khrushchev was speaking trying to justify his handling of 
the crisis, 35-40 high ranking military officers removed themselves from the session in a sign of 
disapproval by walking out.75  That in itself, if it indeed occurred, was a strong gesture to the 
Party of the military’s disapproval.  Writing on the Cuban Missile Crisis while a senior fellow at 
the Brookings Institute, Garthoff cited an unconfirmed intelligence report as his source of the 
possible displeasure shown by the military at the Supreme Soviet meeting in December.76  Thus 
far, there are no reports to substantiate that intelligence report.  There were other signs as well of 
the military’s discomfort with the removal of missiles from Cuba.  Interviewing Khrushchev 
several months after the end of the crisis, Norman Cousins was told by the Soviet leaders that the 
Soviet military leadership interpreted the crisis as, ‘the biggest tragedy, as they [the military] saw 
it, was not that our country [USSR] might be devastated and everything lost, but that the Chinese 
or the Albanians would accuse us of appeasement or weakness.’77  It seemed from that interview 
the military’s concern was more concerned with fraternal communist reaction and the perception 
of weakness by a superpower when the Sino-Soviet split was building into a wide chasm.  
Despite a clear source from the military illustrating the frustration with the removal of weapons 
from Cuba, there are clear indications that displeasure was building against Khrushchev’s 
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military gambit and policies.  Even more important were the clear signs of significant cracks in 
the Stalingrad Group, created in January 1960 but widened by the winter of 1962-63.
Writing two months before Khrushchev’ removal, Marshal Sokolovskii urged greater 
study of the requirements for a conventional war.  Was the Soviet Union prepared to fight a local 
war that did not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons?  Sokolovskii insisted that the Soviet 
military must prepare for a protracted, conventional war.  He went as far as to state that the 
Cuban missile crisis showed the “insufficiency of a bare-minimum deterrent for a confrontation 
provoked by an adventurous gamble.”78  Across the armed forces, grumblings were heard from 
rank-and-file soldiers.  Soldiers asked how the Cuban gamble had served Soviet interests, and 
“what do we have in common with Cuba, why are we being dragged into this fight?”79  Above 
all, soldiers and conscripts, objected to the temporary cessation of discharges due to the Cuban 
crisis.  Malinovskii reported all of this to Khrushchev in October.
The military had served a consultative role in the Cuban Missile Crisis.  A plan that was 
doomed to fail from the beginning, even in the eyes of the high command, was approved in the 
belief that the CPSU leadership understood the Marxist-Leninist laws of social development.  
Secrecy was of the utmost importance for the successful deployment and stationing of missiles in 
Cuba.  Without secrecy, as we know with hindsight, the Soviet missile deployment was doomed 
to fail.  Biryuzov’s mission to Cuba in May was nothing more than a trip to the Caribbean.  
Whether he came back with a positive or negative assessment of the probability of sending 
missiles surreptitiously to Cuba was beyond the military’s purview at that point.  Khrushchev 
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was convinced.  Khrushchev only needed to ‘follow’ procedures to give the air of the 
deployment having been a collective, collegial thought process of all Party and military leaders.  
A sense of military professionalism can be found in the decision-making process of the 
Soviet high command during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  After the removal of Moskalenko and 
Golikov, the military commanded acted within their role of counsellors and advisors to the 
Presidium on military matters.  Officers close to Khrushchev advised him with information that 
supported decisions he wanted to make.  Evidence was skewed despite sufficient knowledge as 
witnessed in the case of concealment of the missiles once deployed in Cuba.  Moskalenko was 
opposed to the gambit and voiced his professional opinion to the detriment of his career.  
Fractures began to show among the Stalingrad Group.  Officers such as Biryuzov kowtowed to 
Khrushchev, while others did not forget their duty to both the state and the military post they 
held.  Even Zakharov became replaceable in 1963 when Khrushchev awarded the post of Chief 
of the Soviet General Staff to Biryuzov.  Pliability was a necessary trait to be retained in 
command posts in Khrushchev’s Soviet Union.
 The Soviet high command did play a role in the decision-making processes in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis.  That role was one of advisor and consultant.  The actual decision to send missiles 
was made by the Party itself, and was the brainchild only of Khrushchev.  The military was 
tasked with planning and implementing the deployment of missiles to Cuba.  The planning began 
in the General Staff through the early summer months up to the actual deployment of tactical 
nuclear weapons in September.  Nonetheless, there are many questions left unanswered as to 
what ‘planning’ occurred parallel to the deployment of missiles.    Only once access is granted to 
carry out research in the Ministry of Defense and Soviet General Staff archives will we gain a 
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greater insight into the role that the Soviet high command played throughout the buildup to and 
the progression of the Cuban Missile Crisis.  However, what is clear now is that Khrushchev 
removed officers who voiced political opinions during the crisis and replaced them with officers 
more prone to support his policies and certainly support the Cuban deployment.  Combined with 
the reaction to Khrushchev’s military policies first espoused at the January 1960 Supreme Soviet 
meeting, the Cuban Missile Crisis broke open the Stalingrad Group.  Factions formed supporting 
Khrushchev’s policies in support of their own careers and the Party leader’s patronage and those 
officers whose expertise and educations prohibited them from toeing the Party line and voiced 
concerns over policies and certainly hair-brained schemes such as Cuba.
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Conclusion
 Writing a year after Khrushchev’s ouster, Robert Conquest suggested that beyond the 
CPSU, only the military provided its members with a sense of professionalism and only the 
Soviet military could possibly challenge the CPSU for power.1  Only in 1991, in the waning days 
of the Soviet Union, did some Soviet military officers ally themselves with the anti-reform, anti-
Gorbachev members of the Party to attempt a coup against the ruling elite.  Throughout its 
history the Soviet military served the Party against foreign aggression.  Interactions between the 
CPSU and the Soviet military through the course of the Khrushchev era were marked by a steady  
development.  Despite tense civil-military relations, the Soviet military was able to become more 
professionally-minded during the Khrushchev era as compared to the Stalinist era.  Promoted by 
the Party to a degree, military professionalism was necessitated by the advent on newer, ever-
progressing technologies, which in turn required longer study to develop expertise on modern 
weapons systems and tactics.  Previous studies have characterised civil-military relations 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s at two ends of a spectrum.   Viewed from Kolkowicz’s conflict-
driven, zero-sum prism, or Odom’s cooperation-driven prism, civil-military relations in the 
Soviet Union go beyond just a characterisation of that relationship.  Why were military leaders 
and Party officials in conflict or cooperating?  For the duration of the Khrushchev era, civil-
military relations fluctuated between conflict and cooperation between the Party leadership and 
the leadership of the military; thus, Colton’s synthesis model has until now best explained civil-
military relations in the 1950s and 1960s.  
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 Those fluctuations were governed by the personalities of those in leadership roles within 
the Party and military.  More importantly, it was Khrushchev’s selection of personality, or the 
selection of agents, into command posts within the Soviet military which characterised the nature 
of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union at some of the most tense times of the Cold War.  
Those agents, Zhukov, Malinovskii, Moskalenko et al, acknowledged the domain they 
represented in the military and the limitations and opportunities afforded to those agents within 
the confines of structure.  Zhukov was enabled to become more politically vocal due to his post 
in the Presidium, as well as a key advisor as Minister of Defence.  Nonetheless, there were clear 
lines of demarcation between the purview of the CPSU and that of the Soviet armed forces.  The 
Party’s role was to develop overall military doctrine and strategy and then rely on the Soviet 
military to carry out those ideas.  The military believed it was the sole authority in tactics, 
training, military education, housing, and the overall well-being of officers and rank and file 
soldiers.  When those boundaries were perceived by either sided to be overstepped by the other 
then friction increased, sometimes to the point of conflict, certainly as witnessed with 
Moskalenko’s removal in 1962 when he spoke against a Party military, strategic decision that 
had already been made.   A strong, collegial relationship between the Minister of Defence, and 
top commanders of the military, and Khrushchev provided for a sense of cooperation in civil-
military relations as exemplified in Chapter two which examined Khrushchev’s and Zhukov’s 
cooperation concerning naval policies.  Conflict also drove that relationship when personalities 
were at odds with each other, as exemplified by military officers actions taken during the 
Novocherkassk uprising.  When conflict between Khrushchev and commander arose, it led to the 
replacement of that officers with someone who was more favorably predisposed toward 
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Khrushchev’s thoughts on the military.  That occurred with the removal of Zhukov in 1957, the 
choice not to replace Zhukov with Konev, and the replacement of Moskalenko (who was 
Khrushchev’s man in the removal of Beria) with Biryuzov.  
 One of the common threads that spanned the Khrushchev era was that military officers, 
even when perceived as more pliable by Khrushchev, remained military professionals.  Where 
military professionalism interfered with what he wanted, Khrushchev was able to replace officers 
with those he deemed more pliable who he perceived as more concerned with their careers than 
professional values.  Moskalenko was replaced by Biryuzov as commander of the Strategic 
Rocket Forces when Moskalenko offered a negative opinion of the deployment of missiles to 
Cuba.  Personalities drove civil-military relations in the Khrushchev era.  The personalities 
controlling the institutions better explain the driving force of the conflict-cooperation model 
rather than the institutions themselves.  
 As personality, and the selection of personalities by Khrushchev to command, were the 
driving factor in civil-military relations in the Khrushchev era, this study has concentrated on the 
role of those individual agents in key events during that time period.  Whether it was the primary 
leaders of the military, Zhukov and Malinovskii, or the Stalingrad Group, whose influence 
increased as Khrushchev consolidated power, if Khrushchev had a collegial personal relationship 
with those men, civil-military relations operated in a relatively cooperative fashion.  However, 
even as one of the most cohesive command groups was promoted to prominent leadership roles 
in the military under Khrushchev, his own policy initiatives divided the Stalingrad Group into 
two distinct cohorts.  As the fissures in the Stalingrad Group developed during the key debates in 
the 1960s on changes to military doctrine put forth by Khrushchev, those fissures widened and 
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deepened with the unfavorable, in the military’s opinion, end to the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
Officers such as Biryuzov and Chuikov were more conservative and more pro-Khrushchev.  
Those officers were conservative in the sense that they demurred to Khrushchev and supported 
his calls for military reform in order to advance their own careers rather than out of a sense of 
what was best for the Soviet military’s needs.  Those officers supported Khrushchev’s policies 
over military concerns.  Malinovskii was a moderate who put duty to the military above personal 
gain from blind support given to Khrushchev.  Moderate officers generally understood both sides 
of the military debate, knowing that they owed their post-war promotions to Khrushchev but 
strongly felt that their military training and expertise could not allow them to support policies 
perceived as a detriment to their role as defenders of the USSR.  In several speeches, outlined in 
chapter three, Malinovskii proved well-trained in the nuance of supporting both sides of the 
military argument - deferring to Khrushchev as Party leader but supporting the necessity of 
maintaining a conventional force capable of holding territory even in a future nuclear war.  
Grechko, Zakharov, and Krylov were moderate officers as well.  Those moderate officers were 
more hesitant to support Khrushchev for personal gain, whereas those more conservative officers 
were more willing to bend to Khrushchev policy goals.
 The debate on military strategy and doctrine ran the course of the Khrushchev era; 
however, it managed to severely split the Stalingrad Group of officers in the 1960s, especially 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis.  As we saw in the first chapter, one group was concerned with 
Khrushchev’s overreach into their perceived sole purview of tactics, training, and education.  
They were also concerned with the changes in doctrine that Khrushchev was espousing after 
January 1960.  Those concerns could be construed by the Party to be encroaching on their 
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purview over broad, big picture doctrine and strategy decisions of the military.  A more 
sycophantic group stood by Khrushchev despite policies that were against their institutional 
goals, while more professional officers publicly voiced their concerns of Khrushchev’s military 
policies.  Both factions agreed that their primary goal, or job, was the protection and defence of 
the Soviet Union from outward aggression.  Differences arose between the factions on what was 
necessary to complete that goal and maintain a strong defensive posture.
 Further illustrating the role of Khrushchev’s selection of agents was the tenuous alliance 
of convenient necessity between Zhukov and Khrushchev until 1957.  Throughout his military 
career, Zhukov epitomised a military professional, serving both tsar and commissar with 
distinction.  While his strong-willed, charismatic, and sometimes hot-tempered, personality 
caused friction among his contemporaries in the Party and the military, Zhukov strove to better 
the overall readiness, advancement, and well-being of the Soviet army.  He also felt strongly on 
the need to rein in party education and indoctrination within the military, which he believed was 
unnecessarily taking time away from military training.  His attacks on the GPU were a line that 
was crossed.  He had ventured into the purview of the CPSU’s control of the military.  As was 
stated in chapter two, Zhukov felt the need for Party education in the military was necessary in 
the 1920s but not in the 1950s.  It was Zhukov’s personality that caused cooperation and friction 
between the military and the Party leadership in the 1950s.  In the end it was Zhukov’s strong-
willed personality that put him on a collision course with Khrushchev and the policies he 
advocated for the military.  Khrushchev counted on the military’s and Zhukov’s support in his 
concentration of both Party and governmental power in one person.  Zhukov participated in the 
arrest of Beria, but he was not alone; as other officers played just as important roles as was 
253
witnessed in the case of Moskalenko.  Zhukov, again along with other prominent officers, wrote 
articles in support of Khrushchev’s military policies during the struggle with Malenkov over the 
leadership of the Party and military policies and doctrine.  As has been argued the second 
chapter, that was the extent of Zhukov’s political machinations.  While he did play a political 
role, it can be viewed as certainly for military and personal reasons.  Beria had harassed Zhukov 
into expulsion from Moscow after WW II; thus, the idea of a personal vendetta is not out of the 
question.  In supporting Khrushchev over Malenkov, Zhukov was supporting the Party leader 
whose position was going to best help the military.  Zhukov and other officers acted as a military 
political action committee against Malenkov’s proposed cuts and reductions.  In both scenarios, 
Zhukov had been co-opted by Khrushchev for the his support against factions in the leadership 
struggle, but when given the platform, Zhukov used it for personal and military gains. 
 The same argument has been made for Zhukov’s participation against the Anti-Party 
Group in 1957, just months before his own removal.  Although Zhukov spoke at the Plenum 
called to consider the motives of the Anti-Party Group, his primary role was one of transportation 
coordination.  Using military transport planes, Zhukov was able to move the Central Committee 
members from across the Soviet Union to converge on Moscow, where a group of CC members 
had already established their authority in personnel decisions over the Presidium.  An 
impassioned speech, harkening to the ideals of the Twentieth Party Congress, was Zhukov’s 
personal modus operandi of tacitly supporting Khrushchev.  Zhukov, and other officers, 
personally backed Khrushchev and his supporters within the CC over those attempting to remove 
Khrushchev.  As a Presidium and CC member he the ability to speak at those meetings and, 
along with the KGB, use his position as Minister of Defence in support of Khrushchev.
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 Where doctrine and military policies were concerned with the development and 
implementation of new technologies, Zhukov and Khrushchev were in basic agreement of the 
necessity of those quickly developing military technologies.  Zhukov supported the development 
of nuclear weapons and their attendant delivery systems, namely missiles, manned, strategic 
bombers, and submarine-launched missiles.  In 1955, Zhukov defended Khrushchev’s removal of 
Admiral Kuznetsov from his post as head of the Soviet Navy.  Kuznetsov advocated the 
maintenance of the Soviet surface fleet instead of Khrushchev’s focus on submarines, primarily 
nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines.  In other aspects of the debate over technology 
and doctrine, Zhukov veered from Khrushchev’s path.  It is true that Zhukov supported new 
nuclear technology, but he did not advocate the severe reductions to conventional forces that 
Khrushchev championed throughout his tenure.  Nuclear weapons did not negate the power of 
conventional land forces in an army, they merely changed the nature of the battlefield.  Nuclear 
battlefields still held a place for conventional arms.
 Civil-military relations throughout the Khrushchev era were affected by an ongoing 
debate over Soviet military doctrine and strategy, specifically the impact of quickly developing, 
modern military technologies on the modern battlefield.  Not only during Zhukov’s tenure, but 
perhaps even more tenuous after, the Soviet military and Khrushchev clashed over the impact of 
nuclear weaponry on Soviet doctrine and strategic thought.  Debated not only by military 
theorists and officers, but by engineers and politicians, the discourse was carried into the public 
sphere in newspaper publications as well as monographs.  The Soviet press, both civilian and 
military, first facilitated an ongoing debated during the internal leadership struggle until the 
removal of Malenkov from the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers in February 1955.  
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Khrushchev was supported by the Soviet military in articles published by officers who disagreed 
with Malenkov’s policies of refocusing the Soviet economy towards the consumer sector at the 
expense of the heavy industry and the military-industrial complex.  
 Once his political power had been consolidated in the 1950s, Khrushchev implemented 
reform with the Soviet military aimed at what he believed to be a revolution in military thought 
and doctrine based around nuclear weapons and their attendant delivery systems.  Throughout 
Soviet history military technology developments have been followed by a ‘debate’ on the effect 
of that technology of warfare.  From Svechin, Frunze, and Tukhachevksii to Rotmistrov, 
Sokolovskii, and Talenskii, officers have been at the forefront of that debate.  By the 1960s, the 
Stalingrad group of officers had become a stratified body.  Split over their perceptions on the 
future of warfare, specifically the need for conventional forces in a nuclear age on the battlefield, 
officers such as Rotmistrov, Sokolovskii, and Grechko argued for the maintenance of 
conventional forces as well as the development of the Strategic Rocket Forces and nuclear arms.  
Even Malinovskii, as Minister of Defence, supported those officers; even while he had to serve 
Khrushchev, Malinovskii often opposed Khrushchev's policy of sole reliance on nuclear 
weapons.  Khrushchev had elevated Malinovskii to head the Ministry of Defence precisely 
because he thought Malinovskii’s personality was more pliable.  Khrushchev believed that 
Malinovskii would have been more supportive of his military policies in relations to nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles.  Others officers, specifically Moskalenko, Chuikov, and 
Biryuzov, were more conservative, and they bucked military professionalism, ardently 
supporting Khrushchev’s policies and reforms on the military.  Khrushchev lost support for most 
of his policies and reforms he attempted on the Soviet military from officers and ministers alike.  
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Nonetheless, Khrushchev pursued policies that would put him on a collision course with an 
increasing sense of military professionalism among the officer corps.
 That growing sense of military professionalism reached a zenith throughout the events of 
1962.  While planning and making preparations for the Cuban missile deployment, Khrushchev 
and the leadership had to face growing popular resentment of their policies that reached a boiling 
point in June in Novocherkassk.  As with previous cases, Novocherkassk and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis illustrated the importance of military purviews and perceptions that officers were being 
asked to compromise their professionalism.  Issa Pliyev was given command of the Group of 
Soviet Forces Cuba over a more qualified candidate with greater knowledge of ballistic missile 
technology due to Pliyev’s conduct during operations in Novocherkassk.  Whereas Pliyev argued 
with Presidium members on the ground in Novocherkassk, he did not openly confront the ideas 
of Party control over the military and the military’s role in internal matters.  In Novocherkassk, 
Pliyev managed both officers under his command, who believed the military was above internal 
conflict, and those orders coming from Malinovskii to restore order in the city.  Novocherkassk 
was a prime example of the conflict between the Kremlin and the military.  The Party leadership 
wanted nothing more than the miltary to restore order to the city through the use of force.  
However, internal conflict was beyond the scope of operations according to military officers.  
Only foreign aggression, which threatened the security of the Soviet state, fell under the auspices 
of the military purview.  Officers who questioned the Pary and government’s actions or motives 
were replaced and more pliant officers were appointed in their place.  General Shaposhnikov 
questioned orders to use force against the civilian popluation in Novocherkassk.  After the 
events, he questioned the leadership and was subsequently arrested.  His perceived notion that 
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the military, as most officers saw it as well, was to combat foreign aggression, was put to the test 
at Novocherkassk.  Shaposhnikov forbade the use of force by the soliders under his command 
both at NEVZ and on the Tuzlov bridge the following day.  He did not compromise his military 
professionalism, but it did cost him his career in the Soviet armed forces.  
 Moskalenko and Golikov faced similar judgements when tasked to participate in the 
Cuban deployment, which they did not fully support.  In May 1962, each had criticised 
Khrushchev’s plans for the Cuban operation.  As was stated in the fourth chapter, both 
Moskalenko and Golikov were relieved of their command and replaced by Biryuzov and Epishev 
respectfuly.  Biryuzov and Epishev were viewed as more pliable, and supportive of Khrushchev’s 
outlook for the operations.  It was Biryuzov who, upon his return from Cuba, believed ballistic 
missiles could be easily disguised as palm trees.  Sergei Khrushchev argues that his father was 
led astray by the military during the planning leading up to the Cuban deployment.  Chapter four 
argues that the military did its uptmost to voice concern, which Khrushchev did not listen to.  
Khrushchev only wanted  to hear a military opinion that was in parallel with his own viewpoint.  
When conflict arose, and as strong personalities voiced concern, Khrushchev chose to ignore 
reason, and found cooperation with those officers he appointed from within the Stalingrad 
Group.  The buildup for Cuba and the discussions on feasibility have also shown the fractured 
nature of the Stalingrad Group after the 1960 Supreme Soviet speech by Khrushchev.  It was 
Moskalenko and Golikov, two members of the Group, who were replaced by two other members, 
Biryuzov and Epishev, whose loyalty to Khrushchev was stronger than their own sense of 
military professionalism.
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 In each chapter above, the conflict-cooperation model of civil-military relations has been 
re-examined with an emphasis placed on the primacy of the selection by Khrushchev of 
invididual actors and their personalities to command posts.  Khrushchev chose to elevate  
officers to leadership posts that supported his policies and those who he had a personal history 
with going back to the Battle of Stalingrad and the Soviet offensives toward the west beginning 
in 1943; his personal histories with officers became a necessity for promotion to command posts 
in the 1950s and 1960s.  Colton’s model of Soviet civil-military relations has been expanded on 
by placing the importance on the primacy of individual agents rather than institutions.  
Individuals, and their appointment to key military commands, have been examined to determine 
how conflict and cooperation drove the relationship between the Party and the Soviet armed 
forces.  Througout the 1950s an 1960s, the selection of agents was important to understanding 
how Khrushchev and the key military commanders worked together.  Disagreements occured but 
were over-ridden by the loyalty of officers.  Out of a strong sense loyalty to the state, who ever 
ruled whether tsar or commissar, the military served within their perceived operational 
parameters.  At the same time, where that sense of professionalism interfered with what 
Khrushchev wanted, as that Stalingrad Group fractured over supporting Khrushchev’s military 
reforms and policies, he was able to find more pliable officers who presumably were more 
concerned about their own careers than professional values.    
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Appendix A: List of Military Commands and Officers
   1953-1964
(* denotes member of the Stalingrad Group)
Minister of Defence
 1953 - January 1955: N. Bulganin
 January 1955 - October 1957: G.K. Zhukov
 October 1957 - March 1967: R.Ya. Malinovskii*
Chief of the Soviet General Staff
 1952 - 1960: V.D. Sokolovskii
 1960 - 1963: M.V. Zakharov*
 1963 - 1964: S.S. Biryuzov*
 1964 - 1971: M.V. Zakharov*
Commander of Soviet Ground Forces
 March 1955 - 1956: I.S.  Konev
 1956 - 1957: R.Ya. Malinovskii*
 1957 - 1960: A.A. Grechko*
 1960 - 1964: V.I. Chuikov*
Commander of Air Defence Forces
 1953 - 1954: K.A. Vershinin
 1954 - 1955: L.A. Govorov*
 1955 - 1962: S.S. Biryuzov*
 1962 - 1966: V.A. Sudets
 
Commander of Air Forces
 1947 - 1957: P.F. Zhigarev
 1957 - 1969: K.A Vershinin
Commander of the Navy
 1951 - 1956: N.G. Kuznetsov
 1956 - 1985: S.G. Gorshkov
Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces
 1959 - 1960: M.I. Nedelin
 1960 - 1962: K.S. Moskalenko*
 1962 - 1963: S.S. Biryuzov*
 1963 - 1972: N.I. Krylov*
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Commander of the Warsaw Pact
 1955 - 1960: I.S. Konev
 1960 - 1967:A.A. Grechko*
Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany
 1949 - 1953: V.I. Chuikov*
 1953 - 1957: A.A. Grechko*
 1957 - 1960: M.V. Zakharov*
 1960 - 1961: I.I. Yakubovskii
 1961 - 1962: I.S. Konev
 1962 - 1965: I.I. Yakubovskii
Commander of the Northern Group of Forces, Poland
 1952 - 1955: M.P Konstantinov
 1955 - 1958: K.N Galitskii
 1958 - 1963: G.I Khetagurov
 1963 - 1964: S.S. Maryakhin
Commander of the Moscow Military District
 1949 - 1953: P.A. Artemeyev
 1953 - 1960: K.S. Moskalenko*
 1960 - 1963: N.I. Krylov*
 1963 - 1968: A.P. Beloborodov
Commander of the Leningrad Military District
 1953 - 1957: M.V. Zakharov*
 1957 - 1960: N.I. Krylov*
 1960 - 1963: M.I. Kazakov*
Commander of the Kiev Military District
 1945 - 1953: A.A. Grechko*
 1953 - 1960: V.I. Chuikov*
 1960 - 1965: P.K. Koshevoi
Commander of the Baltic Military District
 1945 - 1954: I.Kh. Bagramyan* 
 1954 - 1958: A.V. Gorbatov*
 1958 - 1959: P.I. Batov*
 1959 - 1963: I.I. Gusakovskii
Commander of the Belorussian Military District
 1949 - 1960: S.K. Timoshenko
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 1960 - 1961: V.N. Komarov
 1961 - 1964: V.A. Penkovskii
Commander of the Carpathian Military District
 1951 - 1954: I.S. Konev
 1955 - 1958: P.I. Batov*
 1958 - 1964: A.L. Getman
Commander of the Far Eastern Military District
 1953- 1956: R.Ya. Malinovskii*
 1956 - 1961: V.A. Penkovskii
 1961 - 1963: Ya.G. Kreyzer
 1963 - 1967: I.G. Pavlovskii
Commander of the North Caucasus Military District
 1953 - 1958: A.I. Yeremenko*
 1958 - 1968: I.A. Pliyev
Commander of the Odessa Military District  
 1951- 1954: K.N. Galitskii
 1954 - 1959: A.I. Radziyevskii
 1959 - 1967: A.Kh. Babadzhanian
Commander of the Siberian Military District
 1953 - 1957: N.P. Putkov
 1957- 1960: P.K. Koshevoi
 1960 - 1964: G.V. Baklanov
 
Commander of the Transbaikal Military District
 1953 - 1956: Ye. G. Trotsenko
 1956 - 1958: D.D. Lelyushenko
 1958 - 1960: Ya.G. Kreyzer
 1960 - 1966: D.F. Alekseyev
Commander of the Transcaucasus Military District
 1950 - 1954: A.I. Antonov
 1954 - 1957: I.I. Fediuninskii
 October 1957 - December 1957: K.K. Rokossovskii
 1958 - 1961: K.N. Galitskii
 1961 - 1968: A.T. Stuchenko
Commander of the Turkestan Military District
 1953 - 1957: A.A. Luchinskii
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 1957 - 1965: I.I. Fediuninskii
 
Commander of the Urals Military District
 1953 - 1956: M.I. Kazakov*
 1956 - 1958: N.I. Krylov*
 1958 - 1960: D.D. Lelyushenko
 1960 - 1961: Ya. G. Kreyzer
 1961 - 1965: I.V. Tutarinov
 
Commander of the Volga Military District
 1953 - 1957: V.I. Kuznetsov
 1957 - 1961: V.N. Komarov
 1960 - 1961: A.T. Stuchenko
 1961 - 1963: I.G. Pavlovskii
 1963 - 1965: N.G. Lyashchenko
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Appendix B: Size of Soviet Army, 1950s - 1960s
Year Authorized 
Size of 
Conventional 
Armed 
Forces
Actual Size 
of 
Conventional 
Forces
Reductions 
(Carried out 
or Planned)
Size of 
Strategic 
Rocket 
Forces 
(RVSN)
March 1953 5,396,039 not available 600,000
August 1955 4,815,870 4,637,523 640,000
January 1956 4,406,216 4,147,496 1,200,000
January 1958 300,000
January 1960 1,200,000 not 
completed 
(included 
250,000 
officers)
43rd Rocket 
Army
50th Rocket 
Army
January 1962 43rd Rocket 
Army
50th Rocket 
Army
33rd Guards 
Rocket Army
53rd Rocket 
Army
Source: Size of the Soviet conventional forces were compiled from Matthew Evangelista, “Why 
Keep Such an Army? Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions,” Working Paper No. 19, Cold War 
International History Project, December 1997, p. 4-6.  “Zapiska G. Zhukova i V. Sokolovskogo 
v TsK KPSS o khode vypolneniia postanovleniia soveta ministrov sssr ot 12 avgusta 1956 g. o 
sokrashchenii chislennosti sovetskoi armii i s predlozheniiami po dalneishenm sokrashcheniu 
vooruzhenykh sil sssr, 9 fevralia 1956 g.”  Voennye arkhivy rossii, 1 (1993), 283.
Size of the Strategic Rocket Forces: Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces 
(Cambridge, MA; The MIT Press, 2001).  See also, http://russianforces.org. 
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Appendix C: Publications and Presentations from Thesis
“Georgii Zhukov- The Model Officer,” Association of Ethnicity and Nationalism  Annual 
Conference, London School of Economics, 13-15 March 2010 (to be published in a  
forthcoming issue of Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism)
 “Operation ‘Anadyr’ Der sowjetische militärische Führungsstab und die Kubakrise 
 1962,” in Krisen im kalten krieg. eds., Bernt Griener, Christian Müller, and 
 Dierk Walter, Hamburg, Germany: Hamburger Edition HIS, 2008.
“Personalities in Conflict and Cooperation: Civil-Military Relations in the  Khrushchev 
Era,” BASEES Conference, Fitzwilliam College, University of Cambridge, 29-31 March 
2008
 “The Soviet Military at Novocherkassk: The Apex of Military Professionalism in the 
 Khrushchev Era,” in Soviet State and Society Under Khrushchev. Melanie Ilic 
 and Jeremy Smith, eds. London: Routledge, 2009.
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